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ACC - anterior cingulate cortex 
ANS - autonomic nervous system 
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Post-EM - post-emotion manipulation period 
pSTS - posterior superior temporal sulcus 
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ToM - theory of mind 
TOSCA - Test of Self-Conscious Affect 
TPJ - temporo-parietal junction 
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Guilt in the Body and Brain: A Psychophysiological and Neuroimaging Investigation 
Melike M. Fourie 
 
Guilt has been described as a quintessential moral emotion with an important regulatory function 
for the individual and society. Few studies have, however, empirically investigated guilt, largely 
because of challenges associated with its real-time elicitation. I aimed to elucidate the 
physiological and neural correlates of guilt by developing two novel emotion elicitation 
paradigms. In Study 1, I examined the cardiovascular physiology of guilt and pride in 49 females 
to uncover physiological substrates underpinning these emotions‟ behavioural motivations. 
Although both emotions motivate prosocial behaviour, guilt typically inhibits ongoing 
behaviour, whereas pride reinforces current behaviour. To succeed in eliciting real emotions, I 
employed a novel social psychology interaction task. Results pointed to dissociable sympathetic 
activation during guilt and pride: Guilt participants experienced prolonged cardiac sympathetic 
arousal as measured by preejection period, whereas Pride participants experienced transient non-
cardiac somatic arousal and a shift to low frequency power in the cardiac spectrogram. These 
findings also supported their distinctive motivational functions. For Study 2, I developed an 
fMRI social prejudice paradigm using a modified version of the Implicit Association Test. The 
paradigm employed preprogrammed feedback, indicating either high or non-existent implicit 
prejudice, to elicit guilt and pride in 22 low-prejudice individuals. fMRI results indicated that the 
current experience of guilt was associated with increased activity in anterior paralimbic 
structures (anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula), as well as in areas associated with 
mentalising (medial frontal cortex, posterior cingulate, and precuneus). No significant activations 
were observed for the pride condition. Significant negative correlations between self-reports of 
guilt and neural activity were also observed in the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex and right 
posterior insula. These findings may reflect either decreased vagal efference during guilt, or 
individual differences in a regulatory response to block affective pain. Both studies confirmed 
that guilt may be reliably elicited with real-time laboratory paradigms. In addition, acute guilt‟s 
prominent association with higher self-reported Behavioural Inhibition System sensitivity and 
conflict-related supragenual anterior cingulate cortex activity provide support for its function as 














The aim of this thesis was twofold: First, I wanted to demonstrate that guilt may be 
elicited reliably and measured in real-time through carefully developed  emotion elicitation 
paradigms. Such an approach may be particularly informative because the data obtained would 
be more ecologically valid than those from, for instance, questionnaire measures typically 
employed. Second, because guilt is such an important moral emotion, I wanted to characterize its 
biological substrates to inform our current understanding of the motivational function of this 
emotion. The studies in this thesis were therefore designed to systematically explore the 
construct of guilt, at both physiological and neural levels.  
 Neuroscientists have not always considered the inner landscape of feeling states and 
consciousness as suitable topics for rigorous empirical research; such subjective matters were 
typically placed in the realm of psychoanalysis and related disciplines (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). 
In recent years, however, this situation has changed dramatically, with interest in emotion and 
affective phenomena assuming center stage in many leading neuroscientific laboratories around 
the world. Despite this growing interest, the complexities of conducting research in emotion are 
considerable, most often requiring highly specialized designs and instrumentation along with 
complex data analytic and methodological challenges, including effective emotion induction 
procedures  (Coan & Allen, 2007). Emotion researchers striving for a complete understanding of 
any emotional process are therefore faced with significant challenges.   
By far the majority of studies in affective neuroscience to date have investigated basic 
emotion phenomena, perhaps because such emotions are easier to elicit and detect (by way of 
facial expression), and can also be studied in animals. In the last decade, however, the spotlight 
has turned to the moral emotions to refine our understanding of the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms that underlie moral behaviour (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, & 
Zahn, 2008). In this regard, converging evidence indicates that moral intuitions (including moral 
emotions) are instant feelings that directly influence moral judgments and behaviour (Damasio, 
1994; Haidt, 2001). Moral judgment is therefore the result of quick and automatic affective 
processes, rather than of slow and effortful moral reasoning. 
Guilt has been described as a quintessential moral emotion. It is associated with the belief 
that you have harmed another person and should have thought, felt, or acted differently (Kubany 












between right and wrong (Kroll & Egan, 2004). Several pitfalls have, however, halted its 
empirical investigation. Most notably, the problem of eliciting and measuring authentic guilt in 
the laboratory presents a real challenge. To date, no consensus exists in the literature as to the 
factors necessary or sufficient to provoke guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). It is 
a complex social emotion that naturally arises in complex social interactions; situations that 
provoke guilt may therefore also elicit other negative emotions. Deception may furthermore be 
necessary in experimental designs of guilt elicitation to evoke an intense emotional experience, 
which in turn raises ethical concerns (Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Zinner, 2007).  
Despite these difficulties, the empirical investigation of guilt merits investigation because 
of its prevalence in healthy people and its association with various neurological and psychiatric 
disorders. Impaired processing of guilt may, for example, lead to amoral or socially inappropriate 
behaviours, such as those observed in antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy (Blair, 
1995; Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003), as well as neuropsychiatric disorders, including 
frontotemporal dementia and frontal lobe lesions (Krajbich, Adolphs, Tranel, Denburg, & 
Camerer, 2009; Sturm, Ascher, Miller, & Levenson, 2008). Excessive guilt, on the other hand, 
has been associated with depressive episodes (O'Connor, Berry, Weiss, & Gilbert, 2002), anxiety 
disorders (Henning & Frueh, 1997), and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Lewis, 1971; Rachman, 
1993).  
Empirically disentangling the biological substrates of important moral emotions, e.g., 
guilt, both physiologically and neurally, could pave the way toward elucidating the mechanisms 
that underlie moral behaviour, and will advance our understanding of the impact these emotions 
have on our physical and mental well-being. Such an integrative approach may also foster the 
synthesis of experimental findings across disciplines. Because autonomic nervous system (ANS) 
activity is an intrinsic aspect of all emotional responses, the first study in this thesis was designed 
to elicit and measure physiological responses associated with guilt, with pride serving as a 
contrasting moral emotion. The second study employed functional neuroimaging (fMRI) to 
investigate the biological correlates of guilt and pride at a neural level. Both paradigms were 
designed with the aim of improving on previous investigations, and, in particular, to elicit current 
emotions relevant to the individual rather than drawing on hypothetical or remembered 













Affective neuroscience is currently one of the most fast-developing and ground-breaking 
areas of scientific enquiry. Yet, the phenomenon at the heart of this field of study, and implicated 
in nearly all psychological phenomena, including cognition, memory, perception, and decision-
making, remains strangely ill-defined: What exactly constitutes an emotion (Gross, 2010; Lang, 
2010)? Across diverse theories, there is some common agreement that emotions may be defined 
as complex phenomena that consist of coordinated but dissociable subjective, cognitive, 
physiological, and expressive components that propel us into action and guide goal-directed 
behaviour. 
Within the affective world, however, emotion phenomena may range from reflex-like 
impulses that occur under the cognitive radar (e.g., an unconditioned fear response), to more 
complex affective states that require higher-order processing of the environment, self, others, and 
social standards (e.g., embarrassment). In addition, the time course of affective phenomena may 
range from momentary emotional reactions, to moods, which last for hours or days, to emotional 
traits, and, finally to emotional disorders (Ekman, 1994). It is therefore important to make 
explicit the working definition of emotion that will be employed for the purpose of this thesis. 
Toward this aim, I define emotions as discrete, transient biological reactions that deal with 
specific situations in an adaptive fashion by triggering integrated response tendencies or complex 
behaviours toward the attainment of either survival and reproductive goals, or social goals more 
indirectly related to survival (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Tracy & 
Robins, 2007a). To the extent that emotions direct or alter behaviour, one may expect our 
affective responses to negative events to be particularly well-developed (Frijda, 1986). 
Our affect system has been moulded over millennia of evolutionary forces to serve 
unique adaptive functions. Emotions trigger survival responses (e.g., fight and flight), 
environmental exploration, and reproductive behaviours, to name but a few, while a subset of 
emotional responses have also developed into salient social cues that can betray the individual‟s 
current emotional state (Darwin, 1872). Emotional responses are too numerous and nuanced, 
however, for each to exist as a unique and discrete wiring of the nervous system. Instead, there 
appears to be a limited set of basic emotion systems that are evolutionarily conserved and that 
rely on innately specified mechanisms to help us deal with a few species-constant problems 












however, on the criteria that should be employed to distinguish these more evolutionarily hard-
wired emotions from those that emerge through subsequent learning and cultural experience 
(Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992; Panksepp, 1998; Turner & Ortony, 1992). Because the basic or 
primary emotions are not the main focus of this thesis, I will not comment here further on issues 
regarding their classification and distinguishing features. For all practical purposes, however, I 
will employ Ekman‟s framework whenever I do refer to them. Accordingly, there are six basic 
emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, and fear, which trigger predictable and 
automatic responses to prototypical environmental challenges, and may be recognized cross-
culturally from nonverbal expressions (Ekman, 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 
Levenson, & Friesen, 1983).  
Compared to the basic emotions, the moral and self-conscious emotions are more 
cognition-dependent and emerge later in ontogeny (Lewis, 2000). They are thought to be unique 
to humans and certain primates (Gallup, 1982), and play a fundamental role in communal 
contexts. The formation of social systems is, in fact, considered a key driving force behind the 
evolution of our current moral apparatus. Evolution favours group-living rather than going solo, 
because it offers several reproductive and long-term survival advantages, e.g., sharing child-
rearing duties and defending against predators (De Waal, 2006). These social functions, in turn, 
required the evolution of more sophisticated cognitive and emotional capacities, for example, 
prosocial motives, theory of mind, empathy, and moral emotions like shame and guilt, to enable 
us to live harmoniously in social groups (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). In neurological terms, an 
increase in connectivity between affective and cognitive brain structures may have facilitated the 
evolution of more complex emotional states. 
Experiencing affect may lead to many potentially far-reaching consequences, influencing 
complex phenomena such as moral behaviour, interpersonal relations, and social currency, but 
also affecting health status (Leary, 2007; Newton, 2009; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004). 
In this regard, emotions may be viewed as part of a phenomenal chain, starting with fast-acting 
central nervous system changes, moving to somewhat slower autonomic nervous system 
changes, to yet slower neurochemical and hormonal changes, and eventually to changes in health 
(Larsen & Prizmic, 2004). Although emotions form part of everyday life, frequent exposure to 
certain emotional states may thus affect short- and long-term physical health and increase risk for 











recognised link between affect and health, ANS and endocrine reactions in responses to discrete 
affective states have been studied extensively (Kreibig, Wilhelm, Roth, & Gross, 2007; Lerner, 
Dahl, Hariri, & Taylor, 2007; Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 2006; Rottenberg, Kasch, 
Gross, & Gotlib, 2002).  
Psychophysiological research in affective neuroscience has, however, largely neglected 
the moral emotions, despite their powerful influences on our reasoning, behaviour, and social 
status. We are ultra-social organisms that stand or fall by our social reputation. Moreover, the 
moral emotions are arguably more tied to our mental and physical well-being in the complex 
social environments we have to navigate now in the 21
st
 century, than they have been ever before 
(see, e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Consider, for example, the nauseating feeling associated with 
social exclusion or rejection, the pangs of guilt experienced after wrong-doing, the sheer 
embodiment of empathic feelings toward another, or the sense of elatedness after a praise-worthy 
accomplishment. Because these complex emotions form the currency of our social lives, they 
warrant empirical scientific exploration, despite the fact that the challenges associated with such 
an endeavour may be enormous.  
 
Guilt as a Moral and Self-conscious Emotion 
“…morality would be reduced to a meaningless concept if it were stripped from its 
motivational and emotional aspects” (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & 
Grafman, 2005, p. 806).  
 
How do we decide what the right thing is to do in a given situation? This is a prototypical 
question at the heart of moral psychology, where morality may be defined as a set of rules 
embraced by a cultural group to regulate interpersonal conduct and cultivate social harmony 
(Hogan, 1973). The mechanisms that underlie moral behaviour may be parsed into three different 
domains of enquiry: the moral emotions, theory of mind, and abstract moral reasoning (Casebeer, 
2003). In Funk and Gazzaniga‟s (2009) neurobiological model of human morality, automatic 
social processing, which includes moral emotions, is thought to activate parallel neural circuits 
that evaluate the actions and intentions of others and that ultimately results in a decision or action 
through mechanisms of competition. This process is experienced subjectively as a moral sense of 












acts post-hoc in an attempt to explain the relation between the subjective moral response and 
explicit contextual information available. Similarly, most contemporary researchers view 
affective processes as powerful driving forces in effective moral cognition (Casebeer, 2003; 
Haidt, 2007; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2008; Nichols, 2002), but also in equitable 
decision-making (Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008), and the development of appropriate social 
behaviour (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003). 
The notion that affect is central to moral judgment is an idea that was perhaps re-
instigated by the affective revolution of the 1990s, when various researchers gave prominence to 
automatic, effortless affective mechanisms in terms of their ability to influence cognitive 
processes (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989). Prominent examples include Damasio and 
colleagues‟ somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1994), 
and Haidt‟s (2001) social intuitionist model. Haidt (2001) argued that moral judgment is driven 
by instantaneous, affect-laden intuitions (e.g., loyalty and reciprocity), and that our actions in the 
moment are hardly ever influenced by abstract moral reasoning. These convictions, however, 
were not always held throughout history. Rather, philosophers, for the most part, compared the 
conflict between reason and emotion to a conflict between divinity and animality (see, e.g., 
Plato's Timaeus, 4th century B.C./1949). Rationalists since the ancient Greeks have worshipped 
reason, fostering the classic assumption that higher forms of human existence, including rational 
thought, may be hijacked by emotion (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).  In the 18
th
 century, however, 
Hume‟s (1777/1960; 1739/1984) attack on rationalism, followed later by the writings of Freud 
(1901/1965), placed emphasis on intuitive moral sentiments, which they believed are imperative 
in driving moral judgments and behaviours. The cognitive revolution of the 1960s, nevertheless, 
had the effect of reinstating purely cognitive models of moral behaviour, i.e., that moral 
judgment is reached primarily through a process of conscious reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 
1965). 
Although people undeniably engage in moral reasoning that can correct and override 
automatic affect-laden intuitions (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2007), moral psychologists 
today consider moral emotions to be critical motivational forces that serve to compel immoral 
behaviour and promote appeasement and reparative actions (Eisenberg, 2000; Keltner & 
Buswell, 1997). Failure in the appropriate elicitation of these emotions may thus lead to complex 











prefrontal damage, frontotemporal dementia), for example, are characterized by a propensity for 
unacceptable or inappropriate social behaviour (Blair, 2010; Muller et al., 2003; Pardini et al., 
2003; Saver & Damasio, 1991; Sturm, Rosen, Allison, Miller, & Levenson, 2006). Impaired 
moral emotional processing has been proposed to underlie the often observed dissociation in 
these disorders between knowing the right thing to do, and actually doing the right thing in real-
life situations (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002).  
Despite the apparent prominence of moral emotions in guiding appropriate social 
conduct, very little empirical research has been performed to characterize these emotions. 
Reasons for this lack of research may be both theoretical and methodological. Moral emotions, 
for example, show more cross-cultural variability, cannot be distinguished purely based on facial 
expressions, and are complex affective states that are difficult to capture in artificial 
experimental situations (Lewis, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004a). 
Given the renewed interest in affect in terms of moral behaviour, however, it is now appropriate 
to develop more accurate functional models and taxonomies of the moral emotions, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the more “basic” ones. But how should the moral emotions be defined? 
Tangney and colleagues view moral emotions as representing a critical element in the 
link between internalised moral standards and moral behaviour, such that individual differences 
in the experience and anticipation of these emotions may mediate people‟s adherence (or lack 
thereof) to their moral standards (Tangney, Struewig, & Mashek, 2007).  Moral emotions differ 
from basic emotions in that they have more cognitive complexity (Lewis, 2000), and are linked 
to the welfare of other individuals or of society as a whole (Haidt, 2003). Moral emotions are 
thus intrinsically interpersonal, because they go beyond the direct interests of the self. Haidt 
(2003) argued that the more an emotion may be considered as moral, the more easily it should be 
triggered by an event or elicitor that does not directly concern the self, and the more it should 
stimulate prosocial action tendencies. Because guilt satisfies both of these criteria robustly, it is 
not surprising that it is considered a quintessential moral emotion (Eisenberg, 2000).  
Also included under moral emotions are envy, empathy, shame, indignation, regret, pride, 
gratitude, embarrassment, pity, contempt, awe, and jealousy. Moll and colleagues (2007) have 
proposed a tentative taxonomy wherein moral emotions may be classified as prosocial (e.g., 
guilt), empathic (e.g., compassion), or other-critical (e.g., contempt). Depending on the specific 












as moral emotions (Haidt, 2003).   
A few of the moral emotions also belong to a distinct family of „self-conscious‟ emotions; 
these primarily include guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride (Lewis, 2000). They are called 
„self-conscious‟ because the self is the object of evaluation, and because they are evoked by 
either implicit or explicit self-reflection (Tangney et al., 2007). These emotions provide us with 
immediate and prominent feedback about our current social and moral acceptability, by way of 
either punishing misbehaviours or reinforcing socially valued behaviours (Tangney et al., 2007; 
Tracy & Robins, 2004a). Importantly, self-conscious emotions can exert their motivational 
influences on actual as well as anticipatory behaviours. While the negative evaluation of self (or 
the behaviour of self) leads to aversive feelings of guilt, shame, and embarrassment, the positive 
evaluation of self leads to positive feelings of pride and self-approval. The positive or negative 
acclaim is thus always applied to the self (Williams & DeSteno, 2008).   
Self-conscious emotions are intimately connected with other basic emotions, like anger 
and sadness, but differ from them in that they require self-awareness, and initiate self-evaluative 
processes according to a set of cultural standards, rules, or goals (Lewis, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 
2004a). Leary (2004) pointed out that self-conscious emotions are founded in social relationship 
and therefore always require a real or imagined audience of other individuals. Moreover, Leary 
(2004, 2007) contends that these emotions are much more intimately associated with what other 
people may think of us, than with what we think of ourselves. Consider also, for example, 
James‟s (1884, p. 195) articulation on this matter: “The most important part of my environment 
is my fellow-man. The consciousness of his attitude towards me is the perception that normally 
unlocks most of my shames and indignations and fears.” This focus on another‟s evaluation of 
self, even if it is an internalised standard of another, is considered unique to self-conscious 
emotions, and ostensibly serves to maximise interpersonal acceptance and minimise interpersonal 
rejection (Leary, Koch, & Hechenbleikner, 2001). An important inference from this reasoning is 
that the ability to evaluate ourselves through the eyes of others requires the ability to represent 
the mental states of others, that is, „theory of mind‟ (ToM) or mind reading (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Frith & Frith, 1999). ToM ability is thus considered necessary to recognize or experience self-
conscious emotions (Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003; Leary, 2007). 
Because self-awareness underlies our ability to read the minds of others (Humphrey, 











emotional reactions that may be interpreted as prototypical self-conscious emotions (De Waal, 
2001; Gallup, 1982; Parr, Waller, & Fugate, 2005). Similarly, self-conscious emotions are not 
observed in human infants who have not yet acquired the ability to think consciously about 
themselves (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). Compared to most basic emotions, which 
typically develop within the first 9 months of life, the self-conscious emotions emerge 
considerably later in ontogeny – around the time when a sense of self distinct from others 
develop (Lewis, 1995). The most basic form of embarrassment, for example, is only observed 
around 15 to 24 months (Lewis et al., 1989), while more complex self-conscious emotions, like 
guilt and pride, only emerge during the third year of life (Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 
2002; Lagattuta & Thompson, 2007). Self-conscious emotions may also develop later because 
children first need to understand the standards, rules, and goals that govern culturally appropriate 
social behaviour (Sullivan, Bennett, & Lewis, 2003). The development of guilt, in particular, is 
considered closely related to the development of empathic responding (Hoffman, 1982, 1998), 
and also requires the individual to be able to distinguish clearly between the self and behaviour 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
The appearance of self-awareness in the evolutionary lineage that led to modern man 
resulted in dramatic changes in human thought, emotion, and behaviour (Leary, 2004; Leary & 
Buttermore, 2003). Unlike selfless animals, we are capable of generating emotion only by 
reflecting upon ourselves and are permitted to imagine how we are being perceived by others. 
Because all emotion theories since Darwin (1872) have attributed some adaptive advantage to 
emotional experiences, the fundamental question about the self-conscious emotions is: What is 
their adaptive significance? Unlike basic emotions, which are essential for survival, Tracy and 
Robins (2004a, 2007a) argue that the self-conscious emotions are crucial for the attainment of 
social goals that are tied more indirectly to survival. These emotions facilitate social interaction 
and maintain interpersonal relationships by virtue of promoting reparative and appeasement 
behaviours following misdeeds (Baumeister et al., 1994; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Keltner & 
Harker, 1998). For example, one is more likely to forgive someone who violated a social 
convention when that person displays the self-conscious emotion of embarrassment, than 
someone who displays indifference or no emotion at all (Beer & Keltner, 2004). In addition, self-
conscious emotions are adaptive in that they affectively prohibit socially disruptive acts, and that 












(Nichols, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004a). The self-regulatory function of these emotions in 
everyday life is thus considered primary (Beer et al., 2003; Beer & Keltner, 2004; Leary, 2007). 
Guilt, shame, and other self-conscious emotions. Research on the moral emotions has 
predominantly focused on the two negatively valenced self-conscious emotions of shame and 
guilt (Tangney et al., 2007).
1
 These emotions are often used interchangeably, and cannot readily 
be distinguished by the type of situation that led to their elicitation (Tangney, 1992). They are, 
however, distinct affective experiences associated with very different effects on the individual 
(Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Because distinctions between 
shame and guilt have often been confounded in the past, Tangney and Dearing (2002) stressed 
the importance of clearly differentiating between them in theoretical formulations.  
Although guilt and shame have been distinguished based on various criteria (see, e.g., 
Fontaine et al., 2006), the distinction proposed by Helen Block Lewis (1971) is arguably 
regarded as the most prominent in literature. According to Lewis, a key difference between guilt 
and shame centers on the role of the self: whereas guilt focuses on one‟s bad behaviour 
(“specific” self-focus), shame focuses on the bad self (“global” self-focus). Both emotions thus 
involve negative self-evaluations, but while guilt renounces only a particular behaviour, in shame 
the entire self is apprehended as globally negative. This shift of emphasis from self to behaviour 
is thought to give rise to fundamentally different phenomenological experiences (Tangney et al., 
2007). It should be clarified, however, that while guilt focuses on a specific behaviour, the self is 
nevertheless evaluated as the agent that performed the negatively apprehended act. Various 
researchers (e.g., Kubany & Watson, 2003; Lamb, 1983; Lewis, 1971) have, in fact, identified 
responsibility for causing harm as a critical determinant of guilt. Guilt, like shame, therefore 
requires a causal link with the self.  
The experience of guilt can be described as a painful feeling of discomfort aroused when 
one has violated a personally relevant moral or social standard, or when another may have such a 
perception (Baumeister et al., 1994). This aversive feeling is thought to function as an emotional 
cue that signals when behaviour is unacceptable and should be interrupted or avoided 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Monteith, 1993). Guilt is also characterized by 
feelings of tension, especially when people postpone facing up to their guilt (Izard, 1991), as well 
                                                 
1Throughout the rest of this thesis I will refer to guilt as either a moral or self-conscious emotion, 











as a sense of regret or remorse. Regret forms an integral part of guilt as it is the painful 
realization that things could have been different, yet it may be distinguished from guilt in that it 
only involves harm to oneself, not to another (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje, & Manstead, 
2004). The experience of guilt, however, stops short of the self-condemnation usually 
experienced with shame; rather, guilt is associated with a desire to change the situation 
(Niedenthal et al., 1994). Moreover, guilt is usually accompanied by strong empathic feelings 
toward the victim, and therefore fosters prosocial behaviours to rectify or alleviate the harm one 
has caused (Ausubel, 1955; Hoffman, 1998). Guilt is thus viewed as more positive and adaptive, 
and less devastating, than shame, from both an interpersonal and psychological perspective 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
By comparison, shame has been described as an acutely painful experience where the 
entire self is painfully scrutinized and experienced as fundamentally flawed (Eisenberg, 2000). 
Whereas a guilt-ridden person wants to undo aspects of behaviour, the shamed person wants to 
undo aspects of the self (Niedenthal et al., 1994). In an attempt  to escape these painful feelings 
and avoid further humiliation, shame is associated with the desire to hide, disappear, or die 
(Ferguson & Crowley, 1997). Shameful feelings are consequently associated with social 
withdrawal and are thought to disrupt an individual‟s ability to form empathic connections with 
others (Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007). The motivations or “action tendencies” stimulated 
by shame are thus very different from that of guilt: Whereas guilt motivates the desire to rectify 
or amend, shame motivates the desire to hide.  
Classic and contemporary theorists have also differentiated between guilt and shame 
based on their relations to prohibitions and ideals, respectively (Freud, 1930/1961a; 1923/1961b; 
Piers & Singer, 1953; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). The modern-day interpretation of this account is 
founded in self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), where guilt is predicted to arise from lack of 
congruence between actual behaviour and personal ought standards (i.e., prohibitions), whereas 
shame is predicted to arise from lack of  congruence between one‟s actual behaviour and what 
one aspires to be based on societal goals (i.e., ideals). Teroni and Deonna (2008) emphasized, 
however, that shame will only ensue when the ideal in question is actually undermined, because 
simply not living up to it may be more associated with self-disappointment. Because prohibitions 
may be equated with norms (something that is forbidden), and ideals with values (something 












whereas shame is associated with undermining a value (Teroni & Deonna, 2008).  
One might ask why a certain behaviour sometimes leads to guilt and sometimes to 
shame? Based on the above distinction, Teroni and Deonna (2008) suggested the following: If a 
prohibited act is viewed by an individual as the deliberate undermining of a personal value, 
shame will probably ensue; but if the act is construed as an unintentional mistake, guilt will 
probably ensue. This is because mistakes are less easily viewed as opposing one‟s values than as 
dispositions to act against them freely. 
Whereas some have declared the different distinguishing criteria between guilt and shame 
to be conflicting (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2006), Teroni and Deonna (2008) argued that such an 
opinion is not warranted. Rather, different criteria speak to different dimensions of guilt and 
shame that together may give rise to a more coherent understanding. For example, guilt may be 
directed toward behaviour perceived as violating a norm. By comparison, shame is associated 
with an undermined value, but because values form an integral part of one‟s self-concept, one‟s 
core identity is easily threatened by shame. Based on the above distinction, it also becomes more 
apparent why shame has sometimes been described as the less „moral‟ emotion of the two (e.g., 
Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). Shame‟s association with ideals rather than prohibitions 
makes it more likely to arise from nonmoral issues than guilt, e.g., performance failures, 
inferiority, or the loss of reputation. Shame, nevertheless, serves an adaptive purpose, despite the 
fact that it is not likely to foster prosocial behaviours. For example, it reminds the individual of 
standards of propriety that should be adhered to within a social group (Ferguson & Crowley, 
1997). In addition, shame has been associated with a coordinated physiological response in 
reaction to “social self” threats, which may trigger adaptive behaviours in certain contexts 
(Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004).  
To conclude the section on guilt and shame, something should also be said on their 
relation to psychopathology – a topic of active debate. Guilt, in principle, has been argued to 
have both adaptive and maladaptive consequences (Kugler & Jones, 1992). Tangney and 
colleagues‟ cumulative research, however, seems to suggest that “pure guilt”, untarnished by 
shame, serves purely adaptive purposes for the individual (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et 
al., 2007; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). In this vein, guilt fosters moral behaviour 
through reparative and empathic behaviours. By comparison, shame has been associated more 











externalization, and substance abuse (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Dickerson, Kemeny, 
Aziz, Kim, & Fahey, 2004; Kim, Talbot, & Cicchetti, 2009; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & 
Gramzow, 1992). Results on the topic of psychological symptoms and adjustment, however, vary 
widely (see, e.g., Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000; Harder, 1995), with a 
possible confounding factor being the use of different indices of guilt and shame. For example, 
scenario-based measures generally highlight the positive potential of guilt, whereas measures that 
assess dispositional guilt that is more chronic or ruminative generally find little difference 
between shame and guilt in terms of emotional and social adjustment (Einstein & Lanning, 1998; 
Eisenberg, 2000). 
Nevertheless, both emotions may eventually become maladaptive when the emotional 
experiences are inappropriate or excessive (Lewis, 1971; Quiles & Bybee, 1997). Clinicians, for 
example, often associate excessive guilt and shame with the obsessive mental undoing of past 
emotional events (Niedenthal et al., 1994). More specifically, guilt has often been described as an 
agitation-based emotion that is associated with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; Lewis, 1971; Rachman, 1993). By comparison, shame has been 
described as a dejection-based emotion that plays an important part in depression (Lewis, 1971; 
Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006; Thompson & Berenbaum, 2006). More research employing 
measures that clearly distinguish between situational and dispositional affect, however, are 
necessary to tease apart the long-term effects of guilt and shame on mental health.  
The last negative emotion in the family of self-conscious emotions is embarrassment. 
Embarrassment has often been conceptualized as a milder form of shame (Izard, 1977; Lewis, 
1971), yet recent data suggest that it may be classified as a distinct emotional response that 
cannot be distinguished purely by affect intensity (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tangney, Miller, 
Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Whereas guilt and shame are associated with the violation of moral 
standards, embarrassment appears to be less central to the domain of morality (Tangney et al., 
2007). Rather, embarrassment is associated with the (often accidental) violation of social 
conventions (e.g., etiquette and hygiene, choices of clothing, faux pas, cognitive errors, and loss 
of bodily control) (Haidt, 2003). Its function in these situations is thought to appease others and 
promote adherence to social norms (Keltner, 1995; 2000). Embarrassment is furthermore a 
uniquely public emotion that requires either the real presence of others, or imagining vividly 












Finally, the positive self-conscious emotion of pride has long been neglected in 
psychological research. It arises when people believe they are socially valued or responsible for 
socially valued acts (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995). Pleasurable feelings of pride are considered to 
serve essential motivational functions in everyday life: pride rewards and reinforces 
achievement-oriented as well as socially valued behaviours, thereby stimulating future pride-
eliciting behaviours (Tangney et al., 2007). In addition, the motivational function of pride has 
been demonstrated to act as a mechanism that helps us persevere on effortful tasks to achieve 
long-term goals, despite short-term costs (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Taken together, pride 
fuels our human desires and pursuits, while bestowing social status and acceptance upon those 
individuals who perform such socially valued acts (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Another social 
function of pride may thus be to inform others of our status. Pride is also intrinsically linked to 
the development and maintenance of a genuine sense of self-esteem, which in turn informs 
individuals of their social value (Brown & Marshall, 2001; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995).  
Tracy and Robins (2004a, 2007b) have distinguished between two distinct forms of pride 
that are associated with very different psychological correlates. Paralleling Lewis‟s (1971) self 
versus behaviour distinction, they identified „hubris‟ as global pride in self, whereas „authentic‟ 
pride is more associated with event-specific achievements. Hubris or pridefulness is largely 
viewed as maladaptive and is associated with negative personality traits, e.g., narcissism, 
hostility, and shame-proneness. By comparison, the achievement-oriented form of pride is 
associated with adaptive traits (e.g., conscientiousness and extraversion), and promotes further 
successes and prosocial behaviours (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). 
 
The Experimental Elicitation of Emotion: Requirements and Caveats 
“I myself took for granted without discussion that the word 'emotion' meant the rank 
feeling of excitement, and that the special emotions were names of special feelings of 
excitement, and not of mild feelings that might remain when the excitement was 
removed.” – (James, 1894, p. 208).  
   
The elicitation of authentic and truly felt emotional responses in the laboratory is 
certainly one of the most challenging aspects of emotion research in general (Coan & Allen, 











typically employed to elicit basic emotions appear less effective in eliciting these more inward 
sensitivities (Tracy & Robins, 2004a). Although considerable research and attention has been 
devoted to self-conscious emotions, they are cognitively complex and typically arise in social 
contexts through intricate, self-evaluative processes (Lewis, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 2008). Self-
conscious emotions, therefore, cannot be distinguished purely by the nature of external stimuli, 
or by the types of situations that elicit them, for it is rather the manner in which individuals 
perceive the situation that defines the resulting emotion (Lewis, 2000). Moreover, self-conscious 
emotions may be strongly influenced by the cultural context and personal beliefs of participants 
(Bierbrauer, 1992; Haidt, 2003). Ecological validity in the investigation of such emotions is thus 
of primary importance (Casebeer, 2003; Moll, Zahn et al., 2005).   
A distinct challenge for most emotion induction methods, and particularly those 
pertaining to the moral emotions, is to create experimental manipulati ns that involve more than 
mere intellectual contemplation of a scenario. For it to qualify as a real emotional experience, 
distinct from cold reason, participants also have to experience a “bodily reverberation” or 
“feeling of excitement” of some kind (James, 1884, 1894). Moral emotion elicitation paradigms 
to date may typically be divided into three categories: (i) those where participants have to 
imagine what they would do in highly unrealistic/unfamiliar scenarios, which often involve 
deciding whether they would respond in a utilitarian manner for aggregate welfare or not (e.g., 
“Would you smother your own baby to save yourself and other townspeople from enemy 
soldiers?”) (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), (ii) those where 
participants have to imagine their reactions to more realistic moral scenarios, albeit not related to 
them personally (e.g., “You drive home from a party one evening and crash into another car at a 
stop light and kill the passengers”) (Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002; Finger, Marsh, 
Kamel, Mitchell, & Blair, 2006; Kédia, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & Martinot, 2008), (iii) and 
those experimental contexts, by far in the minority, where participants are placed in real, 
emotion-evoking situations that pertain to themselves (e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).  
Although the first two categories may generate moral emotions with some degree of 
success, they can hardly be taken as a proxy for the type of emotion that occurs in everyday life: 
Judging oneself based on fictitious mental representations is likely to yield a different emotional 












Rather, it is likely that experiments in the last category hold the most merit in terms of eliciting 
ecologically valid emotions. To support this claim, I provide a brief overview of emotion 
elicitation methods that have been employed in a wide variety of previously-published studies. 
Emotion elicitation methods in previous research have included deliberate mood-
induction, e.g., “Think of things that make you sad” (George, Ketter, Parekh, Herscovitch, & 
Post, 1996); presentation of emotionally evocative stimuli, such as the International Affective 
Picture system (IAPS) (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 
1997), viewing emotive facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 
2007), or emotional film segments (Britton, Taylor, Berridge, Mikels, & Liberzon, 2006; Kreibig 
et al., 2007), reading short emotion sentences (Moll et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2004) or 
vignettes (Berthoz et al., 2002); listening to emotional music segments (Khalfa, Isabelle, Jean-
Pierre, & Manon, 2002); contorting faces into prototypical emotion expressions (Coan & Allen, 
2003b; Ekman et al., 1983); and recording previous emotive experiences (script-driven imagery), 
where participants are required to recall and relive a past emotive experience while listening to 
an audio-taped description of the event (Dougherty et al., 1999; Shin et al., 2000).  
Although each of these methods has its own merits, most of them may have limited 
ability to elicit a genuine or intense emotional experience capable of arousing the autonomic 
nervous system (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Stemmler, Heldman, Pauls, & Scherer, 2001). 
Reading short emotive sentences or vignettes, for example, may be associated with significant 
subjective reports of emotion but limited activation of the autonomic nervous system, because 
participants may be making emotional judgments in line with the emotional characteristics of the 
task, rather than experiencing real affect (Levenson, 2003a). Research furthermore suggests that 
people often overestimate the intensity of their emotional reactions to hypothetical scenarios 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). In contrast, Ekman and colleagues‟ Directed Facial Action Task 
(DFA) (Ekman et al., 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990) has limited capacity to induce 
strong phenomenological experiences of emotion in participants (Boiten, 1996), although it does 
appear to elicit significant emotion-specific autonomic activity (Levenson & Ekman, 2002). 
Various complex affective phenomena, including guilt, are not accompanied by clearly 
distinguishable facial expressions, however (Robins, Noftle, & Tracy, 2007), rendering the DFA 
unsuitable to study such phenomena.  











used to study emotion in a well-controlled laboratory environment (see, e.g., Hubert & de Jong-
Meyer, 1991; Kreibig et al., 2007). This method offers a reliable, replicable, and ethically 
acceptable way to elicit strong emotional reactions across several response systems (including 
experience, behaviour, and physiology) when standardised film clips are used (Rottenberg, Ray, 
& Gross, 2007). Despite these practical advantages, however, several factors also limit the 
usefulness of film stimuli in emotion elicitation. Notably, films are high in cognitive demand and 
attentional capture, which are associated with well-recognized autonomic correlates (e.g., heart 
rate deceleration) that will impact on the overall autonomic response (Levenson, 2003a). The 
ecological validity of film stimuli has also been questioned. Frijda (1989), for example, argued 
that emotions elicited by imaginary events are unlike emotions elicited by comparable real-life 
events, and require a willing “suspension of disbelief” of the illusory reality of the film for its 
operation. Film-induced emotions are furthermore experienced from a characteristic 
observational angle, i.e., a knowing that the self is not directly concerned (Frijda, 1989). In this 
regard, film-induced emotions may be similar to emotions evoked in real-life observational 
situations.  
When it comes to ecological validity, especially for the more social emotions, imagery or 
reliving a previous emotional experience may seem like a particularly fine approach, because the 
experience remembered is personally relevant and constitutes an event that each individual finds 
personally arousing. Waldstein et al. (2000), for example, found that cardiovascular arousal for 
both happiness and anger was more pronounced during a personally-relevant emotion recall 
condition than during a film-viewing condition. Several emotion researchers, however, have 
pointed out the failure of imagery paradigms to elicit reliable emotion-specific physiological 
differences, or to produce similar ANS patterns as other methods (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larson, 
Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000; Stemmler, 1989; Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992). Such findings may be 
explained in several ways. Most notably, re-experiencing an emotion in a controlled and safe 
experimental environment is clearly phenomenologically different from the original emotional 
encounter. For example, in reliving a previous fearful experience (e.g., a bank robbery), one may 
experience only a memory or diminished version of the emotion, or experience nothing at all 
(Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). In line with this view, the intensity of relived emotions often appears 
to be too low to detect somatovisceral activation (see, e.g., Shin et al., 2000; Stemmler et al., 












Furthermore, it is unclear what the effect of reliving different personal experiences may have on 
experimental results (Rainville et al., 2006). Memories, for example, are often emotionally 
mixed, such that each participant‟s experience may have a different emotional overlay, e.g., 
sadness coupled with guilt, versus sadness coupled with anger. Such differences in the 
experienced emotion may in turn create unwanted variation in the emotions recorded. 
In light of the limitations of the methods described above, contemporary emotion 
researchers stress the importance of moving away from the study of remembered or hypothetical 
experiences and moving toward the examination of emotions in vivo, during meaningful 
personal interactions that have higher internal validity than hypothetical or past events (Herrald 
& Tomaka, 2002; Smith & Pope, 1992; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Fischer and Kleef (2010), 
for example, recently pointed out emphatically that emotions are inherently social processes, and 
that the social dimension should be more incorporated in emotion research. Social emotions, in 
particular, critically depend on the social environment and need to be evoked in the contexts in 
which they naturally occur (Harmon-Jones et al., 2007; Roberts, Tsai, & Coan, 2007). This social 
dependence is moreover true of guilt, which has been described as an “interpersonal 
phenomenon that is functionally and causally linked to communal relationships between people” 
(Baumeister et al., 1994, p. 243). The real-time elicitation of interpersonal guilt thus requires a 
paradigm involving complex social interactions, yet such manipulations have remained largely 
elusive to date because of various methodological challenges.  
The study of emotion has long embraced social psychology experiments that employ 
well-constructed cover stories to mask deception (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 
1990; Gambaro & Rabin, 1969; Harmon-Jones et al., 2007; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001; 
Schachter & Singer, 1962). Because such experimental manipulations are representative of the 
natural contexts in which human emotions typically occur, they have high ecological validity, 
with dyadic interaction tasks considered to have the greatest such validity (Roberts et al., 2007). 
Although social psychology experiments are often difficult to conduct and require much 
planning and creativity, they can be high in realism and have the potential to elicit valid 
emotional responses that are unaffected by social desirability concerns. Researchers are, 
however, often challenged by the lack of experimental control afforded by experiments that 
resemble real-life situations (Levenson, 2003a). The duration of events in such situations, for 











involved. In addition, social psychology experiments that induce emotions may pose serious 
ethical concerns: Not only do they employ deception, but the elicitation of strong negative affect 
may be experienced as painful or traumatic by research participants (see Aronson et al., 1990, for 
a discussion of these ethical issues).  
Despite the above concerns, deception may be unavoidable if important psychological 
phenomena that impact on health and society, such as guilt, are to be probed. Harmon-Jones and 
colleagues (2007) have expressed their opinion on this matter quite strongly: They argued that 
methods that fail to elicit valid emotions, e.g., hypothetical scenarios, should also be considered 
ethically questionable, because valuable resources may be spent to obtain meaningless or 
misleading data.  
High-impact real-life manipulations, however, need not cause lasting distress if 
participants are treated with care and sensitivity. To avoid potential negative repercussions, 
experimenters should pay special attention to post-experimental interviews. During these 
interviews, each participant should be debriefed adequately about the true purpose of the 
experiment and why deception was necessary, and, importantly, the experimenter should ensure 
that each participant leaves feeling positive about his or her experimental experience. Post-
experimental interviews are also vital in determining whether a participant‟s data should be 
included in subsequent data analysis (Levenson, 2003a), i.e., to ascertain whether the deception 
was effective and to verify the nature of the experienced affect. 
Emotion elicitation in the scanner. With regard to neuroimaging studies of emotion, 
researchers are faced with several additional challenges. Notably, the highly artificial nature of 
the scanner environment places several constraints on the natural elicitation of desired emotional 
states. Neuroimaging requires participants to be placed in an environment that may be anxiety-
inducing in and of itself for many; in the case of fMRI, participants also have to concentrate on 
not making any head movements during the experiment.  
Researchers are also severely constrained by methodological limitations of neuroimaging. 
For example, imaging studies mostly require several instances of the same emotion to be 
aggregated in order to create enough power to detect significant brain activation. However, 
repeated exposure to emotional stimuli may be associated with habituation effects (Liberzon et 
al., 2000). The scanner environment also places obvious limitations on the types of emotion 












paradigms are difficult to construct.  
Perhaps because of these difficulties and constraints, there has been a tendency in fMRI 
emotion paradigms to investigate dimensions of emotion, rather than discrete affective states 
(e.g., Canli et al., 2001; Hamann, Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002; Lane, Fink et al., 1997; Liberzon, 
Phan, Decker, & Taylor, 2003; Sabatinelli, Lang, Bradley, Costa, & Keil, 2009; Viinikainen et 
al., 2010). It is easier to manipulate dimensions of emotion, like arousal and valence, in the 
scanner (e.g., by using emotive pictures or faces) than it is to evoke discrete emotional states 
relevant to the participant. Imaging studies on basic as well as moral emotions, however, suggest 
that brain activations associated with distinct positive and negative emotions cannot be explained 
solely on the basis of valence (Britton, Phan et al., 2006; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009).  
Several additional features of moral emotions make them particularly difficult to study 
with neuroimaging techniques. Casebeer (2003), for example, pointed out that moral cognition is 
genuine, in that our moral cognitive equipment, which consists of emotion, reason, and action, 
evolved to effectively coordinate actual behaviour, not hypothetical scenarios. It is difficult, 
however, to create such believable situations within the scanner, where participants would 
perceive themselves to be agents of current moral/immoral actions. As mentioned previously, 
moral emotions are also social phenomena, yet real social interaction is difficult to simulate 
within the scanner.  
Several researchers have tried to overcome the lack of social interaction afforded by the 
scanning environment by creating novel paradigms where participants interact with either real 
or imagined others. Prohovnik and colleagues, for example, made use of simulated face-to-face 
social interactions to induce affect. Participants were shown video clips of actresses describing 
personal experiences of happiness/sadness while looking directly at the camera (viewer) 
(Prohovnik, Skudlarski, Fulbright, Gore, & Wexler, 2004). The authors argued that their 
paradigm offered multifaceted emotional stimulation similar to real-life situations, which would 
thus induce affect in participants through automatic mimicry. Their results suggested that 
socially relevant emotional stimulation evokes robust neural responses in participants. A 
different approach was adopted by Eisenberger and colleagues, who employed an effective 
fMRI paradigm to study the neural effects of social exclusion (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & 
Williams, 2003). Their task consisted of a virtual ball-tossing game (“Cyberball”) during which 











(ostensibly in different scanners). After some time, however, the participant became ostracized 
(excluded) from the game when the two players stopped throwing him/her the ball. The 
Cyberball paradigm has also recently been adopted to study empathic responses (Masten, 
Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011), as well as jealousy (Harmon-Jones, Peterson, & Harris, 2009).  
Other imaging paradigms on moral values have developed economic games to study 
brain activation during the real-time social interaction of two or more players (de Quervain et 
al., 2004; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Even more remarkable is the 
hyper-scanning methodology that has been employed by Montague et al. (2002), which can be 
used to study the social interactions of several people while being scanned simultaneously. 
Creating a social dimension, or the illusion thereof, in neuroimaging paradigms is therefore 
difficult, though not impossible. Nevertheless, emotion researchers endeavouring to uncover the 
brain organisation of emotion face serious challenges. Innovative studies that effectively 
overcome the lack of social interaction during fMRI will no doubt be essential in elucidating 
the neural correlates of moral emotion.  
Taken together, the difficulty with many of the methods described above is that they 
may not elicit anything resembling an actual emotional experience that one would encounter 
outside the laboratory (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). In this regard, the key to true, purposeful, 
and intense emotion elicitation would be to create an ecologically valid situation in which the 
participant experiences the relevant emotion as a feeling pertaining to the self (Harmon-Jones et 
al., 2007). This approach would undoubtedly also assist investigations of emotion-specific 
autonomic activity, an area of much controversy and debate.  
 
The Measurement of Emotion: Psychophysiology 
”…emotions briefly take the reins of the ANS and alter its pattern of activation in service 
of behaviours that are likely to deal successfully with particular problems/challenges that 
face the organism.” (Levenson, 2003a, p. 219)  
 
Another key factor hindering the systematic empirical investigation of self-conscious 
emotions is their measurement. Guilt is an internal affective state that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to assess directly (Tangney, 1996). Whereas the other self-conscious emotions 












behaviour (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tracy & Robins, 2004b, 2008), guilt has 
been described as the negative emotion with the least distinct facial expression (Izard, 1991). 
Although guilt may also be associated with changes in outward appearance, emotional responses 
may occur without overt facial or behavioural signals if the experienced emotion is subtle or 
inhibited (Ekman, 1993). The assessment of guilt therefore often relies extensively on self-
reported feelings. While subjective evaluations have previously been considered the most 
suitable data for the study of emotion, they only provide an incomplete glimpse of the underlying 
biological structures and processes associated with emotion (Cacioppo, 2004). This lack of 
objectivity has hampered progress in the past, placing emotions in the domain of philosophical 
and theoretical speculation. Researchers are now, however, advocating the importance of using 
more objective measures to construct and test theories of emotion if we are to expand our 
knowledge of emotion-related phenomena (Coan & Allen, 2007).  
Although the need for more objective measures has been emphasized in several critiques 
of self-report (see, e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Ryaff & Singer, 2003), a large section of 
emotion research continues to depend entirely on subjective measures to derive and test theories. 
Problems associated with self-report emotion measures include the fact that they require 
participants to be both aware of and willing to disclose their emotions, assumptions that are 
frequently not met if emotions are experienced implicitly, or if participants are unwilling to 
openly discuss their feelings (Robins et al., 2007). Language may also present a problem in 
capturing the precise affective experience. Lay-people, for example, frequently confuse the 
distinction between similar emotions like guilt and shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Emotion 
self-reports are also vulnerable to demand characteristics and can easily be distorted to appear 
more socially desirable (Harmon-Jones et al., 2007). Males and females may also distort 
emotional responses in different ways to conform to gender stereotypes (Brody & Hall, 2000). 
Finally, the response coherence across different responses systems (e.g., self-report and 
physiology) may be limited (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Self-reports 
can therefore not be used, ipso facto, to infer responses in other systems. Though essential to 
capture some aspects of the phenomenality of emotion (Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2007), self-reports 
of emotion thus have the potential to bias data in emotion research, and should ideally be used in 
conjunction with other measures to capture the emotional experience adequately.  











psychophysiological methods have become part of most mainstream research laboratories. 
Contemporary emotion researchers increasingly make use of continuous physiological recordings 
to better understand the underlying psychobiological processes at work during an emotional 
response, and to inform theories of emotion (Curtin, Lozano, & Allen, 2007). Although cognitive 
science has taught us much about the ubiquitous nature of emotion in all aspects of human 
cognition and behaviour, emotions are essentially physiological processes that cannot be fully 
understood without considering their underlying physical substrates (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). 
Changes in indices of visceral and cardiovascular autonomic activity may thus be interpreted as 
objective indicators of emotional processing. Moreover, because somatovisceral activation 
constitutes the interface between brain and behaviour, studying the physiology of emotion may 
also indirectly inform theories of their psychological function (Stemmler et al., 2001).  
Moral emotions have largely been neglected when it comes to their psychophysiological 
measurement. James, more than a century ago, hinted at the association between the “inward 
sensibilities” (e.g., indignation and pride) and physiological change, reasoning that those feeling 
states may at first sight appear devoid of all bodily reverberation, yet are “fruits of the same soil 
(as the „standard‟ emotions) with the grossest bodily sensations of pleasure and of pain” (James, 
1884, p. 201). No study to date, however, has investigated the cardiovascular physiology of a 
current guilt response, and only recently has research suggested that the self-conscious emotions 
of embarrassment, shame, and pride are associated with distinct psychobiological responses 
(Dickerson, Gruenewald et al., 2004; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Moral 
or self-conscious emotions‟ association with peripheral physiological responses is hardly 
surprising, however, when one considers the strong motivational forces that these emotions exert 
on our daily behaviours (Kroll & Egan, 2004). Moreover, distinct moral emotions have been 
associated with disease pathogenesis, which suggests that they may trigger bodily changes as 
early precursors of the disease process (Brosschot & Thayer, 1998; Mayne, 1999; Orth et al., 
2006; see also review in Tangney et al., 2007). The psychophysiological exploration of moral 
emotions thus warrants further investigation. 
Autonomic specificity. The existence and role of unique somatovisceral activation 
patterns for individual emotions is a controversial and methodologically challenging issue in 
emotion research (Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000; Ellsworth, 1994; Levenson, 1992; 












given that it has spurred a large amount of research and debate over the last century.  
Although Darwin (1872) noted that bodily reactions to specific emotional stimuli appear 
to be conserved across species, the debate may have begun properly with James‟s (1884) 
assertion that emotional experiences are associated with unique patterns of bodily responses, and 
that the perception of these peripheral physiological changes is the emotional experience. What 
became known as the James-Lange theory of emotion (James, 1894; Lange, 1885) thus has a 
slightly backward twist to it: The emotional experience is not one‟s mental response to a 
stimulus, but rather the perception of the ensuing peripheral physiological changes that result in 
an emotional feeling. Accordingly, we do not tremble because we feel afraid, but we feel afraid 
because we tremble; the emotional colour of any feeling state is due to the brain‟s perception of 
bodily arousal. Neural representations of automatically generated bodily responses have also 
more recently been incorporated in theories that posit a central role of autonomic feedback 
(expressed as “gut feelings”) in guiding motivational behaviour and social interaction (Damasio, 
1994, 1999; Katkin, Wiens, & Öhman, 2001).  
Probably the most well-known opposition to the James-Lange theory of emotion is that of 
Walter Cannon (1927, 1929), whose most salient argument was that bodily responses are too 
undifferentiated and stereotyped to provide the fine distinctions necessary to account for the 
wealth of emotional feelings. Rather, changes in bodily arousal manifest as generalised, 
nonspecific sympathetic arousal (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962), and are not necessary/critical 
for the emotional experience. By this account, the emotional experience is thus exclusively 
mediated by central networks.  
Despite considerable evidence outlining the presence of highly differentiated and organ-
specific response patterns within both axes of the autonomic nervous system (Morrison, 2001; 
Porges, 1995), the issue of whether afferent signals from the body are integral to the experience 
of unique emotional states remains unresolved (Heims, Critchley, Dolan, Mathias, & Cipolotti, 
2004). In a recent attempt to refute Cannon‟s heuristic, Harrison and colleagues showed that 
organ-specific autonomic responses during two types of disgust differentiated central emotional 
feeling states (Harrison, Gray, Gianaros, & Critchley, 2010). Changes in both cardiac and gastric 
activity also correlated with the overall magnitude of experienced disgust. In particular, however, 
they identified, through use of fMRI conjunction analyses, a common neural substrate (anterior 











functioning as an interface between embodied and experiential processes.  
Most psychologists today will acknowledge the role of peripheral feedback in modulating 
emotional intensity; a point of great contention in emotion research, however, is the notion that 
every emotion is autonomically unique (Critchley, 2005). In this regard, it should be noted that 
autonomic signatures may be observed only during the brief period after the arousal of an 
emotion and before actual behaviour commences (Levenson, 2003a; Stemmler, Aue, & Wacker, 
2007). Autonomic specificity is therefore not expected to pertain to longer emotional 
phenomena, e.g., mood states. Furthermore, specificity does not require every emotion to be 
associated with a unique ANS signature, but only that some affective states differ from others in 
consistent ways (Levenson, 1992). James himself, for example, did not assert that the 
physiological responses, or, for that matter, the symptoms of any particular emotion, be set in 
stone; he argued that bodily variation may occur within limits that still preserve the functional 
resemblance of the given emotion (James, 1894). The search for autonomic specificity in current 
emotion research may thus have been born out of an unwarranted focus on a single aspect of 
James‟s theory (Ellsworth, 1994). Perhaps more informative would be to investigate under what 
conditions and for which emotions differential physiological activity exists (Cacioppo et al., 
2000). 
Overall, good evidence exists for distinct physiological patterning of various basic (and 
primarily negative) emotions like anger, fear, and disgust (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Collet, Vernet-
Maury, Delhomme, & Dittmar, 1997; Ekman et al., 1983; Levenson et al., 1990; Rainville et al., 
2006). Heart rate appears to discriminate best among these emotions (Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992), 
with greater heart rate acceleration typically observed for anger, fear, and sadness compared to 
disgust. By comparison, autonomic specificity for positive emotions remain uncertain, an issue 
perhaps exacerbated by the fact that they have received far less attention than negative emotions 
in psychophysiological research, and are often studied individually (Levenson, 2003a).  
Emotion specificity research is, however, plagued by findings that do not always replicate 
across studies, or across different emotion elicitation procedures (Boiten, 1996; Stemmler, 1989). 
In this regard, variability associated with different emotion elicitation techniques and selected 
autonomic measures have certainly contributed to some of the inconsistencies that characterize 
research in this area (Christie & Friedman, 2004; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). Imagery, for 












may in turn hinder the physiological discrimination between distinct emotions (Rainville et al., 
2006). Autonomic changes accompanying emotion are also thought to provide essential support 
for action, i.e., mobilising energy resources necessary for specific behaviours (Davidson, 1994; 
Levenson, 2003b). Different behaviours, however, may be necessary or adaptive under diverse 
circumstances, e.g., fear may be associated with either vigilance or flight, depending on the 
situation (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). By this view, physiological arousal responses may 
also vary depending on the nature of the action tendencies recruited by the emotion in a specific 
context (see, e.g., Dickerson, Gruenewald et al., 2004). Also consistent with this view is positive 
emotions‟ general lack of association with distinct autonomic patterning, which may be attributed 
to the fact that, unlike negative emotions, they are not strongly associated with specific action 
tendencies or high-activity motor programs (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Frijda, 1986). 
Stemmler and colleagues (2001) argued against absolute emotion specificity, and 
incorporated the effects of various situational and motivational variables on somatovisceral 
activation in their component model of somatovisceral response organization. According to this 
model, multiple influences are superimposed during any emotion elicitation to create the net 
somatovisceral response pattern; the same emotion may thus lead to different physiological 
profiles depending on the context within which the emotion is induced. They argue that there are 
three sources that may influence somatovisceral activation during discrete emotional episodes. 
The first source constitutes the non-emotional context of the induction, including body position 
and temperature, ongoing motor activity, and cognitive demands of the situation. The second 
source reflects the emotion signature proper (i.e., noncontextual somatovisceral activation 
specifically elicited by the emotion in question). The physiological response of a particular 
emotion is hypothesized to be conserved across different contexts, and serves to protect and 
prepare the organism for prototypical behavioural responses. The last source of variance is 
necessitated by the contextual demands of the situation, and includes motivational and 
behavioural direction in the pursuit of an emotional goal. This component thus allows for flexible 
modification of bodily resources in accordance with momentary demands.  
To determine whether context effects on somatovisceral responses may be separated 
systematically, Stemmler and colleagues (2007) devised an experiment where they independently 
manipulated the effects of both emotion and motivational direction. Their paradigm involved a 











protagonists in anger and fear scenarios that differed in motivational direction (i.e., either 
approach or withdrawal). Results indicated that emotion and motivation contributed 
independently to somatovisceral effects, and could be separated though statistical analysis. 
Taken together, emotions may be associated with specific somatovisceral activation, 
although the detection of a specific response pattern may be confounded by context effects. 
Investigating the physiological profile of any emotion, however, remains an important step in 
unravelling its psychological processes and relationship to physical and mental health. Put 
differently, response patterns of autonomic activation within sympathetic, parasympathetic, and 
humoral axes may serve as objective measures to characterize and distinguish internal phenomena 
that are not readily quantifiable through subjective report. 
The autonomic nervous system (ANS). To conclude this section I will describe autonomic 
arousal responses in the body, focusing on one influential psychophysiological theory that relates 
autonomic function to social behaviour: the polyvagal theory (Porges, 1995). 
The autonomic nervous system constitutes the principal means to regulate the body‟s 
internal environment (Brownley, Hurwitz, & Schneiderman, 2000). It is subdivided into a 
sympathetic (SNS) and parasympathetic (PNS) nervous system, which dually innervate most 
internal organs. The SNS and PNS, however, usually have antagonistic effects on the target 
organ: Sympathetic activation prepares the body for action (i.e., “fight or flight”) by increasing 
both cardiac chronotropy (contractile rate) and cardiac inotropy (contractile strength) to facilitate 
motor action, whereas parasympathetic activation is associated with energy conservation and 
recuperative actions, such as heart rate slowing and decreased blood pressure. SNS influences on 
the heart are mediated by the release of norepinephrine from sympathetic nerve terminals. In 
contrast, PNS deceleration of the heart is mediated by the myelinated vagus nerve, which releases 
the neurotransmitter acetylcholine.  
In psychological research, heart rate reactivity is often conceptualized as a unitary 
construct that depends only on individual differences in sympathetic reactivity (Cacioppo, 
Uchino, & Berntson, 1994). Cardiac chronotropy, however, may be influenced by multiple modes 
of autonomic control, including sympathetic or beta-adrenergic stimulation, vagal withdrawal, or 
some combination of the two (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991). Cacioppo et al. (2000) 
therefore iterated that emotions may be more readily differentiated if contributions from both the 












The polyvagal theory is based within an evolutionary framework that relates different 
modes of autonomic responding with adaptive social behaviour (Porges, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2007). 
Specifically, Porges articulated three autonomic subsystems that are phylogenetically ordered and 
that respond to challenges in a hierarchical fashion depending on the specific context. First is the 
social communication system that fosters calm and prosocial behaviours when the environment is 
perceived as safe. This system is dependent upon the activity of the phylogenetically new and 
fast-acting myelinated vagus nerve, which originates in the brainstem nucleus ambiguus and 
terminates on the heart‟s cardiac pacemaker (the sinoatrial node). Increased efferent activity of the 
myelinated vagus slows the heart and has an inhibitory effect on cardiac sympathetic influences. 
The second system is associated with active mobilization to cope with threats, and comprises the 
sympathetic nervous system. In challenging situations, the vagal brake is rapidly withdrawn, 
leading to SNS dominance and increased metabolic output. Finally, the immobilization system is 
phylogenetically the most primitive mode of response, it leads to freezing or feigning death, and it 
depends on activity of the slow-responding unmyelinated vagus nerve. According to the 
phylogenetic hierarchy, mammals respond with the newest vagus system first, which inhibits the 
older systems. When defensive strategies are called upon, however, the older systems are 
recruited sequentially.  
The polyvagal theory has inspired much research in diverse areas of psychological 
enquiry, and has allowed researchers to formulate testable hypotheses of pathological disease 
progression in both physical and mental health (e.g., Beauchaine, 2001; Beauchaine, Gatzke-
Kopp, & Mead, 2007; Rottenberg, 2007). The theory states that the myelinated vagus is a 
dynamic contributor to a range of social and emotional processes by way of its ability to rapidly 
regulate visceral homeostasis (Porges, 2003; 2007). Another central premise of polyvagal theory 
is that the brainstem nuclei that regulate the myelinated vagus also have afferent fibers to the 
cranial nerves that mediate facial expression. This bi-directional coupling allows a mechanism by 
which cardiac states can be coordinated with spontaneous social behaviours. 
Estimates of cardiac vagal activity are usually obtained through unobtrusive measures of 
heart rate variability (HRV) (Berntson et al., 1997). HRV may be described as rhythmic 
oscillations in the time between consecutive heartbeats, with greater variability considered to 
reflect greater behavioural flexibility in response to environmental demands (Porges & Byrne, 











rely on different signalling mechanisms with different temporal characteristics, which in turn 
form the basis for HRV frequency analysis (Montano et al., 2009). SNS influences mediated by 
norepinephrine unfold and decay rather slowly (4 s to 20 s), whereas PNS influences mediated by 
acetylcholine have a very short response latency (0.5 s to 1 s). Only PNS regulation of the heart 
via the vagus, therefore, is capable of modulating beat-to-beat cardiac activity. The rhythmic 
variation of cardiac rate in response to respiration, known as respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), 
is viewed as a relatively pure estimate of vagal activity because only PNS modulation of the heart 
is fast enough to covary with respiration (Berntson et al., 1997). RSA results from the rhythmic 
gating of vagal efference during breathing: during inhalation vagal outflow is reduced and HR 
accelerates, and during exhalation vagal outflow is increased and HR decelerates. It should be 
noted, however, that the use of RSA as a measure of cardiac vagal control may be confounded by 
respiratory frequency and depth, which should ideally be taken into account in experimental 
designs (Allen, Chambers, & Towers, 2007; Grossman & Taylor, 2007). 
To calculate HRV, a continuous electrocardiogram (ECG) of heart rate is required that 
permits reliable identification of R-R intervals (see Allen et al., 2007 for details). HRV may then 
be assessed via either statistical analyses (time domain) or frequency domain measures (Task 
Force, 1996). To obtain frequency measures, power spectral analysis is employed to partition the 
amount of HRV occurring at different frequencies into a power spectrum. Prominent bands on 
this power spectrum represent the major oscillatory components of HRV, with the two most 
reliable periodicities occurring at a high frequency (HF) and a low frequency (LF). The HF (.15- 
40 Hz) component occurs at the frequency associated with spontaneous adult breathing, and 
primarily reflects PNS control over the heart due to respiratory sinus arrhythmia (Hayano et al., 
1991).  
Controversy exists, however, with regard to the physiological origin of the LF component 
(.04-.15 Hz). While some contend that LF heart rate variability reflects primarily cardiac 
sympathetic innervation (Malliani, Pagani, Lombardi, & Cerutti, 1991; Pagani et al., 1991), most 
researchers would agree that the LF component also contains parasympathetic influence, and thus 
reflects a combination of SNS and PNS activity (Eckberg, 1997; Martinmäki, Rusko, Kooistra, 
Kettunen, & Saalasti, 2006). The LF component is also assumed by some to be related to the 
endogenous rhythm of baroreceptor activity, which functions to regulate blood pressure (Moak et 












baroreceptors are activated that stimulate a central reflex mechanism in the brainstem to inhibit 
SNS activation and stimulate vagal efference, thereby lowering blood pressure. LF spectral power 
may therefore also reflect baroreflex-mediated vagal modulation. 
To conclude, HRV may be viewed as a noninvasive experimental measure of 
physiological flexibility. Individuals with higher resting heart rate variability are thought to be 
more emotionally responsive to the environment and less likely to be associated with 
psychopathology and cardiovascular disease (Beauchaine, 2001; Thayer & Lane, 2007). HRV 
may also serve as a proxy for more central regulatory processes (Porges, 1996; Thayer & Lane, 
2000). HRV, for example, has been used as an estimate of sustained attention (Weber, Van Der 
Molen, & Molenaar, 1994), and an index of emotional stress and stress vulnerability (Porges, 
1995). More recently, HRV has also been associated with individual differences in emotion 
regulatory ability (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; Butler, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006). A growing 
body of literature thus points to the prominent involvement of HRV in emotional responding, yet 
more research is necessary to elucidate its precise function. 
 
Neurobiology of Moral Emotions 
Moral behaviour is fundamentally important to human beings: It forms the bedrock of an 
ethical society and allows us to flourish in our rich social environments. Yet relatively little is 
known about the neural underpinnings of moral cognition (Casebeer, 2003). Over the past 
decade, a growing number of researchers have started to use functional neuroimaging and 
clinico-anatomical methods to uncover the neural substrates of moral behaviour. Despite these 
efforts, we still know relatively little about how moral judgments, as well as moral emotions, are 
instantiated in the brain, and what the particular contributions of various neural regions may be. 
This state of affairs may be attributed to numerous factors, including the highly distributed 
neural architecture of moral cognition (Casebeer, 2003), the lack of ecological validity of most 
functional imaging paradigms (Levenson, 2003a; Moll, Zahn et al., 2005), and limitations of 
neuroimaging methods themselves.  
Neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
positron emission tomography (PET) detect changes in local cerebral blood flow during mental 
activities (Raichle, 1994). Whereas PET measures local variations in regional cerebral blood 











deoxygenated hemoglobin in active parts of the brain, known as the blood-oxygenation-level-
dependent or BOLD signal (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990; Raichle, 1998). Both techniques 
are thus indirect measures of neuronal activity, centered on the principle that areas with 
increased activity will have a corresponding increase in local blood flow. Although there is 
reason to believe that a high degree of coupling exists between neural activity and local blood 
flow changes (neurovascular coupling), the exact nature of this relationship is not known 
(Arthurs & Boniface, 2002; Logothetis, 2003; Logothetis & Pfeuffer, 2004). Moreover, the 
temporal and spatial resolution of fMRI, and especially PET, is limited (Aguirre, Zarahn, & 
D'Esposito, 1998).  
Despite these limitations in inferring mind-brain relationships through functional imaging 
techniques, findings from imaging studies on moral cognition consistently point to the 
involvement of the same neural networks (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005). B th neuroimaging and 
clinical evidence have implicated the involvement of partially dissociable prefrontal, temporal, 
and limbic networks in moral phenomena (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Grafman et al., 
1996; Kiehl et al., 2001; Miller, Chang, Mena, Boone, & Lesser, 1993; Muller et al., 2003; 
Sturm et al., 2006; Tranel, 1994). Neocortical, as well as phylogenetically older mesolimbic and 
orbitofrontal (OFC) regions, are therefore involved. The moral emotions are complex subjective 
experiences and are also thought to arise from distributed activation in these areas (Zahn, Moll et 
al., 2009). It is still uncertain, however, whether the neural circuitry recruited during moral 
emotion elicitation is similar across different emotions, or whether it differs depending on the 
specific moral emotion in question (Kédia et al., 2008). At this stage, available evidence suggests 
that both qualitative and quantitative differences exist between the neural correlates of distinct 
moral emotions (Takahashi et al., 2004; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009).    
Neurobiology of basic versus moral emotions. fMRI studies that investigate brain 
activation associated with basic emotions, e.g., the positive emotion of happiness, and especially 
negative emotional states, like sadness, fear, anger, anxiety, and disgust, typically report 
increased activation in limbic and paralimbic structures (Damasio et al., 2000; George et al., 
1996; George et al., 1995; Kimbrell et al., 1999; Lane, Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz, & Davidson, 
1997; Pardo, Pardo, & Raichle, 1993; Phillips et al., 1997; Reiman et al., 1997). These 
activations are readily explained when one views the basic, more survival-laden, emotions as 












Brainstem and limbic areas not only monitor bodily homeostasis, but also appear to underlie the 
instantiation of central motivational states and the processing of affectively significant 
information (Mesulam, 1985; Stellar, 1994). Damasio et al. (2000) showed that brainstem 
tegmentum, hypothalamic, and limbic activations were associated with several basic emotions, 
thus underscoring the essential relation between structures involved in the 
representation/regulation of the body‟s internal milieu and viscera, and subjective feeling states. 
Moreover, Damasio and colleagues suggested that the distinct neural patterns associated with 
each emotion may form the basis for the mental states known as feelings (Damasio, 1999; 
Damasio et al., 2000). It is important to note that basic emotions, like fear and sadness, can be 
distinguished from central motivational states, in that basic emotions consist of the temporal 
binding of contextual information (e.g., perceiving a feared object) and the central motivational 
state itself (e.g., undirected anxiety) (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005).   
Basic emotions have been associated with substantial variability in terms of their neural 
activation patterns. Although this variation may reflect the large range of elicitation methods and 
stimuli employed in basic emotion experimental paradigms (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005), it also 
supports the notion that different emotional states engage brain regions in unique patterns. 
Different limbic structures are typically associated with different basic emotions, and are thought 
to represent the specific emotional quality (Paradiso et al., 1997; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009). For 
example, sadness has consistently been associated with anterior paralimbic structures, e.g., 
ventromedial PFC/subgenual cingulate (George et al., 1995; Lane, Reiman et al., 1997; Mayberg 
et al., 1999); anger has been associated with activation in the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior 
cingulate areas (Damasio et al., 2000; Dougherty et al., 1999); disgust typically activates the 
anterior insula (Phillips et al., 1997; Wright, He, Shapira, Goodman, & Liu, 2004); and fear has 
consistently been associated with the amygdala (LeDoux, 2003; Morris et al., 1996). 
Human moral cognition, on the other hand, is considered intimately entwined with the 
evolution of the prefrontal cortex (Wood & Grafman, 2003). The PFC, and other evolutionally 
„newer‟ forebrain areas, remained connected to and are innervated by the brain‟s regulatory core; 
limbic and paralimbic structures therefore also serve as a foundation on which the moral 
emotions are built (Casebeer, 2003). The anterior cingulate cortex, for example, is a  
large paralimbic structure that plays an integral role in the interface between cognition and 











is the PFC, which is regularly activated by moral emotion imaging studies (Moll, de Oliveira-
Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002), and has been proposed to form part of a complex neural circuit 
involved in the instantiation and regulation of emotion and motivation (Davidson, Pizzagalli, 
Nitschke, & Kalin, 2003). Ventromedial and orbitofrontal PFC, in particular, are regarded as 
important neural substrates in the automatic processing of moral emotions, because dysfunction 
in these areas can result in inappropriate or inefficient moral emotions (Beer et al., 2003; 
Koenigs et al., 2007), reduced empathy (Eslinger, Parkinson, & Shamay, 2002), and antisocial 
behaviours (Saver & Damasio, 1991). In comparison, the rostral frontopolar cortex appears to be 
more involved in explicit moral reasoning and prospective assessments (Greene et al., 2001; 
Moll, Eslinger, & Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Okuda et al., 2003), as well as prosocial behaviour 
(Masten et al., 2011).  
Compared to the „less complex‟ basic emotions, a remarkable verlap in brain activation 
is observed in moral cognition imaging studies. In a review of moral cognition, Moll and 
colleagues (2005) highlighted a network of structures that were consistently found to be active 
across a wide range of stimulus modalities and task requirements. Notably, these structures were 
activated in studies employing moral judgment/reasoning tasks (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; 
Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2003; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, 
Bramati, & Grafman, 2002), as well as studies investigating specific moral emotions (e.g., 
Berthoz et al., 2002; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004). Brain 
structures activated included the anterior PFC (BA 9/10), medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC; BA 10/11/25), medial and ventromedial PFC (BA 12/32), the anterior temporal lobes (BA 
20/21/38), the superior temporal sulci (STS; BA21/39), insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; 
BA 24/32), precuneus (BA 7/31), and limbic regions. Moll et al. (2005) argued that moral 
phenomena (including moral emotions) rely on the binding of three main components: Context-
dependent representations of events (i.e., structured event knowledge) provided by prefrontal 
regions, social perceptual or context-independent featural representations (i.e., semantic 
properties extracted from different social situations), which are stored in the postero-superior and 
anterior temporal regions respectively, and central motivational/emotional states (e.g., 
aggression, sexual desire, anxiety, sadness, hunger, attachment), which are represented in limbic 
and paralimbic structures. When these components interact and are activated together by way of 












during compassion, cortical representations may allow one to notice the emotional need of 
someone in distress, while central motivational states will give rise to feelings of sadness, 
attachment and anxiety, which will move one to help the person in pain (Moll et al., 2005). 
These component representations are consistently detected in different moral emotion studies. 
Of particular interest is the fact that the structures activated by moral cognition paradigms 
include areas most commonly associated with theory of mind (ToM) ability, namely the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the superior temporal sulci (STS) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ), 
and the temporal poles bilaterally (Frith & Frith, 1999; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). As explained 
previously, the ability to represent the mental states of others, i.e., ToM, appears to be integral to 
the experience of self-conscious emotions (Eisenberg, 2000; Heerey et al., 2003; Leary, 2004, 
2007). Robust ToM is in fact necessary for a whole range of morally important cognitive abilities 
(Casebeer, 2003). For example, a negative self-conscious emotion may require the recognition 
that a social norm has been broken, as well as the negative evaluation of self, both of which are 
important ToM abilities (Takahashi et al., 2004).  
In support of the notion that self-conscious emotions are intimately tied to inferences 
about others‟ evaluations of self, several imaging studies on these emotions have found 
activations in regions implicated in ToM (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004; 
2008). The importance of ToM ability in the production of complex social emotions was even 
more evident in Kedia et al.‟s (2008) study, where they examined the distinct moral emotions 
that result when „an agent harms a victim‟. By varying the involvement of self and other as either 
the agent or victim of a moral transgression, they created scenarios that evoked four different 
moral emotions: self-anger (“I harm myself), guilt (“I harm someone else”), other-anger 
(“someone else harms me”), and compassion (“someone else harms himself”). Kedia et al.‟s 
results indicated that only conditions that also involved other people (all conditions except that of 
self-anger) activated structures that are known to be involved in ToM, including the dorsal 
mPFC, precuneus, and bilateral TPJ. These areas are thought to play unique roles in the brain‟s 
ability to perceive and reason about other people (Saxe, 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Other 
regions commonly implicated in the ToM network include the posterior cingulate cortex and 
limbic/paralimbic structures, such as the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (Fletcher, Happe et 











Because the amygdala is intimately associated with emotion in general, a closer look at its 
role in moral emotion is appropriate. As mentioned above, the amygdala is most consistently 
associated with the capacity to generate/recognize fear-related emotions and detect threat (Amaral, 
2003; Breiter et al., 1996; LeDoux, 2000). It has also, however, been associated with the processing 
of positive/interesting stimuli, e.g., happy faces and unusual pictures, and appears to be involved in 
processing the salience of emotional stimuli in general (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Hamann & Mao, 
2002; Liberzon et al., 2003; Somerville, Kim, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2004). While the 
amygdala is thus commonly implicated in the processing of (salient) basic emotions, Adolphs 
(2003) has suggested that the amygdala‟s function in humans evolved to play a specific role in 
detecting subtle social signals in everyday life. By way of support for this notion, Adolphs and 
colleagues found that patients with either unilateral or bilateral amygdala lesions showed worse 
impairments for the perception of social emotions, than that of basic emotions (Adolphs, Baron-
Cohen, & Tranel, 2002). Consistent with this interpretation, amygdala activation has been observed 
in imaging studies of various social emotions, e.g., other-anger (Grèzes, Berthoz, & Passingham, 
2006), empathy (Völlm et al., 2006), and guilt (Berthoz, Grèzes, Armony, Passingham, & Dolan, 
2006). It is therefore unlikely that, in humans, the amygdala only plays a role in the more survival-
laden basic emotions, although clinical evidence for severe moral behavioural dysregulation in 
patients with focal amygdala lesions is still missing (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005).  
Review of moral emotion neuroimaging studies. While several neuroimaging studies in 
the past decade have examined the neural correlates associate with various complex social 
emotions, e.g., jealousy, compassion, romantic and maternal love, admiration, indignation, and 
social pain (Aron et al., 2005; Bartels & Zeki, 2004; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; 
Immordino-Yang, McColl, Damasio, & Damasio, 2009; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2005; 
Takahashi et al., 2006), only a handful of these focused specifically on guilt. The first was a PET 
study conducted by Shin et al. (2000), who employed a script-driven imagery paradigm to study 
regional changes in cerebral blood flow associated with reliving a previous guilty episode. 
Reliving guilt, compared to a neutral condition, was associated with enhanced neural activity in 
several anterior paralimbic areas, including the anterior cingulate cortex, left anterior insula and 
inferior frontal gyrus, and the temporal poles. Almost all subsequent paradigms made use of 
either short sentences or vignettes depicting moral violations to elicit guilt. I provide a brief 












 In one of the first fMRI studies that used emotive sentences to study moral phenomena, 
Berthoz et al. (2002) investigated the neural responses to stories depicting both intentional and 
unintentional (embarrassing) violations of social norms, with either a personal or impersonal 
reference. They thus aimed to study the effects of intentionality and agency in social violations. 
In response to both types of social violations, Berthoz et al. reported increased activity in areas 
associated with ToM, as well as in areas associated with processing aversive emotional 
expressions (e.g., lateral OFC, BA 47). They argued that the ToM activations may have been 
associated with attempts to infer the intentions of the offender, while the OFC activation may 
have corresponded to the processing of actions that evoke anger in other people. In a subsequent 
publication, they reanalyzed their fMRI data and found that intentional social violations 
performed by the self, which may be associated with guilt, were additionally associated with 
bilateral amygdala activation (Berthoz et al., 2006).  
Similarly, Takahashi et al. (2004) assessed the evaluative processes of guilt and 
embarrassment through an emotional judgment task. Their participants thus rated the described 
statements according to how guilty/embarrassing they appeared, e.g., Guilt: “I betrayed my 
friend”; Embarrassment: “I noticed that the zipper of my pants was open.” Takahashi et al.‟s 
(2004) fMRI results also implicated ToM areas for both emotion conditions, while the 
embarrassment condition additionally activated areas such as the right temporal cortex and the 
bilateral hippocampi.  
Using a slightly different approach, Finger et al. (2006) studied the effects of the 
presence or absence of an audience on neural responses to moral and social transgressions. They 
employed short vignettes in the second person (i.e., “You did this”), and argued that moral 
transgressions with or without an audience should be associated with the experience of guilt, 
whereas only witnessed social transgressions should be associated with embarrassment (Keltner 
& Buswell, 1997). Besides activation in ToM areas (mPFC, bilateral temporal poles, and left 
STS), Finger et al. reported that the dorsomedial (BA 8) and ventrolateral (BA 47) PFC showed 
increased BOLD responses in all conditions that required a change from the current behaviour, 
i.e., a change away from the „bad‟ behaviour. These conditions included moral transgressions 
regardless of whether an audience was present, but only social transgressions in the presence of 
an audience.  











by Moll et al. (2007), who independently addressed agency and emotional processing in several 
moral emotions. While the sense of agency engaged ventral frontal and temporal areas, prosocial 
emotions (including guilt, embarrassment and compassion) were associated with activation of the 
anterior mPFC and STS/temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Empathic emotions (guilt and 
compassion) additionally activated the mesolimbic reward pathway (e.g., ventral 
tegmentum/thalamus), which plays an important role in social attachment (Insel & Young, 
2001). The guilt condition was also associated with activation in the left anterior insula. In the 
Kedia et al. (2008) study described above, the guilt and other-anger conditions also activated 
emotional structures, including the bilateral amygdala, ACC and basal ganglia, in addition to 
ToM areas. 
In a continued effort to disentangle important context variables of moral emotions, Moll 
and colleagues designed a study in which agency (self versus other), as well as value-related 
actions, were manipulated (Zahn, Moll et al., 2009). Participants thus imagined themselves (self-
agency), or someone else (other-agency), performing actions that were either in accordance with 
a social value (resulting in pride or gratitude, respectively), or that were counter to a social value 
(resulting in guilt or anger/indignation, respectively). Zahn et al.‟s results supported the notion 
that abstract social knowledge is represented within anterior temporal regions, while distinct 
moral emotions engaged differential activations within fronto-mesolimbic regions. Specifically, 
the individual difference effect for guilt (i.e., higher individual frequency of guilt) was associated 
with increased activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex (SCC, BA 32) and anterior 
ventromedial PFC. In a subsequent study and reanalysis of fMRI data, however, Zahn and 
colleagues reported that the subgenual cingulate has a direct association with empathic concern, 
rather than guilt per se (Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, Garrido, & Moll, 2009). The pride 
condition was associated with activation within the mesolimbic reward pathway, e.g., the ventral 
tegmental area, and higher individual frequency of pride was specifically associated with 
increased activity in the tectum. Another fMRI study that specifically examined pride, however, 
only reported increased activity in temporal areas (Takahashi et al., 2008). 
Finally, a recent study employed a novel paradigm based on the alternating presentation 
of emotive facial expressions and contextual sentences to examine neural activations associated 
with guilt (Basile et al., 2011). Specifically, Basile and colleagues aimed to differentiate between 












guilt that arises more in the context of interpersonal situations, e.g., feeling guilty about someone 
else‟s bad luck (altruistic guilt). Results for the main effect of guilt indicated significant 
activation in the anterior and posterior cingulate, and in the left medial prefrontal gyrus. 
Deontological guilt, however, was associated with activation in a more dorsal ACC area 
(supragenual cingulate), while altruistic guilt was associated with activation in a more ventral 
area within the left mPFC. In addition, the left anterior insula responded selectively to 
deontological guilt, suggesting that this form of guilt entails aversive emotional processing 
(Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). 
 Taken together, the information presented above suggests that the instantiation of moral 
emotions are associated with structures involved in cognitive/emotion integration and higher-
order context-specific representations (i.e., PFC and ACC), areas involved in monitoring one‟s 
own and another‟s mental state (ToM) (i.e., mPFC, temporal areas, posterior cingulate, and 
precuneus), and areas associated with emotional processing, i.e., limbic regions (Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Moll et al., 2007; Moll, Zahn et al., 2005). Guilt, in particular, appears to be associated 
with activation in the ACC extending to the medial prefrontal cortex, as well as the anterior 
insula (particularly on the left) (Basile et al., 2011; Kédia et al., 2008; Moll et al., 2007; Shin et 
al., 2000; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009). While prefrontal areas are necessary for higher-order 
cognitive processes, the anterior cingulate and anterior insular cortices are considered essential in 
forming an emotion (Craig, 2002). The insula is specialised for mapping visceral responses and 
generating subjective feeling states (limbic sensory cortex), in turn, the ACC is associated with 
behavioural motivation because of its association with autonomic and emotional control (limbic 
motor cortex) (Craig, 2002; Critchley, 2005). Together, they thus represent emotional feeling and 
drive, respectively. The association of these areas with guilt also concurs with findings from 
patients with frontotemporal lobar degeneration. Such patients are characterized by diminished 
self-conscious emotional responding, which is thought to be the result of selective neural loss in 
frontal and insular brain regions (Sturm et al., 2006, 2008). 
Another important conclusion that may be drawn from the literature reviewed above, is 
that the emotion elicitation method or study design will probably impact significantly on the 
neural activations observed. For example, real-life experiences of moral emotions are expected 
to be far more emotionally arousing than emotions elicited through descriptive sentences or 











in areas associated with increased emotional arousal in response to real-life emotional events, 
e.g., the amygdala, insula, anterior cingulate, and medial OFC (Critchley, 2005; Critchley, 
Mathias, & Dolan, 2002; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). In a similar vein, George et al. (1996) argued 
that the regions activated during actual sadness may be different from remembering emotionally-
laden memories or seeing sad human faces. Even more intriguing is preliminary evidence 
suggesting that externally generated emotions (e.g., those generated by visual stimuli) involve 
the amygdala to a greater extent than internally generated emotions (e.g., memories of personal 
emotional events) (Damasio et al., 2000; Reiman et al., 1997). Data derived from the meta-
analysis conducted by Phan et al. (2002) indicated that emotion elicitation through use of visual 
aids (e.g., pictures or faces) readily activated the amygdala, whereas emotion elicitation through 
recall/imagery tasks tended to activate the anterior cingulate and insula. The amygdala thus 
appears to be specialized for processing visually relevant emotional cues in order to alert us to 
threats in our environment (Zald, 2003).  
 A final consideration drawn from the literature reviewed above involves the importance 
of the self as the moral agent in moral emotion elicitation studies. Various fMRI studies of moral 
dilemmas have reported increased activity in affective structures when one is personally 
involved in a moral situation (Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Kédia et al., 2008). For 
example, when the self is directly responsible for the harm done to someone else (e.g., you have 
to push a person in front of a trolley in order to save five others), increased activity in the 
amygdala and basal ganglia is observed, compared to when your actions have more indirect 
effects (e.g., by hitting a switch you can divert the course of the trolley to kill one person, but in 
the process save the lives of five others) (Greene et al., 2004). Further support for the importance 
of the direct involvement of the self in moral emotion elicitation comes from recent fMRI 
studies, where enhanced activity in the amygdala was observed when participants were involved 
as either the agent or victim of a social transgression, rather than being merely a witness to the 
scenario (Berthoz et al., 2006; Grèzes et al., 2006).  
Notwithstanding these general findings, individual variability among participants in 
terms of personality and dispositional affect has been shown to impact significantly on brain 
activation patterns (Canli et al., 2001; Hamann & Canli, 2004). Assuming homogenous 












processing, especially given that individual differences in the domain of emotion appear to be the 
rule rather than the exception (Eugene et al., 2003). 
 
Behavioural Motivation: The BIS/BAS Model 
In recent years, a central question in neurocognitive research has concerned how 
individual differences in neurobiological processes relate to personality, motivation and 
behaviour, and by extension, psychological dysfunction (Curtis & Cicchetti, 2007; Davidson et 
al., 2000; Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2009; Jackson et al., 2003; Larsen & Prizmic, 
2004). Considerable variability exists among healthy adults in the intensity, expression, and 
regulation of an emotional response, and it is well documented that the intensity of this affect 
may be predicted from previously obtained subjective measures (Carver & White, 1994; Ochsner 
& Gross, 2005). The approach I adopted in the current research, therefore, was aimed at 
evaluating guilt (and pride) in terms of individual differences in affective style, particularly in 
relation to behavioural motivation tendencies. This is of particular significance, given the 
conflicting accounts in the literature on guilt‟s behavioural motivation: Is it an inhibitor of 
transgressive behaviour, or a promoter of prosocial behaviour (Baumeister et al., 1995; Monteith, 
1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Sheikh & 
Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002)?  
 One dominant theory of behavioural motivation suggests that there are two fundamental 
brain systems that govern adaptive behaviour: the behaviour inhibition system (BIS), and the 
behaviour activation system (BAS) (Fowles, 1980, 1988; Gray, 1975, 1982, 1987b). Following 
this theory, stable, trait-like individual differences in BIS and BAS sensitivities to emotionally 
salient stimuli in the environment shape emotional learning and define individual temperament. 
Because Gray‟s work was originally derived from work with nonhuman animals (Gray, 1972), 
the BIS/BAS dimensions of personality have a strong link with neural physiology, unlike most 
other theories of temperament (Morgan, 2006; Smillie, Pickering, & Jackson, 2006).  
The BIS is an attentional system that is sensitive to cues of punishment, extreme novelty, 
and frustrative nonreward (e.g., situations where continued goal-directed behaviour is not 
rewarded). In a more recently updated model, Gray and McNaughton (2000) proposed that the 
BIS is sensitive to any stimuli that generate competing responses tendencies and thus require 











such conflicts is associated with increased attention and arousal, and functions to momentarily 
inhibit or halt ongoing behaviour, but also elicits behaviours aimed at resolving the conflict, e.g., 
environmental scanning and risk assessment (McNaughton & Corr, 2004).   
Gray held that BIS functioning supports the experience of negative feelings such as fear, 
anxiety, frustration, and sadness, with strong BIS corresponding to anxiety-related disorders 
(Fowles, 1988; Gray, 1981). Gray thus proposed the BIS as the causal basis of anxiety. 
Neurobiologically, the BIS is associated with the amygdala and septohippocampal system, 
including both its monoaminergic brainstem afferents and related structures, as well as its 
neocortical projections to the frontal lobes (Gray, 1982; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). In 
particular, because the ACC is strongly associated with conflict-monitoring, as supported by 
numerous studies in cognitive neuroscience (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; van Veen, 
Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001), BIS activation is thought to act via the ACC to 
detect conflict and interrupt action (Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008). 
The second system, i.e., BAS, is a motivational system that responds strongly to signals 
of reward, nonpunishment, and escape from punishment. As such, the BAS subserves 
motivational functions that govern both approach behaviours (i.e., behaviours that maximize 
reward by moving toward goals) and active avoidance (i.e., behaviours that minimize 
punishment by moving away from threats). BAS functioning is associated with the experience of 
positive affect, such as hope, elation, and happiness, but also aggression and anger (Gray, 1981; 
Harmon-Jones, 2003; Wingrove & Bond, 1998). Extreme levels of BAS have been associated 
with impulsivity (Gray, Owen, Davis, & Tsaltas, 1983). The neural basis of the BAS is rooted in 
the dopaminergic neurotransmitter system and includes structures such as the ventral tegmentum, 
nucleus accumbens, and ventral striatum (Gray, 1987a).  
Taken together, the BIS is thus associated with stopping, while the BAS is associated 
with going. According to Gray, individuals with high BIS sensitivity should be naturally inclined 
to fixate on possible threats or punishment in their environment, and should be prone to 
experience negative affect. Conversely, individuals with high BAS sensitivity should be more 
responsive to cues of reward and more prone to experience positive affect.  
Since Gray‟s original postulations, considerable effort has been made to assess BIS/BAS 
reactivity in individuals across several response systems, e.g., self-report, physiological, and 












of analysis for assessing BIS and BAS sensitivity in humans (Corr, 2001). For example, a large 
body of literature employing electroencephalography (EEG) has provided general support for the 
association between greater left-sided frontal asymmetry and BAS activation, whereas the BIS 
does not appear to be directly related to frontal EEG asymmetry (Coan & Allen, 2003a). 
One of the most used and best validated self-report scales developed to assess BIS and 
BAS sensitivity are the Carver and White BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994). The BIS and 
BAS, as measured by these scales, are associated with sensitivity to punishment and reward, 
respectively. Notably, the BAS scale specifically focuses on motivation toward goals and does 
not include avoidance behaviours, e.g., escape from punishment or threat. It therefore only 
measures approach aspects of the BAS. Some ambiguity has also been associated with the 
specific interpretation of the BIS, i.e., whether it is associated with the inhibition of action, as 
originally proposed by Gray, or whether it reflects behavioural avoidance in response to a threat 
(Amodio, Master et al., 2008). In a recent study employing EEG measures, Amodio and 
colleagues (2008) determined that BIS (as measured by the Carver and White BIS/BAS scales) 
was associated with conflict-related activity located in the dorsal ACC (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, 
van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003). In their study, self-reported BIS scores were 
uniquely related to successful response inhibition, as assessed by the N2 event-related potential 
on No-Go trials in a Go/No-Go task, and unrelated to approach/avoidance tendencies, as 
assessed by baseline frontal cortical asymmetry. They interpreted these findings as providing 
support for BIS‟s association with behaviour inhibition rather than avoidance. 
A substantial body of research has also examined the BIS and BAS in relation to 
peripheral measures of physiological activity during experimental manipulations of reward or 
punishment, in an effort to associate specific measures of cardiac reactivity and electrodermal 
activity with BIS and BAS reactivity (Arnett & Newman, 2000; Fowles, 1980, 1988; Gomez & 
McLaren, 1997; Knyazev, Slobodskaya, & Wilson, 2002). In this psychophysiological tradition, 
physiological correlates of BIS and BAS are typically assessed in situations of appetitive 
responding for reward (i.e., BAS), and during frustrative nonreward or extinction (i.e., BIS). 
Although this approach has revealed several putative physiological markers of behavioural 
approach and behavioural inhibition activation, results have not always replicated well across 
different studies and paradigms (e.g., Heponiemi, Keltikangas-Järvinen, Kettunen, Puttonen, & 











generally appear to show only a weak relation to physiological measures of reactivity (Brenner, 
Beauchaine, & Sylvers, 2005). 
Despite these inconsistencies, BAS activation has consistently been associated with HR 
acceleration during tasks of reward, while BIS activation is most consistently associated with 
electrodermal activity during frustrative nonreward (Fowles, 1980, 1988; Fowles, Fisher, & 
Tranel, 1982; Tranel, 1983). Conflicting accounts in the literature, however, exist on which 
peripheral index (i.e., the sympathetic or parasympathetic nervous system) mediates the 
relationship between BAS and HR reactivity. While some studies have found significant 
correlations between self-reported BAS and parasympathetic withdrawal, as indexed by RSA 
(Heponiemi et al., 2004; Knyazev et al., 2002; Ravaja, 2004), others have found SNS-linked 
cardiac reactivity, as indexed by PEP, to be a superior physiological estimate of approach 
motivation (Brenner et al., 2005; Crowell et al., 2006). Different findings might be a result of 
different tasks used, different quantification of behavioural activation/inhibition tendencies, and 
the presence or absence of incentives, across different studies.  
Based on psychophysiological evidence and the Polyvagal Theory, however, Beauchaine 
(2001) has argued that both the BIS and BAS should be mediated by the sympathetic nervous 
system. This assumption is derived from numerous observations indicating that emotional 
lability and psychopathology are associated with reduced cardiac vagal tone and excessive vagal 
reactivity, resulting in sympathetically-mediated fight/flight response strategies (i.e., approach or 
avoidance) (Beauchaine et al., 2007). Based on functional and phylogenetic considerations, 
Beauchaine and colleagues have asserted that PEP reactivity marks behavioural approach/active 
avoidance (i.e., BAS), while electrodermal responding is associated with behavioural inhibition 
(i.e., BIS) (Beauchaine, 2001; Beauchaine, Katkin, Strassberg, & Snarr, 2001). Conclusive data 












SPECIFIC AIMS AND RATIONALE 
  
The overarching goal of this thesis was to study the manifestation of guilt in the body and 
in the brain by investigating the autonomic and neurophysiological responses to current 
experiences of guilt. By investigating guilt in different response systems, i.e., by measuring 
subjective emotional experience, autonomic activation,  and haemodynamic brain activity in 
response to guilt-evoking stimuli, I hoped to perform integrative research that would advance our 
understanding of how these response systems are coordinated in an emotional response (Larsen 
& Fredrickson, 1999). Such an interdisciplinary approach may also be well suited to inform our 
current understanding of how this important moral emotion regulates social behaviour.  
In order to realize this goal, however, I required emotion elicitation paradigms that would 
be effective in the different settings employed, i.e., in the laboratory as well as the MRI scanner. 
Although ecologically valid emotion elicitation procedures are particularly difficult to design for 
the moral emotions (Casebeer, 2003), my Literature Review highlighted the importance of such 
an approach. In a nutshell, ecological validity entails the design of emotion elicitation procedures 
that evoke “real” emotions that may be representative of emotional events participants encounter 
in real life, and that can be distinguished from situations where participants merely make 
emotional judgments (Levenson, 2003a). 
My first aim, therefore, was to develop an elicitation paradigm to investigate the real-
time physiology of guilt during a controlled experimental situation. A critical aspect of the 
method employed was that it should afford participants with a personal sense of agency, so that 
they would perceive themselves as being responsible or playing a role in the harm caused to 
another (Kubany & Watson, 2003). Based on Harmon-Jones and colleagues‟(2007) 
recommendations, I considered a social psychology manipulation that is high in realism and that 
involves deception to be the most effective approach. As a contrasting self-conscious moral 
emotion, I also investigated pride, based on Cacioppo et al.‟s (1993) suggestion that emotion-
specificity researchers should include positive and negative emotions, as well as neutral 
conditions for baseline comparison, in their study designs.  
For Study 1 I therefore designed and tested a novel social psychology paradigm to 
examine the physiological profiles of guilt and pride. I aimed to describe the autonomic 











also interpreted results in terms of individual differences in sensitivity to Gray‟s behaviour 
activation system (BAS) and behaviour inhibition system (BIS) (Gray, 1982, 1987b; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000).  
My second aim was to investigate the neural correlates associated with current guilt 
through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Once again, I was compelled to develop 
a novel paradigm of high ecological validity that would be suitable to elicit guilt within the MRI 
chamber. This time, the paradigm was designed to evoke guilt in low-prejudice individuals as a 
result of bogus feedback on an implicit measure of prejudice, namely the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT). The guilt that was elicited by this manipulation may be described as deontological 
rather than altruistic, because it involved the violation of a personal moral norm, rather than an 
interpersonal situation in which someone else was harmed (Basile et al., 2011). I again included 
pride as a contrasting emotion condition for comparison purposes. 
My final goal was to integrate results from Study 1 and 2 to provide a holistic account of 














STUDY 1: THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY OF GUILT 
Investigating the physiology of discrete emotions serves several important functions, 
including uncovering emotion-specific physiological activity (Levenson, 2003a), and 
investigating the relation between affect and specific health outcomes (e.g., Lerner et al., 2007; 
Steptoe & Brydon, 2009). Notably, such investigations also help inform psychological theories of 
emotion with regard to their motivational and behavioural functions (Amodio, Devine, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2007; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Izard & Ackerman, 2000). Compared to 
investigations into the basic emotions (e.g., Rainville et al., 2006), however, the 
psychophysiological exploration of moral emotions has received little attention to date. The 
dearth of such literature may be attributed largely to inherent methodological challenges 
associated with the successful elicitation, as well as the measurement, of moral emotions (Lewis, 
2000; Tangney, 1996).  
Moral emotions are internal affective states that are linked to the wellbeing of other 
individuals or society as a whole (Tangney et al., 2007). As early as 1884, William James argued 
that not only basic emotions, but also the moral emotions, are associated with physiological 
arousal. He maintained that we experience “bodily modifications” unlocking “shames and 
indignations and fears” that are brought about by our sensitivities to another‟s perception of the 
self (James, 1884, p. 195). As ultra-social organisms who stand or fall by our social reputation, 
moral emotions motivate us to perform socially valued acts while affectively prohibiting socially 
disruptive ones (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tangney et al., 2007). One may therefore expect them 
to wield large physiological responses, corresponding with their strong motivational roles 
(Williams & DeSteno, 2008).  
Guilt and pride are moral self-conscious emotions integral to preserving social bonds. 
Guilt is an intense, gnawing feeling of moral discomfort experienced when one‟s behaviour 
violates a personal or societal standard (Baumeister et al., 1994). Because guilt is also associated 
with empathy toward the victim, it can motivate reparative actions (Hoffman, 1998).  
Conversely, pride is a positive emotion that accompanies both our trivial and life-changing 
accomplishments (Tracy & Robins, 2004b). It therefore provides the psychological motivation 
or reinforcement for future pride-eliciting behaviours (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). The 
authentic rather than hubristic form of pride is considered adaptive in that it promotes continued 











pride therefore motivate prosocial or socially adaptive behaviour, despite being associated with 
quite different phenomenological experiences.  
Emotions initiate both motor responses and complex goal-directed behaviour in order to 
confer an adaptive advantage upon the individual (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Frijda, 1986). By 
this view, the primary function of physiological arousal may not be to determine the emotional 
response per se, but rather to prepare the body for different action programs recruited by the 
relevant emotion (Davidson, 1994). I therefore hypothesized that the physiology of guilt and 
pride should reflect their distinctive activation functions: Guilt should disrupt ongoing behaviour 
and operate as a punishment cue (Monteith et al., 2002), i.e., function as a source of negative 
arousal; pride, in contrast, should reinforce current behaviour and encourage one to perform well 
again (Tracy & Robins, 2007a), i.e., function as a source of positive arousal. 
To understand physiological substrates underpinning behavioural motivations associated 
with guilt and pride more fully, I developed an emotion elicitation paradigm designed to be 
ecologically valid and intense enough to arouse the autonomic nervous system (ANS). I utilized 
measures of both sympathetic (SNS) and parasympathetic (PNS) nervous system activity to be 
able to discriminate between these modes of autonomic control during visceral arousal 
(Cacioppo et al., 2000).  
Porges‟ (2001, 2007) polyvagal theory emphasizes how different physiological states 
support distinct forms of behaviour: Whereas cardiac SNS activation serves to mobilize bodily 
resources to cope with threats (i.e., fight or flight), cardiac PNS activation, via the vagus nerve, 
provides inhibitory input to the heart and facilitates social interaction (see also Porges, 1995). To 
index vagal activity, I analyzed the high frequency (HF; > .15Hz) and low frequency (LF; .04 - 
.15Hz) components of heart rate variability (HRV) by way of spectral analysis. While the HF 
variability in the heart is broadly accepted as a relatively pure estimate of vagal control 
(Berntson et al., 1997; Hayano et al., 1991), the physiological underpinnings of the LF 
component are more controversial (Goedhart, Willemsen, Houtveen, Boomsma, & de Geus, 
2008). Conceptualizations of LF include it reflecting either a combination of vagal and 
sympathetic activity (Malliani et al., 1991; Martinmäki et al., 2006; Pagani et al., 1991), or 
baroreflex-mediated vagal activity (Brychta, Shiavi, Robertson, Biaggioni, & Diedrich, 2007; 












rate,  most researchers agree that reduced total HRV (both tonic and excessive reactivity) is 
nonadaptive and related to increased cardiovascular risk (Thayer & Lane, 2007).  
The measures employed furthermore allowed me to distinguish between different modes 
of SNS arousal, given that distinctive regulatory mechanisms are thought to be involved in 
cardiac and skin sympathetic activity (Rainville et al., 2006): Whereas electrodermal activity is 
indicative of somatic arousal mediated predominantly by sympathetic cholinergic activity of 
human sweat glands (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000), preejection period (PEP) is indicative of 
cardiac SNS arousal mediated by β-adrenergic inotropic drive (Cacioppo et al., 1994). PEP and 
SCL reactivity thus originate from largely distinct physiological systems that do not necessarily 
correlate with each other.  
These SNS indices have been linked to the two primary motivational systems proposed 
by Gray, viz., the behaviour activation system (BAS) and the behaviour inhibition system (BIS) 
(Gray, 1982, 1987b; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). As mentioned previously, Beauchaine (2001) 
has suggested that both motivational systems are mediated peripherally by the sympathetic 
nervous system. Specifically, electrodermal activity has been associated with both trait and state 
anxiety (Katkin, 1965), which are mediated by the BIS (Fowles, 1980; Gray & McNaughton, 
2000). In contrast, PEP has been linked to BAS activation because of the functional role of the 
SNS in mobilizing energy resources for behavioural activation (Beauchaine, 2001; Beauchaine 
et al., 2007; Brenner et al., 2005).  
Because so much is still unknown about the duration of affective phenomena (Verduyn et 
al., 2009), and therefore the time course of any concomitant patterned autonomic response, there is 
considerable variability in the literature in terms of the temporal matching between the 
measurement of an emotion, and the onset of emotion induction (Levenson, 2003a). For example, 
while most studies have recorded physiological data during the emotion induction (Boiten, 1996; 
Britton, Taylor et al., 2006; Khalfa et al., 2002), some studies have collected physiological data 
after the emotion induction (Schwartz, Weinberger, & Singer, 1981; Stemmler, 1989). To ensure 
that I captured the emotional response in full, I recorded and analyzed physiological data both 
during the emotion manipulation, as well as directly afterward, during the post-emotion 
manipulation period. This approach has also been adopted in previous emotion research, and 
indicated that the effects of an emotion manipulation may even become more pronounced during 











The experimental paradigm relied on interpersonal induction through staged interactions 
with two confederates to elicit real emotions of guilt and pride. Contemporary emotion research 
relies increasingly heavily on such methodology, which is believed to hold more merit and 
internal validity than hypothetical or remembered scenarios (Harmon-Jones et al., 2007; Herrald 
& Tomaka, 2002; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the 
emotion-triggering process may be dependent on, or enhanced by, the sociality of the 
stimulating context (Britton, Phan et al., 2006). The use of two carefully trained female 
confederates greatly enhanced the realism of the setup, so that participants actually experienced 
the emotions in question. 
A pilot study that was conducted in the department validated the effectiveness and 
credibility of the interpersonal induction technique. One of the most promising findings 
emerging from the pilot study was that the elicitation of guilt, using this paradigm, appeared to 
be reasonably uncontaminated by the similar emotion of shame, as well as other negative 
emotions such as fear and anger. In the Guilt condition, participants were led to believe they 
were partly responsible for the dismissal of a research assistant. The manipulation was therefore 
designed to elicit guilt resulting from empathy for a victim, combined with the belief that one 
has had an active part to play in another‟s distress (Frijda, 1994; Hoffman, 1998). In addition, 
the scenario was one of morality, which was deemed appropriate because research suggests that 
guilt arises primarily in response to moral transgressions (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995). In short: at 
the outset of the experiment, a confederate acting as the research assistant offered each 
participant double the amount of money the participant was supposed to receive as study 
compensation. Participants were told not to mention this to anyone.  Halfway through the 
experiment, however, a confederate acting as the supervisor discovered that money was missing 
from the participant compensation fund. Upon learning the truth of the missing money, the 
supervisor then decided to dismiss the research assistant, leaving participants feeling responsible 
and guilty for accepting the additional money, as well as for the ill fortune that befell the 
research assistant.  
For the Pride condition, I employed preprogrammed positive feedback as well as staged 
interactions with confederates (similar to, e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Williams & DeSteno, 
2008), given that pride is most strongly evoked in situations of publicly praised accomplishment 












participants‟ perceived accomplishments on an attentional task, and may be characterized as the 
authentic, more achievement-oriented form of pride that is thought to serve an adaptive social 
role (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Most theorists agree that authentic pride can be defined as “a 
positive, self-conscious emotion arising from achievements that can be attributed to one‟s 
abilities and efforts” (Williams & DeSteno, 2008, p. 1007).  
I also included a Neutral control condition to distinguish physiological responses specific 
to emotion induction from those due to the experimental context (Stemmler et al., 2001). In this 
condition, participants experienced the same context and sequence of events as in the other 
conditions, but without any emotional overlay. The Neutral condition thus served to control for 
any potentially unrelated sources of variability in the data (Christie & Friedman, 2004).  
Based on previous research suggesting greater autonomic activation in negative than in 
positive emotions (the so-called "negativity bias"; Cacioppo et al., 2000; Cacioppo & Gardner, 
1999), I predicted that guilt would be characterized by greater cardiac reactivity than pride. 
However, because no study to date has investigated, in a direct manner, the cardiovascular 
physiology of a current guilt experience, I had no specific hypothesis regarding ANS contributions 
in this condition. Because of the internal apprehension and anxiety caused by feelings of guilt, I 
predicted significant sympathetic arousal. While I also expected greater electrodermal activity in 
the guilt versus pride condition, I did not expect this measure to differentiate between these two 
emotion conditions, because of its correspondence to arousal rather than valence (Cacioppo et al., 
2000). For pride I anticipated, based on previous findings (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), low 
cardiovascular arousal.  
A related aim of the present investigation was to assess individual difference 
characteristics in the experience of guilt and pride. Various self-report scales were therefore 
included to assess their relation to subjective as well as physiological emotional responses. 
Notably, all participants completed the self-report BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994) in 
order to determine the relation between BIS and BAS sensitivity and experimentally-induced 
affect. I predicted that, because of guilt‟s function as a punishment cue, that a high BIS score 
would be associated with greater experimentally-induced guilt, whereas higher sensitivity for 
personal reward (i.e., a high BAS score), would be associated with greater experimentally-induced 













Fifty-six female participants between the ages of 18 and 25 were recruited from a 
university population. I recruited only females to avoid confounds due to sex differences in 
emotional experience, expression of negative emotions, and physiological responses (Manstead, 
1992; Shields, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In addition, because both confederates were 
White, an all-White participant sample was recruited to avoid the potential confound of differing 
cross- and inter-racial attitudes from interfering with the desired emotional response in the social 
interaction task (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). 
Health status of participants was determined by self-report questionnaire (presented in 
Appendix A). Those with previously diagnosed neurological, psychiatric, cardiovascular, or 
substance use disorders were excluded. Other exclusion criteria included undergoing medical 
treatment affecting the circulation, taking any medication for depression or anxiety in the 
previous 6 months, and being left-handed (Oldfield, 1971). Contraceptive medication was 
allowed. Participants were informed that they would receive ZAR30 as compensation for 
participating in the 90-min study. The study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Cape Town‟s Department of Psychology.  
All participants completed the procedures described below. Seven were excluded before 
data analysis, however, because of equipment failure (n = 2), high scores (> 26) on the Beck 
Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) (n = 2),  and post-experimental 
interviews suggesting they suspected deception (n = 3). The final sample thus consisted of 49 
healthy females (age: M = 19.92 years, SD = 1.58).  
Experimental Design and Setting 
Each participant was randomly assigned to either a Guilt (n = 16), Pride (n = 16), or 
Neutral (n = 17) condition in a cross-sectional between-subjects design. Because the paradigm 
involved deception, a within-subjects design was not feasible.  
The study took place within a dedicated research laboratory in the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Cape Town. A section of the lab was enclosed with curtains to 












conversations in the rest of the laboratory. The curtained-off section housed two computers (one 
for data acquisition and one dummy), as well as the ambulatory monitoring system and 
electrodes used for physiological recordings. 
Computerized Tasks   
Computerized tasks were presented on a PC with a 13-in. monitor in three blocks, so that 
block consisted of three different tasks. The first task in a block was always a simple reaction 
time task that required very little attention. It consisted of a moving virtual environment of 
hospital corridors; participants simply had to press a key every time a doorway was passed 
through. The second task was a Corsi Block-type test where participants had to remember and 
repeat progressively longer spatial sequences. The final task in a block was a Digit Span-type 
task where participants had to remember and repeat a progressively longer number sequence. 
Both working memory tasks stopped after two consecutive errors. 
Psychological and Self-Report Measures  
Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) was employed 
to measure the presence and severity of depressive symptomatology. It is a 21-item multiple-
choice self-report measure in which participants are asked to rate to what extent they have 
experienced each symptom during the past two weeks on a 4-point scale, ranging from 0 to 3. 
The questionnaire produces a single score as a measure of the intensity of the depressive 
symptoms, with higher scores indicating more cognitive, motivational, behavioural, and somatic 
symptoms of depression.  
The BDI-II has been used regularly in South African research (e.g., Ward, Flisher, Zissis, 
Muller, & Lombard, 2001), and has good test-retest reliability (Beck et al., 1996). In addition, 
the BDI-II exhibits a high level of internal consistency in a student sample, with alphas ranging 
from .89 to .93 (Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000). 
Dispositional affect.  General levels of positive and negative affect were assessed using 
the profile of Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS is a self-report measure that consists of two mood scales with 10 items each 
(e.g., enthusiastic, distressed, jittery) to provide brief measures of positive and negative affect. 











experience on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all), to 5 (extremely). The 
scales can be used to detect current mood fluctuations when used with the short-term instructions 
(e.g., “right now” or “today”), or can be used to measure more general affective traits when the 
longer-term instructions are used (e.g., “past year”). Participants in the current study were asked 
to indicate how they feel “generally”; the measure was therefore used to determine pre-
experiment levels of positive and negative affect.  
The scales have been shown to have excellent convergent and discriminant validity and 
exhibit traitlike stability over a 2-month time period when the longer-term instructions are used 
(Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS is also reliable in several settings, and Cronbach‟s alphas 
range between .85 and .89 for the PA scale, and between .82 and .85 for the NA scale (Crawford 
& Henry, 2004; Thompson, 2007). 
Proneness to guilt, shame and pride. The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; 
Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000) was used to assess participants‟ dispositional 
Shame-Proneness, Guilt-Proneness, Alpha Pride and Beta Pride. The TOSCA-3 is a scenario-
based measure that consists of 16 common scenarios drawn from written accounts of personal 
guilt, pride, and shame experiences of several hundred college students. Five of these scenarios 
have positive outcomes (e.g., “You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project. 
Your boss singles you out for a bonus because the project was such a success”), and the 
remaining 11 have negative outcomes (e.g., “At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a 
project, and it turns out badly”). For each scenario, participants are given a set of responses and 
are asked to indicate, on a 5-point scale, their likelihood of responding with shame, guilt, 
externalization, alpha pride, beta pride, and detachment/unconcern. 
Construct validity has been demonstrated in the TOSCA‟s relation to other measures of 
shame and guilt, as well as to other theoretically relevant constructs (Tangney, 1995; Tangney, 
Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992). Test-retest stability has been shown to be satisfactory (.85 and .74 
for shame and guilt, respectively; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et al., 1992), while alphas for the 
TOSCA-3 subscales ranged between .46 and .74 in a recent study (Hasui et al., 2009). 
Behavioural activation and inhibition. Tendencies toward behavioural inhibition and 
behavioural activation sensitivity were assessed through the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 
1994). The BIS/BAS scales consist of 20 items (plus 4 distracter items) that describe 












“Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.” Respondents are required to rate each statement on 
a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very true for me) to 4 (very false for me).  
The BAS scale (13 items) is related to extraversion, positive affectivity, and increased 
sensitivity to cues of reward. It can be divided into three subscales that assess the self-reported 
tendency of an individual to (i) respond with drive toward incentives (BAS Drive), (ii) be highly 
responsive to reward in the environment (BAS Reward Responsiveness), and (iii) seek out fun 
activities (BAS Fun Seeking). Conversely, the BIS scale (7 items) measures apprehension or 
inhibition in response to a threatening situation and is associated with greater proneness to 
anxiety, neuroticism, and negative affectivity in general. High scores on the BIS scale are 
associated with increased sensitivity to cues of punishment or nonreward. 
The BIS/BAS scales possess good test-retest reliability (Carver & White, 1994), and 
Cronbach‟s alphas for the BIS and BAS subscales have been shown to be 0.76 and 0.83, 
respectively (Jorm et al., 1999). 
State affect. Measures of state affect were obtained at baseline (Emotion Time 1) and 
directly after emotion manipulation (Emotion Time 2). Although the second affect measure 
included the same items as the first, the order and visual presentation of items differed to 
disguise the fact that it was a repeated measure. Words describing different affective states were 
presented individually on the computer interface so that participants could rate their current 
emotional state on a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). 
Single-item measures included guilt, shame, pride, satisfaction, anger and anxiety. In addition, 
indices were created for general negative affect (averaged ratings for sadness, fear and disgust 
with situation) as well as a general positive affect (averaged ratings for happiness, hope and 
relief). This index creation was done to reduce the number of dependent variables for 
subsequent analyses. My primary interest, however, was in single-item ratings of guilt and pride. 
Prosocial motivation. A questionnaire on HIV/AIDS was included to assess amending or 
prosocial behaviour after the emotion manipulation. The first section of this questionnaire 
assessed general knowledge about AIDS. Participants were then asked to indicate whether they 
would be willing to volunteer their time as a research participant in various HIV research studies.  
If they were willing, they had to indicate for how many studies, ranging from 1 to 6 (30 min 
each), they would volunteer over a period of 1 year. The questionnaire highlighted the fact, 











Manipulation check. Upon completion of the study, participants were shown a list of six 
possible emotions and asked to make a forced-choice decision as to which emotion, as well as the 
intensity level (on a Likert scale ranging from 1 „not at all‟, to 5 „very much‟), they experienced 
most during the experimental manipulation. The list of emotions included fear, pride, shame, 
guilt, anxiety, and satisfaction; there was also a neutral option (if the participant felt no particular 
emotion). Participants were allowed to select a maximum of three choices. 
Procedure 
On arrival at the laboratory, each participant signed consent documents (Appendix B) and 
completed sociodemographic, mood, and personality measures (i.e., BDI-II, PANAS, BIS/BAS, 
TOSCA-3). The experimenter briefly explained the nature of the investigation and gave each 
participant a standard set of orienting remarks. The experiment‟s cover story was that 
participants would practice some computerized working memory tasks to assess associated 
physiological change (Appendix C). Each participant was then guided to the curtained-off section 
of the laboratory where the computerized tasks were explained to them. Two actors performed as 
confederates to heighten the realism of the setup. They were both female to avoid potential 
gender biases from interfering with the emotion induction (all participants were also female). The 
dialogue between the experimenter and her confederates was carefully scripted, as were the lines 
the experimenter and confederates delivered to the participants. (Appendix C presents the 
emotion manipulation dialogue.) 
Pre-manipulation procedures. The experimenter explained to participants that a 
research assistant (Confederate #1) would assist in task administration because she (the 
experimenter) was needed elsewhere and could not stay for the full testing period. While the 
experimenter introduced the experimental procedures, the supervisor (Confederate #2) entered 
the laboratory and requested that the experimenter meet with her as soon as possible. The 
experimenter therefore left the laboratory while the assistant remained with the participant. The 
assistant attached all electrodes necessary for physiological measurements and once signal 
integrity was established, recorded a baseline rest period (5 min). Participants then rated their 
current emotional state (Emotion Time 1). The rationale for doing this was explained to 
participants in terms of affect changes or transient emotional states that might influence a 












course of an experiment which would, ostensibly, allow the research team to control for small 
shifts in mood that might influence results (Carver & White, 1994). The research assistant also 




Experimental manipulation: Guilt condition. In this condition, the research assistant 
nonchalantly gave participants more money than the normal compensation amount (ZAR60 
instead of ZAR30), indicating that this offer was not standard procedure and should be kept 
secret. As justification for the extra compensation, the assistant mentioned that some participants 
did not show up for testing and that the supervisor would not miss the money. The assistant left 
“to go to the bathroom” during the second block of computerized tasks.  Shortly thereafter, the 
supervisor and experimenter unexpectedly returned. This entrance was timed to take place as 
participants finished the second block of computerized tasks. Upon discovering money missing, 
the supervisor interrogated the participant, asking her directly whether she had been given more 
than ZAR30 by the research assistant. When participants confirmed this through a nod of the 
head (they were still under instructions not to speak), the supervisor communicated her feelings 
that the research assistant was untrustworthy and slack and needed to be fired. The supervisor 
furthermore instructed the experimenter to hire a new assistant as soon as possible, and to finish 
off the experiment while she dealt with the assistant. Participants were therefore left to 
understand they had some agency in the misfortune of the kind assistant. Shortly thereafter, a 
second measure of state affect (Emotion Time 2) required participants to rate their current 
emotional state. 
Experimental manipulation: Pride condition. Pride condition participants underwent a 
similar procedure as those in the Guilt condition, but with these exceptions: (i) They were not 
offered extra money, and (ii) they received  bogus visual and verbal performance feedback aimed 
at eliciting achievement-oriented pride (e.g., Williams & DeSteno, 2008). During the instruction 
phase, the experimenter informed the participant that her test scores would be transferred to a 
„host-computer‟ (i.e., the dummy computer). Participants in this condition also received 
predetermined normative information suggesting superior performance (e.g., a high percentile 
score and congratulatory sentence) after each computerized task block (Webster et al., 2003). 
                                                 
2This control measure was enforced in all three conditions to minimize physiological confounds 











When the supervisor and experimenter returned unexpectedly midway through the tasks, the 
supervisor ostensibly noticed the exceptional scores on the „host computer‟ and warmly 
congratulated the participant. She used scripted nonverbal cues, such as smiling, voice intonation 
and shaking the participant‟s hand, as well as phrases such as “you are outperforming most other 
candidates” and “keep it up” to convey how impressed she was with the participant‟s 
performance.   
 Experimental manipulation: Neutral condition. Neutral condition participants 
experienced a similar context to those in the emotion elicitation conditions, but did so without 
any emotional overlay. They thus did not receive extra money or performance feedback, and all 
dialogue between confederates, as well as questions posed to the participant, featured neutral 
content. Care was taken to ensure that the amount of personal interaction in this condition 
matched that in the two emotion elicitation conditions. In the Neutral condition, the supervisor 
only inquired of the participant whether everything was progressing satisfactorily. This condition 
served to determine the magnitude and direction of physiological changes specific to emotion 
elicitation and distinct from the experimental context (Stemmler, 1989).  
Post-manipulation procedures and debriefing interview. Upon completion of the third 
block of computerized tasks, participants completed the HIV/AIDS questionnaire to assess 
prosocial activation. Participants were then told that the experiment was over and that they were 
allowed to talk again. They were then asked to indicate which emotion they experienced most 
when the supervisor entered for the second time (i.e., the manipulation check). Importantly, the 
manipulation check was performed before the experimenter overtly stated the real purpose of the 
investigation. Where necessary, the experimenter clarified certain emotion terms (e.g., shame and 
guilt) to avoid artifacts due to erroneous labeling of emotions.  
The debriefing session took the form of a funneled approach, where the experimenter first 
carefully probed participants for suspicion while maintaining the cover story, followed by more 
specific questions relating to their experiences during the experiment (Harmon-Jones et al., 
2007). To distinguish between guilt and shame, participants‟ counterfactual thinking was also 
recorded by asking them to imagine what might have caused the event to end differently. For 
example, they were asked: “If you could change what happened, do you wish that you were a 
different type of person, or do you wish that you responded differently?” (Niedenthal et al., 












were actually experienced (Levenson, 2003a). Participants were then debriefed in full about the 
true nature of the investigation and were asked not to discuss the experiment with fellow 
students. In particular, participants in the Guilt condition were reassured that the research 
assistant had not been fired, and they were allowed to keep the extra money as compensation for 
the distress they had experienced. 
Physiological Measures  
Ambulatory Recording. The Vrije Universiteit Ambulatory Monitoring System (VU-
AMS, Version 5fs; de Geus & van Doornen, 1996) recorded the electrocardiogram (ECG), 
impedance cardiogram (ICG), and skin conductance level (SCL) continuously during the 
experiment. Participants remained seated throughout the procedure and were instructed to refrain 
from talking and making exaggerated body movements. These precautions were taken to ensure 
that varying respiratory behaviour did not affect physiological recordings (Grossman, Wilhelm, 
& Spoerle, 2004).  
During the experiment, event markers were inserted at predetermined time-points in the 
manipulation to designate: (i) A neutral period of 90 s that coincided with a button-press task of 
low attentional load; (ii) the emotion manipulation (EM) period of 90 ± 5 s, starting with the 
entrance of the supervisor and experimenter halfway through the experiment and ending with the 
supervisor‟s exit; and (iii) the post-emotion manipulation (Post-EM) period that consisted of the 
90 s directly after the emotion manipulation and also coincided with the low-load attentional 
task. A baseline period of 5 min was also recorded.  All periods were kept of identical length 
across different experimental conditions. Because of the nature of the emotion manipulation (i.e., 
because it depended on the delivery of scripted sentences), the duration of this period varied 
slightly across participants. Event markers were used as guides to extract physiological data from 
fixed periods of interest, i.e., from the neutral, emotion manipulation, and post-emotion 
manipulation periods. 
Ambulatory Signal Scoring. The ambulatory monitoring procedure has been described 
in detail elsewhere (Goedhart, Kupper, Willemsen, Boomsma, & de Geus, 2006; Goedhart, van 
der Sluis, Houtveen, Willemsen, & de Geus, 2007; Riese et al., 2003). Briefly, the ECG was 
recorded from three disposable, pregelled Ag-AgCl electrodes attached in a triangular, 











interbeat interval (IBI) time series was visually inspected for physiologically implausible 
readings. Artifacts were corrected by summing spuriously short IBIs, while missing beats were 
„created‟ by splitting spuriously long IBIs (> 99% of data were free of artifacts).  
From the ECG tachograms, I calculated HR as well as measures of heart rate variability 
(HRV).  HRV was estimated through the time domain measure RMSSD, i.e., the root mean of 
the squared successive differences of successive heartbeat intervals, as well as power spectral 
densities via autoregressive (AR) analysis. RMSSD has been found to correlate strongly with the 
high frequency (HF) component of frequency-domain methods, and vagal activity in turn is the 
major physiological contributor to the HF component (Berntson, Lozano, & Chen, 2005; Task 
Force, 1996). RMSSD could therefore be viewed as reflecting largely parasympathetic 
modulation of the heart through vagal activation/withdrawal, although lower spectral frequencies 
also influence this metric. The AR analyses were done via a software package from the 
Biomedical Signal Analysis Group (Department of Applied Physics, University of Kuopio, 
Kuopio, Finland), using a model order of 15 and an interpolation rate of 5 Hz. To obtain valid 
HRV estimates, I extended the neutral and emotion manipulation periods for these analyses from 
90 s to 120 s (Task Force, 1996). Frequency bands assessed included respiratory or high 
frequency (HF; .15 - .40Hz), low frequency (LF; .04 - .15Hz), and the sum of HF and LF, total 
frequency (TF; .04 - .4Hz). All calculated msec
2
 power values were transformed via natural 
logarithm to normalize the distributions.  
The ICG was monitored using a four spot-electrode configuration consisting of two 
electrodes at the back, which supplied high-frequency current, and two measuring electrodes on 
the chest, to detect the voltage drop over the thorax. The electrical resistance through the chest 
was thus measured as a function of blood volume variation while passing a constant current of 
350 µA, 50 kHz through the chest cavity. Resulting measures included basal thoracic impedance 
(Z0) and the first derivative of basal impedance (dZ/dt, sampled at 500 Hz), from which several 
systolic time interval indices of cardiac contractility (e.g., PEP) could be calculated. The 
impedance data were ensemble-averaged over 30-s intervals, and a manual scoring procedure 
detailed by Sherwood et al. (1990) was used to identify certain waveform components necessary 
to calculate PEP.  PEP scoring was quantified as the time interval in milliseconds between the 












waveform to its maximum. PEP was calculated as the mean value of all 30-s ensemble averages 
within fixed periods of interest (Riese et al., 2003).  
SCL was recorded as an index of the magnitude of emotional arousal, independent of 
valence (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). The constant voltage method (0.5 V), 
sampled at 10Hz, was used to measure changes in electrodermal activity in standard 
microSiemens (µS) conductance units. Ag-AgCl, non-polarizable finger electrodes (6mm 
diameter contact area; BiopacSystems, Inc.) filled with isotonic, 0.5% saline gel (GEL101, 
BiopacSystems, Inc.) were attached to the distal phalanx surfaces of participants‟ middle and 
index fingers of the nondominant left hand. Participants were requested to rest their left hands on 
the table during the experimental procedure.  
Statistical Analysis 
Subjective response data from Emotion Time 1 and Time 2 were analyzed to determine 
whether the emotion manipulations were effective.  Within-subjects analyses, via paired-samples 
t-tests, were performed to determine the relative increases/decreases in target emotions of 
participants in specific experimental conditions. At the group level (i.e., between-subjects), I 
performed multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs), with emotion condition as the 
between-subjects factor and ratings of affective states as the dependent variables. To determine 
which self-reported emotions contributed most to group separation, I performed a discriminant 
function analysis. 
As noted above, all participants engaged in a 5-min baseline period and a 90-s neutral 
period that were identical across all three experimental conditions. Because the neutral period 
corresponded better to the emotion manipulation period in length and attention-demand, this 
period was used in all analyses as the control period against which to assess physiological 
change. Intercorrelations between physiological reactivity indices were performed to investigate 
relations between physiological variables. To determine emotion-specific physiological changes 
during the emotion manipulation (EM) and post-emotion manipulation (Post-EM) periods, one-
way analyses of co-variance (ANCOVAs) were performed with emotion condition as the 
between-subjects factor and reactivity during the neutral period as the covariate.  
Finally, individual difference analyses were performed by correlating personality 












Results for Study 1 are presented in three parts: (i) Subjective Responses, (ii) 
Physiological Responses, and (iii) Individual Differences. There were no significant between-
group differences in terms of age at testing (p = .66), years of education (p = .46), or scores on 
the Beck Depression Inventory II (p = .12).  
Subjective Responses  
Dispositional positive and negative affect. Analyses of general positive and negative 
affect, as assessed through the PANAS, revealed no significant between-group differences in 
dispositional positive affect (PA), F(2,46) = 0.33, p = .72, or negative affect (NA), F(2,46) = 
0.35, p = .71. 
State affect. The dependent variables were participants‟ self-reported levels of emotion 
before (Emotion Time 1) and after (Emotion Time 2) the experimental manipulation. If the guilt 
and pride manipulations were successful, participants in these conditions should report 
heightened levels of guilt and pride, respectively, relative to participants in the Neutral condition. 
Table 1 presents affective ratings of participants before and after the emotion manipulation. 
Within-subjects analyses of state affect changes from pre-manipulation (Emotion Time 
1) to post-manipulation (Emotion Time 2), showed that Guilt condition participants significantly 
increased their ratings of guilt, as well as those of anxiety, anger, general negative affect, and 
shame, ts(15) > 3.50, ps < .01, rs > .60. Their ratings of pride decreased slightly, t(15) = 1.78, p 
= .09, r = .42. Although ratings of guilt increased the most, t(15) = 4.09, p = .001, r = .73, this 
change was not statistically significant compared to increases in other negative emotions (ps > 
.10, rs < .40). 
Pride condition participants significantly increased their ratings of pride, t(15) = 3.26, p 
= .005, r = .64, as well as those of general positive affect, t(15) = 2.26, p = .04, r = .50, but not 
satisfaction, t(15) = 0.44, p = .67, r = .11. Their ratings of guilt showed a significant decrease, 
t(15) = 2.28, p = .04, r = .51.  
Neutral condition participants did not change their ratings of either guilt or pride from 
pre- to post-manipulation (ps > .15, rs < .35). Neutral condition participants, in fact, showed no 
significant changes on any emotion, besides a significant decrease in satisfaction, t(15) = 2.52, p 












Table 1  
Changes in State Affect During the Three Experimental Conditions 
 Neutral (n = 17) Pride (n = 16) Guilt (n = 16) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Satisfaction:  Emotion Time 1 













       Anxiety:                Emotion Time 1 













       Anger:                   Emotion Time 1 













       Pride:                     Emotion Time 1 













       Guilt:                      Emotion Time 1 













       Shame:                  Emotion Time 1 













       General Neg:                 Emotion Time 1 













Sadness:               Emotion Time 1 














situation:                 
Emotion Time 1 













Fear:                      Emotion Time 1 













       General Pos: Emotion Time 1 













Relief:                    Emotion Time 1 













Hope:                     Emotion Time 1 













Happiness:            Emotion Time 1 













Note. Participants rated emotions along a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 











To investigate affect differences across experimental groups, subjective ratings of all 
reported emotions were compared using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).
 3
 The 
MANOVA conducted on the Emotion Time 1 data, with elicitation condition as the between-
subjects factor and ratings of 8 affective states as dependent variables, was not statistically 
significant, F(16,78) = 1.20, p = .30, η
2
 = .19 (Pillai‟s trace). All univariate ANOVAs for 
baseline emotions were also non-significant (ps > .10, rs < .30). There were thus no between-
group differences with regard to baseline state affect. A similar MANOVA conducted on the 
Emotion Time 2 data, however, revealed significant between-group differences after the emotion 
manipulation, F(16,78) = 5.28, p < .001, η
2
 = .52 (Pillai‟s trace).
4
 All univariate ANOVAs were 
now significant (negative emotions: ps < .001; positive emotions: ps < .05), as illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Graph illustrating differences between Guilt, Pride, and Neutral participants‟ mean 
state affect ratings after the emotion manipulation (i.e., Emotion Time 2 ratings).  
Satis: satisfaction, Gen Pos: general positive affect, Gen Neg: general negative affect. 
 
                                                 
3Data were ln-transformed and groups equalized by excluding one randomly-chosen Neutral case 
to correct for any violations of Box‟s test. 
4Because Box‟s test was significant at P < 0.01, the -level was reduced from 5% to 2.5%.  














To determine which self-reported emotions contributed most to discriminating elicitation 
conditions from one another, I performed discriminant function analysis (DFA) on the Emotion 
Time 2 data.  Although DFA does not always replicate well across studies, it was suitable in the 
current context because its purpose was mainly to establish whether the emotion manipulations 
were effective in eliciting guilt and pride, respectively. The DFA analysis yielded two 
discriminant functions (DFs): DF1 significantly discriminated the Guilt condition (p < .001), 
while DF2 discriminated the Pride condition, but not significantly (p = .16) (Figure 2). Structure 
coefficients indicated that guilt (r = .85), followed by general negative affect (r = .61), anger (r = 
.59), and shame (r = .52) contributed most to DF1 and therefore discrimination of the Guilt 
condition (Table 2). In contrast, pride (r = .83) and satisfaction (r = .70) contributed most to DF2 
and therefore discrimination of the Pride condition (Table 2). Group classification rates for this 
analysis reached an overall accuracy of 85.4% (Guilt: 100%; Pride: 87.5% ; Neutral: 68.8%) 
(Table 3).  
Taken together, the results confirmed that guilt and pride, respectively, were elicited 
more strongly than any other emotion by the emotion manipulation conditions.   
 
Figure 2. Discriminant function analysis plot of group centroids using self-report variables from 
Emotion Time 2 (i.e., after the emotion manipulation). The graph plots the variate scores for 













Structure Coefficients for the First and Second  










Note. Structure coefficients ≥ .70 are in boldface. 
 
Table 3 
Pattern Classification Accuracy of Emotion Conditions Based on Self-report  














    DF1    DF2 
Guilt .85 -.02 
General negative affect .61 -.29 
Anger .59 -.02 
Shame .52 -.45 
Anxiety .47 -.05 
Pride -.21 .83 
Satisfaction -.24 .70 
General positive affect -.14 .61 
    S 
       Study Group 








   Neutral 11 (68.80) 5 (31.30) - 16 (100) 
    Pride 2 (12.50) 14 (87.50) - 16 (100) 












To explore subjective guilt and pride responses further, zero-order correlations were 
performed on Emotion Time 2 data for each experimental manipulation. In the Guilt condition, 
ratings of guilt were most significantly correlated with ratings of anxiety (r = .83, p < .001), 
followed by general negative affect (r = .68, p = .004), shame (r = .64, p = .007) and anger (r = 
.55, p = .03). Of the three emotions grouped together under „general negative affect‟, guilt was 
only significantly correlated with disgust with situation (p < .01), but not with fear or sadness (ps 
> .11). Interestingly, guilt and pride had a significant negative linear relationship in the Guilt 
condition (r = -.67, p = .004).  Feelings of pride therefore decreased as feelings of guilt 
increased.  
In the Pride condition, satisfaction was the only emotion that correlated significantly with 
experimentally-induced pride (r = .64, p = .008). 
Manipulation check analysis. The manipulation check was employed to verify that 
target emotions were successfully elicited during the experimental manipulations. Participants 
were required to choose, from a list of six, which emotions and with what intensity (from 1 to 5), 
they experienced most during the experimental manipulation. Within each experimental group, 
emotion ratings were averaged to obtain a rating out of 5.   
Guilt condition participants rated guilt as the emotion they experienced predominantly 
(M = 4.06, SD = 0.85), followed by anxiety (M = 2.88, SD = 0.87), and shame (M = 1.5, SD = 
0.79) (Figure 3). In the Pride condition, pride was the most highly-rated emotion (M = 3.75, SD 
= 0.93), followed by satisfaction (M = 2.50, SD = 0.47), and anxiety. Neutral condition 
participants primarily rated their mood as neutral throughout the experiment, although some also 















Figure 3. Post-experimental manipulation check ratings. Participants from the Guilt, Pride and 
Neutral conditions indicated which emotions they experienced most during the experimental 
manipulation. Satis: satisfaction. 
 
Prosocial motivation. To assess prosocial motivation post emotion elicitation, the 
HIV/AIDS volunteer study data were analyzed. While there were no statistically significant 
between-group differences in the number of participants who volunteered to participate in further 
HIV/AIDS studies, 2(2) = 2.14, p = .34, Pride condition participants were more likely to 
volunteer their efforts (68.75% volunteered), compared to participants in both the Neutral and 
Guilt conditions (47.01% and 43.75%, respectively). Pride condition participants on average also 
volunteered to participate in more studies per participant (M = 2.25, SD = 2.28), compared to 
participants in the Guilt (M = 1.63, SD = 2.19) and Neutral (M = 1.29, SD = 1.72) conditions, 
although these differences were not statistically significant (p = .41). Overall, Pride condition 
participants were thus more likely to engage in prosocial activities following the emotion 
induction. 
 
Integrating the results reported so far, I conclude that the emotion elicitation procedures 
reliably and effectively produced the desired target affects of guilt and pride in the respective 
emotion manipulation conditions.  The Neutral condition was also sufficiently neutral to be used 








































One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) detected no significant between-group 
differences on any physiological parameter during the neutral period (ps > .20, rs < .25). 
Intercorrelations between physiological reactivity indices. Because no between-group 
differences existed during the neutral period, reactivity (Δ) scores could be calculated by 
subtracting the average value of each participant‟s neutral period from her emotion manipulation 
(EM) or post-emotion manipulation (Post-EM) period average. (For SCL, the neutral period 
mean was subtracted from the EM maximum value.) In this way, additional reactivity scores, 
which were associated with the emotional experience itself, were obtained for each physiological 
variable (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). Figure 5 (see page 75) displays the average within-subjects 
additional reactivity or change scores during the emotion manipulation and post-manipulation 
periods. Spearman‟s correlation coefficients were computed to examine the relationships 
between reactivity scores of physiological variables in each experimental group.  Because power 
spectral densities were calculated over slightly longer periods (120 s), these measures were 
analyzed separately.  
Correlation results are shown in Table 4. Of particular interest are correlations between 
PEP and SCL reactivity scores. Although PEP and SCL both reflect sympathetic arousal, no 
significant correlations were observed between ∆PEP and ∆SCL for any experimental condition 
during the emotion manipulation (rs < .35, ps > .18). Another interesting finding was the 
dissociation in the heart rate response for the two emotion manipulation conditions: In the Pride 
condition, ∆HR during EM was significantly correlated with ∆RMSSD (r = -.52, p = .04), but 
not with ∆PEP; in the Guilt condition, however, ∆HR during Post-EM was significantly 
correlated with ∆RMSSD (r = -.79, p < .001) as well as ∆PEP (r = -.76, p = .001).  Preliminary 
interpretation of these results suggest that heart rate increases in the Pride condition were 
predominantly due to vagal unloading, whereas heart rate increases in the guilt condition were a 
function of both vagal unloading and sympathetic drive. Consistent with previous reports 
(Cacioppo et al., 1994), changes in RMSSD and PEP reactivity were not correlated in any 













Table 4  
Spearman‟s Correlations Coefficients Among Physiological Reactivity Scores for Each 
Experimental Group  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Neutral Condition       
1. ∆SCL       
2. ∆HR EM .33      
3. ∆HR Post EM - .18     
4. ∆RMSSD EM -.06 -.36 -    
5. ∆RMSSD Post EM - - -.45 .32   
6. ∆PEP EM .31 .43 - .02 -  
7. ∆PEP Post EM - - .02 - -.07 .88** 
       
Pride Condition       
1. ∆SCL       
2. ∆HR EM .14      
3. ∆HR Post EM - .47     
4. ∆RMSSD EM -.01 -.52* -    
5. ∆RMSSD Post EM - - .29 .06   
6. ∆PEP EM -.33 -.46 - .09 -  
7. ∆PEP Post EM - - -.47 - .06 .89** 
       
Guilt Condition       
1. ∆SCL       
2. ∆HR EM .42      
3. ∆HR Post EM -    .60*     
4. ∆RMSSD EM .22 -.24 -    
5. ∆RMSSD Post EM - - -.79** .43   
6. ∆PEP EM -.34 -.45 - -.18 -  
7. ∆PEP Post EM - - -.76** - .49 .79** 
       
Note. SCL = skin conductance level; HR = heart rate; RMSSD = root mean of the squared 
successive differences; PEP = preejection period; EM = emotion manipulation period; Post-EM 
= post-emotion manipulation period.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Frequency analysis correlations. To explore relations among power spectral densities 
during the neutral and emotion manipulation periods, I performed zero-order correlations. As can 
be seen in Table 5, power spectral densities were significantly correlated across experimental 
conditions (rs > .45, ps ≤ .001). In particular, significant correlations between LF- and HF power 












vagal modulation in the low frequency component. Significant correlations between LF and HF 
power were also detected within each experimental group, with most correlations reaching 
statistical significance (.42 < rs < .72, .09 ≥ ps ≥ .001).  
Table 5 also presents relations between the spectral metrics (i.e., LF, HF, and TF) and 
RMSSD, which can be seen to be significantly correlated. 
 
Table 5 
Zero-order Correlations Among Heart Rate Variability Measures Across Experimental Groups 
 1 2 3 5 6 7 
       
Neutral Period       
1. LF        
2. HF .64***      
3. TF  .94*** .85***     
4. RMSSD .70*** .87*** .87***    
       
Emotion Manipulation Period       
5. LF        
6. HF     .45***   
7. TF     .94*** .70***  
8. RMSSD    .68*** .77*** .81*** 
       
Note. Both the neutral and emotion manipulation periods were extended to 120 s for  
the frequency analyses, while the RMSSD measures were taken from the original 90-s periods. 
LF = low frequency power; HF = high frequency power; TF = total frequency power; RMSSD = 
root mean of the squared successive differences. 
***p ≤ .001. 
 
Emotion manipulation effects. 
SCL. The ANCOVA for SCL, with maximum SCL during EM as the dependent variable 
and mean reactivity during the neutral period as the covariate, was significant, F(2,45) = 6.68, p 
= .003, 
2
 = .23. Post-hoc contrasts indicated significantly higher SCL for Guilt and Pride 
participants compared to Neutral participants (p = .001, r = .47 and p = .03, r = .31). SCL of 
Guilt and Pride participants did not significantly differ (p = .20), an indication that they 
experienced comparable levels of arousal relative to participants in the Neutral condition (see 
Figure 5A).  











function than positive events in terms of producing affective reactions (Larsen, 2002), I tested 
this hypothesis by investigating the SCL decay magnitude of the respective experimental 
conditions. SCL decay was calculated by summing the effective area under the SCL graph for 
each participant from the point of maximum SCL (in the EM period) to precisely 90 s thereafter 
(Figure 4A). 
Because SCL decay data showed large variability, a Kruskal-Wallis test was performed, 
with SCL decay as the dependent variable and experimental condition as the between-subjects 
factor. This analysis detected significant between-group differences, H(2) = 7.36, p = .03. Post 
hoc Mann-Whitney tests (using a Bonferroni correction and significance level of .025), indicated 
that the SCL response of participants in the Guilt condition endured for significantly longer than 
that of participants in the Neutral condition, U = 67, p = .01, r = .43. SCL decay of participants 
in the Pride condition also endured significantly longer than for participants in the Neutral 
condition, but only at the 5% level of significance, U = 79, p = .04, r = .36. A Joncheere-Terpstra 
test detected a significant trend in the data, namely that the SCL response was larger in 
magnitude (i.e., slower decay) as one moved from the Neutral to Pride to Guilt conditions: J = 




Figure 4. Skin conductance decay from SCLmax during the emotion manipulation period over 
90 s. (A) Graphic illustration of the calculation of skin conductance decay. (B) Group differences 






























HR. Because the HR distributions were skewed, HR data were reciprocally transformed 
to minimize large variability across participants. After excluding one outlier from the Guilt 
condition for both EM and Post-EM periods (more than 2 SDs from the mean), HR data 
complied with all assumptions underlying parametric data analysis.  
The ANCOVA for HR detected significant between-group differences during EM, 
F(2,44) = 6.20, p = .004, 
2
 = .22. Post-hoc contrasts indicated that HR of Guilt participants was 
significantly higher than that of Neutral participants (p = .001, r = .43), but not Pride participants 
(p = .22). HR of Pride participants was not significantly higher than that of Neutral participants 
(p = .06). Group differences in HR became more pronounced during Post-EM, F(2,44) = 8.92, p 
= .001, 
2
 = .29, with Guilt participants‟ HR significantly higher than Neutral (p < .001, r = .50), 
as well as Pride (p = .006, r = .38), participants. Pride participants‟ HR still did not differ 
significantly from that of Neutral participants (p = .23) (Figure 5B). 
  PEP. PEP data were reversed-scored and ln-transformed to correct for negative kurtosis. 
After performing these transformations, PEP data complied with all assumptions underlying 
parametric data analysis.  
The ANCOVA for PEP detected significant between-group differences during EM, 
F(2,45) = 9.53, p < .001, 
2
 = .29. Similar to results for HR, these differences became more 
pronounced during Post-EM, F(2,45) = 15.26, p < .001, 
2
 = .41. During both periods, 
significantly shorter preejection periods were observed for Guilt participants compared to Pride 
as well as Neutral participants (ps < .001, rs > .45). PEP of Pride participants did not differ from 
that of Neutral participants during either EM or Post-EM (p > .40) (Figure 5C). 
RMSSD. For RMSSD analyses, two outliers were removed from the Neutral condition 
(these participants had exceptionally high RMSSD values, more than 2.5 SDs from the mean), 
after which data complied with assumptions underlying parametric data analysis.  
The ANCOVA for RMSSD detected significant between-group differences during EM, 
F(2,43) = 15.80, p < .001, 
2
 = .42, as well as during Post-EM, F(2,43) = 7.27, p = .002, 
2
 = 
.25. During EM, the RMSSD of both Guilt and Pride participants were significantly lower than 
that of Neutral participants (p < .001, r = .64 and p = .003, r = .42). RMSSD of Guilt 
participants was also significantly lower than that of Pride participants (p = .01, r = .37). During 
Post-EM, RMSSD of Pride participants recovered somewhat and was not significantly different 











lower than that of Neutral (p = .001, r = .49) as well as Pride (p = .02, r = .36) participants 
(Figure 5D). 
 
 Figure 5. Physiological change scores (from the neutral period) for the Neutral, Pride, and Guilt 
conditions during EM and Post-EM. (A) SCL, (B) HR, (C) PEP and (D) RMSSD 
EM: emotion manipulation period, Post-EM: post-emotion manipulation period, SCL: skin 
conductance level, HR: heart rate, PEP: preejection period, RMSSD: root mean of the squared 
successive differences.  
**p < .01, and ***p < .001 Guilt compared to the Neutral condition. 
$
p < .05 and 
$$
p < .01 Pride 
compared to the Neutral condition. 
#
p < .05, 
# #
p < .01, and 
# # #
p < .001 Guilt compared to the 
Pride condition. 
 
 HR analysis with ΔPEP and ΔRMSSD as covariates. Because HR is dually 
controlled by the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous system, I conducted ancillary 












this aim, ΔPEP and ΔRMSSD were added as additional covariates in the HR ANCOVAs for 
EM and Post-EM. Because ΔPEP and ΔRMSSD were not significantly correlated in any of 
the experimental conditions, it is reasonable to assume that they constituted different aspects 
of ANS activity. If including PEP reactivity as a covariate eliminated or reduced the effects 
of the emotion manipulation on HR, this would suggest that SNS activity underlies HR 
increases during the emotion manipulation. By comparison, if RMSSD reactivity as a 
covariate influenced the effects of the emotion manipulation on HR, this would suggest that 
PNS activity underlies HR increases. ΔPEP and ΔRMSSD were added separately as 
covariates in the analyses to assess their individual effects in reducing the unexplained 
variance. 
Results supported a pattern of increased sympathetic influence coupled with 
parasympathetic withdrawal for guilt. The ANCOVA with HR during EM as the dependent 
variable and HR during the Neutral period as well as ∆PEP as covariates, was not significant, 
F(2,43) = 2.90, p = .07, 
2
 = .12. Similarly, the ANCOVA for HR during EM with HR during the 
Neutral period and ∆RMSSD as covariates, was not significant, F(2,42) = 1.20, p = .31, 
2
 = .05. 
In these analyses, both ∆PEP and ΔRMSSD covariates were significantly related to HR increases 
during the emotion manipulation period (p = .02 and p = .01, respectively). Controlling 
separately for the effects of ∆PEP and ΔRMSSD on HR thus led to non-significant changes 
across experimental groups. 
Similar results were obtained for HR when controlling for ∆PEP and ΔRMSSD during 
the post-emotion manipulation period. Adding ∆PEP and ΔRMSSD separately as covariates in 
this analysis resulted in non-significant group differences: F(2,43) = .46, p = .63, 
2
 = .02 and 
F(2,42) = 3.04, p = .06, 
2
 = .13, respectively. In contrast to RMSSD, however, the effects of 
PEP appeared to become more pronounced during the post-emotion manipulation period. This 
effect could also be seen in ∆PEP‟s significant relation to HR reactivity (p < .001). 
Frequency domain HRV analysis. Because of the necessity of extending the measuring 
periods for HRV frequency analyses to 120 s (Task Force, 1996), I only examined HRV effects 
during emotion manipulation, thus starting at the emotion manipulation period and extending 30 
s into the post-emotion manipulation period. The ANCOVA for HF power data detected 
significant between-group differences, F(2,45) = 4.608, p = .02, 
2
 = .17. Post-hoc contrasts 











Neutral participants, p = .007, r = .38, and p = .03, r = .32, respectively (Figure 6A). The 
ANCOVA for LF power was also significant, F(2,45) = 8.48, p = .001, 
2
 = .27. Post-hoc 
contrasts indicated that Guilt participants had reduced LF power during the emotion 
manipulation compared to both Pride and Neutral participants (ps = .001, rs > .47), while LF 
power did not differ between Pride and Neutral participants (p = .75) (Figure 6B). Analysis of TF 
power yielded between-group differences similar to LF power, F(2,45) = 12.44, p < .001, 
2
 = 
.36, and confirmed that the Guilt group was the only experimental group with significantly 
reduced total heart rate variability (ps < .001, rs > .49) (Figure 6C). 
 
Figure 6. Power spectral densities of the three experimental conditions during the neutral and 
emotion manipulation periods. (A) HF, (B) LF, (C) TF.  
Neu: Neutral experimental period, EM: emotion manipulation period, HF: high frequency power, 
LF: low frequency power, TF: total frequency power.  
**p < .01 and *** p < .001 Guilt compared to the Neutral condition. 
$
p < .05 Pride compared to 
the Neutral condition. 
# # 
p < .01 and 
# # #












Relation between self-reported affect and physiological reactivity. To assess the 
relation between subjective emotion experience and physiological arousal, post-manipulation 
emotion ratings of guilt and pride (i.e., Emotion Time 2) were correlated with physiological 
reactivity scores (Table 6).  
Based on the results, it could be deduced that the subjective experience of guilt was most 
closely related to parasympathetic withdrawal: Ratings of guilt were negatively correlated with 
all indices of HRV, namely, RMSSD, HF power, LF power, as well as TF power. Subjective 
ratings of guilt were also related to HR as well as PEP reactivity during the post-emotion 
manipulation period. By comparison, subjective ratings of pride were relatively unrelated to 
measures of physiological reactivity. In agreement with physiological data, increased pride was 
associated with increased RMSSD (i.e., vagal recovery) during the post-emotion manipulation 
period. Pride was also negatively correlated with electrodermal activity (i.e., SCL). 
 
Table 6 
Correlations Between Experimentally Induced Affect and Physiological Reactivity 
Physiological Measure 
Emotion Time 2: 
Guilt (n = 16) 
Emotion Time 2: 
Pride (n = 16) 
   
ΔSCL -.12  -.42* 
ΔHR EM  .26   .078 
ΔHR Post EM  .57*  -.18 
ΔRMSSD EM -.36  -.07 
ΔRMSSD Post EM -.77***   .43* 
ΔPEP EM -.31   .05 
ΔPEP Post EM -.49*   .06 
ΔLF EM -.42*   .17 
ΔHF EM -.46* -.14 
ΔTF EM -.60** -.20 
   
Note. Because of specific predictions regarding the direction of the correlations  
in the Guilt condition, 1-tailed Pearson‟s correlations were performed. 












Individual Differences  
Relation between personality measures and induced affect.  Individual differences in 
the magnitude of experimentally-induced guilt and pride were assessed by performing partial 
correlations between participants‟ post-manipulation affect ratings (i.e., Emotion Time 2) and 
questionnaire scores (i.e., PANAS, BIS/BAS, and TOSCA-3), while controlling for baseline 
affect (i.e., Emotion Time 1). Table 7 presents the results of these partial correlations. 
In the Guilt condition, participants‟ ratings of experimentally-induced guilt were only 
positively correlated with BIS, r = .58, p = .02, and negatively correlated with the BAS Drive 
subscale, r = -.58, p = .02. Residualized post-manipulation scores for other negative emotions 
(i.e., Emotion Time 1 scores covaried) indicated that BIS was not significantly related to any 
other negative affect: Anxiety (r = .34, p = .22), anger (r = .07, p = .81), shame (r = .47, p = 
.08)
5
, or general negative affect (r = .26, p = .34). By comparison, BAS Drive was also 
negatively correlated with experimentally induced anxiety, shame and general negative affect (rs 
> .55, ps < .04). In the Guilt condition, BIS was therefore correlated uniquely with 
experimentally-induced guilt. (There was no significant correlation between BIS and baseline 
ratings of guilt, rs = .15, p = .30). No other correlations between personality measures and 
experimentally induced guilt reached significance. In particular, the TOSCA-3 index of guilt-
proneness was completely unrelated to baseline, as well as experimentally-induced, ratings of 
guilt (rs < .05, ps > .80).   
In the Pride condition, no significant correlations were detected between experimentally-
induced pride and the overall BAS scale (r = -.34, p = .22), or any of its subscales (i.e., Drive, 
Reward Responsiveness, and Fun Seeking). The only correlation that reached significance was 





                                                 
5In the case of shame, the correlation with BIS may have reached significance if the sample size 
was larger. This is not surprising, however, given the highly correlated nature of guilt and shame 














Partial Correlations Between Experimentally-induced Affect and Questionnaire Measures 
Questionnaire Measures 
Emotion Time 2:  
Guilt (n = 16) 
Emotion Time 2:  
Pride (n = 16) 
   
Positive Affect (PA) -.12 .10 
Negative Affect (NA) .27 .48 
Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) .58* .08 
Behavioural Activation System (BAS) -.33 -.34 
BAS-Drive -.58* -.21 
BAS-Fun Seeking .08 -.32 
BAS-Reward Responsiveness -.06 -.16 
TOSCA-Shame .25 -.07 
TOSCA-Guilt -.01 -.03 
TOSCA-Alpha Pride -.18 .42 
TOSCA-Beta Pride -.40  .52* 
   
Note. Correlation coefficients > .50 are in boldface. Partial correlations were performed  
by controlling for baseline (i.e., Emotion Time 1) levels of guilt and pride, respectively. 
TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect. 
*p < .05. 
 
Relation of guilt and shame proneness to BIS and BAS.  Recent research by Sheikh 
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) identified BIS, as measured by the Carver and White BIS/BAS 
scales, as a unique predictor of shame proneness (measured by the TOSCA-3); they also found 
that BAS uniquely predicted guilt proneness (also TOSCA-3). The present analyses were 
conducted to determine whether these results were replicated in the current data, using 
questionnaire scores of all participants across experimental conditions. 
In line with previous findings (e.g., Carver & White, 1994), BIS and BAS were 
uncorrelated in the current sample (r = -.01, p = .96). Mean responses to the TOSCA-3 measures 
of shame and guilt proneness, however, were highly correlated (r = .41, p = .003). The inter-
correlated nature of shame and guilt proneness is also consistent with previous findings 
(Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher et 
al., 1992). 
To investigate the relationship between BIS and BAS and shame and guilt proneness, 
two linear regressions were conducted, similar to those presented by Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman 











analyses controlled for guilt proneness when predictors of shame proneness were assessed, and 
vice-versa.  
For the first linear regression, the predictive value of BIS on shame proneness was tested 
by entering BIS, BAS, and guilt proneness simultaneously as independent variables. This 
analysis was statistically significant, F(3,45) = 8.90, p < .001. Consistent with Sheikh and 
Janoff-Bulman‟s (2010) findings, BIS significantly predicted shame proneness, β = .33, p = 
.009. The analysis for BAS, however, also reached significance, β = -.30, p = .02 (Table 8).  
For the second linear regression, the predictive value of BAS on guilt proneness was 
tested by entering BIS, BAS, and shame proneness simultaneously as independent variables. 
This analysis also reached statistical significance, F(3,45) = 4.68, p = .006. Consistent with 
Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman‟s (2010) findings, BIS had no significant predictive value for guilt 
proneness, β = .08, p = .6, while the predictive value for BAS almost reached significance, β = 
.25, p = .07 (Table 8). 
 
Table 8 
Linear Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Guilt Proneness and Shame  
Proneness (N = 49) 
Variable B SE B β 
    
Shame Proneness    
Constant 7.00 19.05  
BIS 0.92 0.34  .33** 
BAS -.68 0.27           -.30* 
Guilt Proneness .74 0.25  .37** 
    
Guilt Proneness    
Constant 44.01 8.13  
BIS 0.11 0.20 .08 
BAS 0.28 0.15  .25
†
 
Shame Proneness 0.22 0.08    .44** 
    
Note. R
2
 = .37 for Shame Proneness (p < .001); R
2
 = .24 for Guilt Proneness (p < .01). 
†














Relation between BIS and BAS sensitivity and physiology. To assess the predictive 
power of the Carver and White (1994) BIS/BAS scales in terms of physiological parameters, 
simple regression analyses were performed on baseline as well as physiological reactivity (∆) 
scores. Baseline physiology measures constituted the mean of the initial 5-min baseline 
recordings. 
BIS/BAS scores were largely unrelated to baseline levels of physiological activity, that is, 
they were nonsignificant when predicting mean initial baseline levels of HR, RMSSD, PEP and 
HRV frequency measures. The only analysis that reached significance, was that of BIS and SCL 
(β = .31, p = .03). Higher BIS scores therefore predicted higher baseline electrodermal activity 
across participants. 
BIS and BAS were also largely unrelated to physiological reactivity during the various 
experimental manipulations. The only significant relation existed between BIS and HR reactivity 
during the Guilt manipulation, such that higher BIS sensitivity predicted greater HR acceleration 
(β = .58, p = .02). None of the BAS scales were significantly related to any measure of 
physiological reactivity. 
Discussion 
Self-conscious moral emotions of guilt and pride motivate adaptive social behaviours 
(Leary, 2007). I created a social psychology paradigm of high ecological validity to investigate 
associations between guilt and pride‟s behavioural responses and their underlying physiological 
substrates. The data obtained not only confirmed effective emotion elicitation, but uncovered a 
cardiac SNS arousal pattern for guilt versus a somatic SNS arousal pattern for pride. This novel 
finding provides support for these emotions‟ distinct motivational functions and may be 
extrapolated to predict the impact of these emotions on psychophysiological processes outside 
the laboratory. In terms of behavioural motivation, high punishment sensitivity (as measured by 
Carver and White‟s BIS scale) was uniquely associated with greater self-reported guilt, while no 
relation was found between reward sensitivity (as measured by the overall BAS scale, or by any 
of its subscales) and self-reported pride. Finally, subjective ratings of guilt were strongly 
associated with parasympathetic withdrawal, as assessed by both time- and frequency-domain 












Did the Emotion Inductions Work? 
The present investigation was designed to expand on recent trends in the field of emotion 
elicitation, where researchers strive increasingly to design paradigms that will elicit current 
emotions in psychologically real and engaging situations (Harmon-Jones et al., 2007; Herrald & 
Tomaka, 2002; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Both univariate and multivariate analyses of self-
report data confirmed that guilt and pride were preferentially elicited by the respective emotion 
manipulations: Not only did both target emotions increase significantly from baseline, but they 
also contributed more than any other emotion in separating the Guilt and Pride conditions from 
the Neutral condition. In addition, the manipulation check, where participants were forced to 
select the emotion they experienced most during the experiment, showed the manipulation to be 
very effective and emotion-specific. No explicit verbal references to guilt and pride were made 
during any part of the experiment, suggesting that these emotions were truly felt.  
In the present investigation, I analyzed various self-reported emotions in addition to target 
affects through multivariate analyses. Participants were therefore required to rate several 
emotions that they may or may not have experienced at the time. While this multivariate 
approach may complicate matters, both for the participant and the experimenter, i.e., in terms of 
data analysis, it may also lead to invaluable insights into the subjective nature of the complex 
moral emotions. Emotion researchers typically try to elicit pure emotions, yet it is well 
established that different emotions often co-occur, and that, together, they may represent the 
particular emotional profiles that provide an adaptive advantage for the individual (Izard & 
Ackerman, 2000). For instance, in the Guilt condition of the current study, participants primarily 
reported feeling guilty, together with experiencing other negative emotions, i.e., anxiety, anger, 
shame and general negative affect (particularly disgust with situation). These emotions were also 
significantly correlated with experimentally-induced guilt.  
For my purposes, however, it was important to distinguish guilt from the similar emotion 
of shame, even though these emotions have been reported to be much more highly correlated in 
response to self-caused than other-caused wrongdoing (Schmader & Lickel, 2006). The most 
salient distinction in the literature between shame and guilt, as advanced by Tangney and 
colleagues (2007), is the focus on self versus behaviour. Whereas a particular action is regarded 
as negative in guilt, the entire self is typically regarded as negative in shame (Lewis, 1971). I 












should have thought, felt, or acted differently) during the post-experimental interviews. 
Examples of typical responses included “feeling guilty about getting the lab assistant into 
trouble,” “wishing I never took the money,” “feeling uncomfortable and responsible,” “wanting 
to write a letter to apologize,” and “feeling like I caused the situation.” It therefore appeared they 
were experiencing a deep regret over wrongdoing, accompanied by sincere empathy for the 
research assistant (who had ostensibly lost her job). Many investigators agree that notions of 
wrongdoing and responsibility for causing harm are critical features or determinants of guilt 
(Kubany & Watson, 2003; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). These results, then, are consistent with a 
multidimensional model of guilt (Kubany & Watson, 2003), because both negative affect and 
guilt-related cognitions could be identified.   
Participants in the Pride condition reported feeling mostly pride and satisfaction, and 
these emotions were also highly correlated in this condition. Responses of pride and satisfaction 
are consistent with previous research, where pride has been conceptualized as the mean response 
to ratings of pride and satisfaction (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Examples of typical responses 
after the pride induction included “feeling proud and encouraged”, “feeling that it was fun”, 
“feeling pleased, yet anxious at the attention”, and “feeling good and encouraged to do better.” 
Although the Pride manipulation was successful, one may argue that it was less effective 
than the Guilt manipulation. This is evident from the discriminant function analysis, which was 
unable to discriminate the Pride condition from the other two experimental conditions 
successfully. Increases in ratings of pride, from pre- to post-emotion manipulation, were also 
smaller in the Pride condition than increases in ratings of guilt in the Guilt condition. Several 
factors may account for the fact that the pride manipulation was less emotionally intense than the 
guilt manipulation. First is the fact positive emotions are more difficult to elicit in the laboratory 
than negative emotions, a fact that relates back to the “negativity bias” of  organisms (Davidson 
et al., 2000). This account is described in more detail in the General Discussion. A second 
possibility is that Pride participants may have been skeptical about their task performance and 
consequently may not have accepted the pride-inducing feedback as true. One or two participants 
from the Pride condition did, in fact, admit to questioning the experimental performance 
feedback; however, those who outright rejected the feedback as false were excluded from the 
sample before data analysis. A third possibility concerns the nature of the experimental 











a moral scenario affecting other people or society. It therefore did not carry the same weight or 
level of significance as the Guilt manipulation did. One can imagine that positive feelings of 
pride would be much stronger and earnest if they were in connection to a real contribution one 
has made to society, rather than one‟s performance on a task for which the outcome is probably 
irrelevant.  
Despite being less effective than the Guilt manipulation, the Pride manipulation 
nevertheless provoked significant positive affect and produced a physiological pattern of arousal 
distinct from that of the Neutral and Guilt conditions, as elaborated in the next section. 
Moreover, SCL responses of Pride participants were significantly higher than those of Neutral 
participants, and were of a similar magnitude to those of Guilt participants. Because SCL may be 
interpreted as a measure of primary arousal that reflects the degree of autonomic output 
(Cacioppo et al., 2000), the data suggest that both emotion conditions constituted successful 
emotion inductions. (SCL responses in the Neutral condition may be attributed to mere 
interpersonal interaction with the confederates.) Because the Guilt and Pride manipulations 
therefore produced comparable arousal levels, the current study provided a favorable context 
within which to detect reliable autonomic differences between guilt and pride (Frazier, Strauss, & 
Steinhauer, 2004).  
 
Somatovisceral Responses of Guilt and Pride  
The physiological data supported clear between-group ANS differences: Whereas Guilt 
and Pride participants displayed similar levels of general arousal (i.e., SCL) compared to Neutral 
participants, only those in the Guilt condition displayed significantly increased HR. The fact that 
PEP and RMSSD were not significantly correlated in any experimental condition, however, 
supports the idea that cardiac responses can be mediated by simultaneous or independent 
changes in PNS and SNS outflows to the heart (Cacioppo et al., 1994). I endeavoured to 
distinguish between these effects in my physiological analyses. 
The HR changes of Guilt participants were associated with reciprocal modulation of 
sympathetic (i.e., decreased PEP) and vagal (i.e., decreased HF power and RMSSD) outflows to 
the heart, with decreased PEP persisting through the post-emotion manipulation period. Analysis 
of self-report emotion ratings‟ relation to indices of physiological reactivity supported these 












assessed by both time and frequency domain measures of HRV during EM and Post-EM, as well 
as PEP reactivity during Post-EM. Pride participants displayed low cardiac reactivity, with heart 
rate increases predominantly associated with vagal withdrawal (i.e., decreased HF power and 
RMSSD). Vagal unloading (i.e., RMSSD) of Pride participants, however, showed a faster 
recovery effect during the post-emotion manipulation period than that of Guilt participants. 
Subjective reports of pride were also positively associated with increased vagal power (i.e., 
RMSSD) during Post-EM. The modest HR increases of Pride participants are consistent with 
previous reports of low cardiac reactivity during pride or other positive emotions like happiness 
and contentment (Ekman et al., 1983; Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).  
Intercorrelations between physiological reactivity measures supported the above 
dissociation between PNS and SNS contributions in the Guilt and Pride conditions. In the Pride 
condition, emotion-induced increases in HR were negatively correlated with RMSSD, reflecting 
the negative chronotropic effects of vagal output to the heart. In the Guilt condition, however, 
both RMSSD and PEP were negatively correlated with HR. Stress-induced cardiac sympathetic 
activation shortens PEP because of increased cardiac inotropy, giving rise to increased HR. 
Ancillary HR analyses, with PEP and RMSSD as additional covariates, further supported the 
view that reciprocal vagal withdrawal and cardiac sympathetic activation contributed to the 
tachycardia observed in the Guilt condition. 
Interestingly, both Guilt and Pride participants displayed attenuated HF power and 
RMSSD during the emotion manipulation. In Pride participants, however, the decrease in HF 
power was accompanied by a shift to LF power (TF power remained unchanged), in the absence 
of significant HR increases. Consistent with previous literature, my data provided strong support 
for vagal modulation of LF, in that LF power was strongly correlated with HF power during all 
experimental conditions (Martinmäki et al., 2006). Increases in cardiac LF power are thought to 
reflect somatic SNS activation of vasomotor nerves, with the resultant vasoconstriction then 
leading to baroreflex-mediated vagal modulation (Brychta et al., 2007; Moak et al., 2009). 
Because Pride participants displayed no PEP shortening, I interpreted the reciprocal change in 
cardiac spectral power in these participants as a shift from respiratory-mediated to baroreflex-
mediated vagal drive. This response is in stark contrast to the pronounced PEP shortening 











were not correlated in any experimental condition further substantiated the interpretation of these 
variables as reflecting cardiac and somatic arousal, respectively.  
To test the hypothesis that strong negative reactions take longer to down-regulate than 
equally strong positive reactions, I compared SCL decay (as outlined in the Method section) 
across experimental conditions. Because the relationship of temporal measures of electrodermal 
responding (e.g., recovery time) to psychophysiological processes is not as well understood as 
measures of amplitude or frequency of the skin conductance response, these measures are 
employed less frequently in research (Dawson et al., 2000). The current results, however, suggest 
that the measure of SCL decay holds promise for discerning sympathetic activity. In particular, 
my measure of skin conductance decay indicated that the average guilt response far outweighed 
responses in the Pride and Neutral conditions in terms of the magnitude of skin conductance level 
after the emotion induction. These results are consistent with previous data showing negative 
events to be stronger and longer-lasting than equally strong positive events (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Some have argued that negative affect is up to three 
times stronger than positive affect, such that “one bad day must be outweighed by two or three 
good days in order to maintain average levels of subjective well-being” (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004, 
p. 44). The large variability in the SCL decay data, however, suggests that huge individual 
differences are at play in the down-regulation of affect.  
 
Individual Differences 
In the present investigation I examined the moderating effects of dispositional BIS and 
BAS sensitivities on both subjective and physiological emotion responses. In the Guilt condition, 
behavioural inhibition sensitivity, as measured by the Carver and White BIS/BAS scales, was 
uniquely associated with experimentally-induced levels of guilt, and unrelated to pre-
experiment/baseline guilt. The implication of this finding is that individuals high in punishment 
sensitivity are more likely than those low in punishment sensitivity, to experience intense guilt in 
guilt-inducing situations. Experimentally-induced guilt, however, was also negatively correlated 
with the BAS-Drive scale, which quantifies motivation toward desirable goals. The interpretation 
here may be that high BAS scorers are insensitive to BIS cues of punishment and therefore less 
likely to experience negative affect in general. Support for this interpretation stems from the fact 












i.e., anxiety, shame, and general negative affect.  
The fact that BIS correlated significantly with state, but not trait, guilt is also in line with 
literature: The BIS/BAS scales were not originally designed to assess general affective tone, but 
rather to reflect behavioural tendencies in situations of threat or incentive (Carver & White, 
1994). For example, given the role of the BIS in avoiding punishment via passive avoidance, 
someone who realizes his/her own BIS vulnerability may avoid threatening situations and in the 
process develop personality dimensions of constraint, e.g., Harmavoidance and Control (Fowles, 
2000). In specific situations of threat, however, such a person will experience greater negative 
affect (in this case guilt), than someone with low BIS sensitivity. The distinction between BIS 
and trait negative affect was supported by the fact that negative affect (as measured by the 
PANAS) was not significantly correlated with scores on the BIS scale (p = .18).   
Although guilt‟s role in regulating moral behaviour is widely acknowledged, contrasting 
views in the literature propose different functional accounts of guilt in terms of its underlying 
motivational orientation. Theorists from the prejudice literature argue that discrepant/prejudiced 
responses lead to increased guilt, which functions as a punishment cue and heightens motivation 
for prejudice reduction (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993). The 
increased self-directed negative affect (i.e., guilt) is thought to instigate a self-regulatory cycle 
that should cause the individual to respond more carefully in future situations (Monteith et al., 
2002; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). This program of research thus associates guilt with 
the interruption of ongoing behaviour and engagement in self-reflection. Alternative accounts of 
guilt, however, focus on its adaptive role as promoter of communal or prosocial behaviour 
(Baumeister et al., 1994, 1995; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In this 
theoretical view, guilt is believed to stimulate actions to make amends and restore social 
relationships, e.g., apologizing, confessing, and engaging in reparative behaviours, which would 
in turn alleviate the agony of the guilt itself (Kubany & Watson, 2003). Research focused on 
guilt‟s prosocial nature, therefore highlight its function in behavioural approach motivation. 
Amodio and colleagues (2007) integrated the above accounts by separating immediate 
effects of guilt from its more distal implications, thus forming a dynamic model of its function.  
By this model, guilt first functions as a punishment cue that reduces approach motivation, after 
which it becomes reparative or prosocial when a suitable opportunity for amendment presents 











guilt‟s motivational function. The positive correlation between BIS sensitivity and 
experimentally-induced guilt supports the idea that initial guilt functions as a punishment that 
promotes increased self-focus. The inhibitory/self-reflective nature of guilt was in fact directly 
evident in one case, where the participant was so lost in thought following the guilt induction that 
she forgot to continue with the experimental tasks until summoned to do so. Other participants 
also reported feeling distracted and unable to concentrate wholly on the tasks at hand after the 
emotion induction.   
Support for the prosocial nature of guilt was also sought in the present investigation. The 
questionnaire that was used to assess prosocial motivation, however, did not detect significantly 
more prosocial responding for Guilt condition participants, than for Pride or Neutral condition 
participants. This result may be attributed to the fact that the questionnaire did not offer any 
restoration directly related to participants‟ current guilty feelings. The questionnaire was 
designed to disguise the fact that it tapped prosocial motivation (it involved voluntary 
participation in some unrelated HIV/AIDS studies), based on the notion that any prosocial 
incentives would generalize to other social domains. Findings contradicted this notion, however, 
which rather suggests that any prosocial behaviour that alleviates feelings of guilt should be 
directly related to the original transgression. This assumption is in line with evidence from the 
prejudice literature, where self-affirmation in areas irrelevant to the prejudice-related 
discrepancy, has not necessarily restored the individual‟s self-integrity (Dutton & Lake, 1973). 
Evidence for reparative behaviour, however, stemmed from the fact that 9 out of 16 Guilt 
participants volunteered to give back the money they had received as soon as the experiment 
concluded. Other prosocial motivations (e.g., wanting to write a letter of apology, and wanting to 
restore the research assistant‟s job and reputation) were also identified during the post-
experimental interview, as mentioned earlier.  
In terms of pride‟s motivation, it has recently been described as the “most important 
human emotion” to motivate social behaviour (Tracy & Robins, 2007a, p. 147). When we 
succeed in a task or meet a goal, feelings of pride are associated with increased social interaction 
(Noftle & Robins, as cited in Tracy & Robins, 2007), enhanced performance at subsequent tasks 
(Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), as well as increased efforts toward future goals despite short-term 
losses (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). The achievement-oriented form of pride is thus consistent 












measured by the BIS/BAS scales (Fowles, 1980; Gray, 1982).  
In the Pride condition, however, I found no positive correlation between BAS sensitivity 
and experimentally-induced pride; nor was there a significant increase in HR or PEP reactivity, 
putative physiological markers of BAS (Arnett & Newman, 2000; Brenner et al., 2005; Fowles, 
1980), compared to the Neutral condition. The most feasible explanation for this pattern of data 
may be that the pride manipulation did not include any specific reward incentives and that it 
therefore may not have produced significant changes in behavioural activation. The pride 
manipulation was also less intense than the guilt manipulation, and therefore may have led to 
only marginal increases in behavioural activation. A third possibility, however, and the 
explanation I favor, assumes that pride, like guilt, involves different stages. Initially, pride 
follows a completed success and serves to provide information about an individual‟s current 
social status (Tracy & Robins, 2007a); it is therefore unlikely to motivate immediate further 
action (i.e., BAS). After a while, however, a new challenge appears and it is then that „higher‟ 
pride will activate more action than „low‟ pride. This view is consistent with the fact that, unlike 
negative emotions, positive emotions in general are not associated with specific action programs 
that motivate immediate further actions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). I therefore propose that 
initial pride, as measured in the current study, does not motivate behavioural activation. 
While the BIS/BAS scales pertain to personal reward, authentic pride is also considered 
an emotion that motivates prosocial behaviour, i.e., altruistic acts or reward for society (Tracy & 
Robins, 2007a). In the current study data I did find some support for the prosocial nature of 
pride, however, results were inconclusive possibly due to the lack of sensitivity of the prosocial 
measure. Nevertheless, Pride participants responded the most favourably to the prosocial 
questionnaire after the emotion induction. They were thus more likely than participants from the 
Guilt or Neutral conditions to offer their availability to participate in future research studies 
without further financial reward.   
 To assess the correspondence between behavioural ratings of approach and inhibition 
tendencies and physiological parameters, I conducted simple regression analyses. Consistent 
with previous findings (Brenner et al., 2005; Colder & O'Connor, 2004), self-reported BIS/BAS 
sensitivities were largely unrelated to state reactivity measures of the BIS and BAS. The only 
significant finding was that higher self-reported BIS, for participants in the Guilt condition, 











with electrodermal responding under conditions of frustrative nonreward (Fowles, 1988), the 
current finding is consistent with high autonomic arousal typically observed in high BIS scorers. 
For example, in the anxiety literature, children and adults with high behavioural inhibition and 
social anxiety tend to exhibit higher resting levels of HR and SCL, as well as greater HR and 
electrodermal reactivity during stress (Garrada, Connel, & Taylor, 1991; Mezzacappa et al., 
1997; van Lang et al., 2007).    
 Consistent with previous findings, BIS and BAS sensitivities were also largely unrelated 
to resting levels of  the physiological measures assessed (Heponiemi et al., 2004). In line with 
theoretical formulations of the BIS, however, self-reported BIS predicted higher resting levels of 
SCL. This finding is consistent with the longstanding notion that electrodermal lability is 
associated with trait anxiety (Fowles, Kochanska, & Murray, 2000; Pole, 2007), which falls 
under BIS control (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Interpretations regarding Guilt condition 
participants‟ physiological responses and possible approach/avoidance motivations are 
considered in more detail in the General Discussion. 
 
Measuring Guilt: Some Caveats 
The finding that neither baseline nor experimentally-induced guilt was significantly 
related to the TOSCA-3 index of Guilt-Proneness, may prima facie appear contradictory. It is of 
paramount importance, however, that measures assessing different aspects of guilt and shame not 
be used interchangeably, as explained below.  
Although most individuals have the capacity to experience both shame and guilt in 
distinct scenarios (Tangney, 1990, 1992), there are myriads of negative situations that may elicit 
either emotion. When faced with such an ambiguous situation, one‟s predisposition to respond 
with either guilt or shame is termed guilt-proneness and shame-proneness, respectively 
(Tangney, 1990). Measures that assess responses to such hypothetical scenarios, e.g., the 
TOSCA, thus typically assess guilt-proneness and shame-proneness. By comparison, some self-
report measures have been developed to assess the frequency of actual feelings of guilt, i.e., state 
and trait guilt, such as the Guilt Inventory (GI; Kugler & Jones, 1992). Scenario-based and 
frequency-based constructs of guilt, however, are typically unrelated and may show different 
patterns of association with other individual difference variables (Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 












prosocial/empathic aspects of guilt (Tangney, 1991), the GI is more associated with anxious 
guilt (Einstein & Lanning, 1998).   
Considering the above, it is readily apparent why Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman (2010) 
recently found a positive association between guilt and BAS sensitivity: The TOSCA, which 
they employed to assess guilt proneness, is associated with empathic/reparative guilt (i.e., 
approach motivation). Similarly, the relation they observed between BIS and shame is explained 
by the fact that shame-proneness, as measured by the TOSCA, has been associated with self-
oriented personal distress, which is more in line with behaviour inhibition (Tangney, 1991). 
Despite the significantly smaller sample size of the current investigation (N = 49), compared to 
that of Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman (N = 120), I was able to replicate their findings regarding the 
predictive value of BIS on shame proneness, and BAS on guilt proneness, with reasonable 
accuracy.  
As the present results demonstrated, however, measures of guilt and shame proneness 
may have little to no correspondence with the strength of an emotional reaction during a guilt- or 
shame-inducing situation. The current findings offer support for the interpretation that people 
more sensitive to punishment will experience greater guilt during a guilt-inducing situation. 
 
Limitations and Conclusions 
The current study‟s results reinforce the importance of studying emotions in vivo and in 
ecologically valid settings. A number of potential methodological limitations, however, need to 
be addressed. Firstly, respiration was not analyzed in the current study. I was therefore not able 
to distinguish between  respiration-dependent and respiration-independent PNS activity 
(Rainville et al., 2006), or to verify that respiration fell within the HF band.
6
  Houtveen and 
colleagues (2002), however, showed that respiratory-corrected RSA did not produce a better 
estimate of vagal modulation of heart rate in most stress situations. Moreover, the current 
experimental manipulation was not expected to alter respiratory parameters appreciably 
(participants neither talked nor moved), in which case uncorrected RSA may be permissible for 
group contrasts (Berntson et al., 1997).  
Another limitation is the 500-Hz sampling rate I employed for physiological recording, 
                                                 
6It should be noted, however, that the peak frequencies of all participants, which should reflect 











which is below gold standard for ICG recording. Reliable impedance data, however, have been 
obtained even at 250 Hz using similar instrumentation. In particular, PEP estimates obtained at 
these lower sampling rates have been reported to have high short-term and temporal stability 
(Goedhart et al., 2006; Vrijkotte, van Doornen, & de Geus, 2004), as well as high heritability 
(Kupper, Willemsen, Boomsma, & de Geus, 2006).  
A third limitation is that, in terms of the experimental design, the use of a between-
subjects design over multiple experimental conditions may have introduced unwanted sources of 
physiological variability between participants, despite my efforts to covary out baseline 
differences. Within-subject designs, however, are not necessarily a good solution to this problem, 
because their internal validity is easily threatened (Cook & Campbell, 1979). They may, for 
instance, suffer from adaptation and order effects, or be entirely impractical in designs requiring 
deception in that the element of surprise is sacrificed (Stemmler et al., 2001).  
A fourth limitation involves the fact that I investigated guilt and pride in a female-only 
sample. As noted earlier, I did so to avoid confounds due to possible sex-by-emotion effects. 
Because the issue of sex differences requires a more comprehensive discussion, however, I 
reserve this topic for the General Discussion. 
A final limitation of the present paradigm was that the post-experiment prosocial 
questionnaire was not sufficiently sensitive to detect prosocial motivation in the respective 
emotion conditions. For example, in the Guilt condition, a better approach may have been to 
focus the questionnaire directly on behaviours that would have alleviated/rectified guilt in that 
particular context. Much work is still necessary to investigate prosocial responding following a 
guilt or pride-inducing situation, and to determine which emotion is most likely to motivate 
prosocial behaviour. Preliminary results from the current investigation tentatively suggest, 
however, that pride may be a bigger prosocial motivator than guilt. 
In conclusion, the central finding of this study was the strong but dissociable sympathetic 
arousal during current experiences of guilt and pride. Whereas guilt was associated with 
reciprocal vagal withdrawal and cardiac sympathetic arousal, in pride the SNS activity was 
manifested by transient non-cardiac somatic arousal. Self-reported guilt was furthermore 
positively correlated with BIS sensitivity, supporting the conceptualization that early guilt 
functions as a punishment cue. In contrast, bodily arousal in early pride may be associated with a 












STUDY 2: THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF GUILT 
Over the past 20 years, numerous neuroimaging studies have been conducted on the basic 
emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, fear and disgust); these have led to a better understanding of 
these emotions‟ neuroanatomical correlates and their functional organisation (see e.g., Phan et 
al., 2002; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2004; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). It is only in 
the last decade or so, however, that neuroimaging researchers have turned their attention to more 
complex moral cognitions and the emotions that arise in social contexts, such as guilt, 
embarrassment, and compassion (Immordino-Yang et al., 2009; Kédia et al., 2008; Moll et al., 
2007). Given the complexity of these constructs, neuroimaging investigations are often 
hampered by considerable methodological challenges. Moreover, increasingly sophisticated 
methods of data acquisition and analysis can easily take the focus away from the elicitation side 
of research, making it tempting for researchers to neglect difficult issues surrounding emotion 
elicitation. Levenson (2003a) expressly cautions against this pitfall, arguing that emotion 
research data will only be as strong as the weakest link in the emotion manipulation strategy.  
 Moral emotions are a great deal more difficult to elicit in the confines of an MRI scanner 
than basic emotions are. To date, most neuroimaging studies on moral cognition have focused on 
the neural correlates of moral judgment or ethical decision-making  (Greene et al., 2004; Greene 
et al., 2001; Heekeren et al., 2003; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati et al., 2002; Sommer et al., 
2010; Young & Saxe, 2008), while those that aimed to investigate specific moral emotions have 
primarily made use of paradigms employing emotive sentences or vignettes presented to 
participants in the scanner (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Berthoz et al., 2006; Finger et al., 2006; 
Moll, de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2005; Takahashi et al., 2004, 2008; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009). 
Paradigms that make use of descriptive scenarios, however, focus on the perception, evaluation, 
and interpretation of socially relevant stimuli, rather than the actual elicitation of real emotions 
that motivate social behaviour (Takahashi et al., 2004). Another limitation of scenario-based 
paradigms is that they do not control for the influence of cultural differences between 
individuals, which may impact significantly on the generation of self-conscious emotions. In this 
regard, Haidt (2003) stressed that self-conscious emotions depend critically on aspects of social 
life that vary between Western and non-Western cultures. Moreover, the social background of 











introduce confounding factors into the processing of scenarios and thereby create unwanted 
variability in the data (Nichols, 2002; Takahashi et al., 2008).  
Perhaps the biggest confounding factor within scenario-based emotion elicitation 
methods, however, is that participants are not placed in emotion-evoking situations that are 
relevant to them personally as the causal agent within a real situation, i.e., as the person who 
performed the embarrassing, shameful or praise-worthy act. Rather, they are asked to imagine a 
sequence of hypothetical emotional events with themselves as the protagonist (Kédia et al., 
2008). Intuitively, an imagined scenario would induce a far weaker form of emotion than a real 
emotion-provoking situation. From a neural perspective, Finger et al. (2006) has argued that, 
although one may expect significant overlap between neural activations associated with moral 
emotions in scenario-based methods versus real-life experiences, neural responses during the 
real-life experience of moral emotions would additionally include increased activity in regions 
associated with heightened emotional arousal, such as the amygdala, thalamus, insula, anterior 
cingulate cortex, and medial orbitofrontal cortex (Critchley, 2005; Critchley, Mathias et al., 
2002; Patterson, Ungerleider, & Bandettini, 2002; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Williams et al., 
2005).   
In light of the above considerations, an important aim of the present investigation was to 
contribute to the study of moral emotions by devising an emotion elicitation paradigm of high 
ecological validity that would be effective inside an MRI scanner. I sought to elicit real emotions 
of guilt and pride that would be personally relevant to participants in order to identify neural 
activation associated with the experience of these emotions. To achieve this goal, I developed a 
neuroimaging paradigm based on a central finding in social psychology research, namely that of 
lingering implicit prejudice toward certain social groups in self-professed low-prejudice 
individuals (Devine et al., 1991; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). A careful emotion manipulation 
was constructed to elicit guilt and pride in such individuals; essentially participants were led to 
think that they had either transgressed their personal moral values (guilt induction), or that they 
had responded in accordance with their personal moral values (pride induction) (Moll et al., 
2008). 
 
Implicit Prejudice as a Context for Emotion Elicitation 












against those who are different (e.g., in their ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference) do not rid us 
immediately of prejudiced responses (Allport, 1954). Rather, such efforts are likely to be 
accompanied by a great deal of internal moral conflict between previously held stereotypic 
beliefs, and current efforts to eradicate all such prejudiced beliefs and reactions (Myrdal, 1944). 
This is particularly true in the South African context, where most people have to overcome a 
lifetime of prejudice-promoting socialization experiences (Williams et al., 2008).  
Low-prejudice individuals are especially vulnerable to internal conflict between enduring 
prejudiced thoughts that are automatically activated, and consciously endorsed egalitarian values 
(Devine et al., 1991). Devine (1989) argued that these contradictory thoughts and feelings can 
coexist within the same individual and may be the reason why low-prejudice individuals often 
appear to have prejudiced responses that are not in line with their personal beliefs. Such 
discrepant responses have been demonstrated repeatedly in the literature, to the extent that 
people who report nonprejudiced attitudes on self-report measures frequently manifest 
prejudiced reactions on indirect, implicit, automatic, physiological, or neural indices of prejudice 
(Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003; Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, 
& Williams, 1995; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977; Phelps et al., 2000). Adopting a personal 
motivation to overcome prejudiced tendencies therefore does not guarantee that someone will 
respond without bias across different response domains (Monteith et al., 1993). Several models 
have been proposed to try and explain this phenomenon (e.g., Amodio et al., 2004; Crosby, 
Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Devine, 1989; Katz, Wackenhut, & Glass, 1986; Poskocil, 1977; 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000); however, a detailed account of this literature is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 Of special interest to the present investigation, however, is the fact that discrepancies 
between personal standards and actual responses (of prejudice) are associated with distinct 
affective consequences. Several theoretical frameworks have associated the transgression of 
personal standards with negative affect or psychological discomfort, although theories differ in 
their level of specificity (e.g., Duval & Silvia, 2002; Heider, 1958). Allport (1954), for example, 
argued that one would experience specific feelings of compunction (i.e., guilt and self-criticism) 
when one‟s actual reactions stand in contrast to one‟s personal values, and consequently, to how 
one should have behaved. Another prominent field of investigation linking negative affect with 











1957). The basic tenet of dissonance theorists is that cognitive dissonance is aroused when one 
holds two contradictory ideas simultaneously, or when a certain behaviour threatens one‟s 
internalized standards or self-concept. In dissonance theory, however, the precise nature of the 
negative affect that ensues is usually expressed as a feeling of psychological discomfort or 
frustration, and is not usually described in terms of discrete negative emotions (Elliot & Devine, 
1994; Harmon-Jones, 2000).  
 Higgins‟s self-discrepancy theory, however, provides a more articulated framework and 
predicts that distinct negative emotional states will arise from specific types of perceived self-
discrepancies (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986). Higgins posits that 
people evaluate their “actual” selves in terms of “ideal” and “ought” standards that are imposed 
by the self or some other(s), such that deviations from these create distinct negative emotions. 
For example, self-discrepancy theory predicts that discrepancies between actual/own versus 
ideal/other standards will result in vulnerability to shame and embarrassment, whereas 
discrepancies between actual/own versus should/own standards will result in vulnerability to 
feelings of guilt, self-contempt, and agitation (Higgins, 1987). Conversely, self-discrepancy 
theory predicts that ought discrepancies based on others‟ standards (i.e., should/other), should 
lead to feelings of threat and anxiety, and possibly resentment.  
 Self-discrepancy theory has become part of mainstream theorizing about guilt and shame 
and can be traced back to Freudian opposition between the id or ego, and the ego-ideal and 
superego (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In neo-Freudian theory, shame ensues when one 
undermines the idealized standards of the ego-ideal; in contrast, guilt ensues when one violates 
prohibitions imposed by the superego (Piers & Singer, 1953). In a similar fashion, Higgins‟s 
(1987) theory clearly distinguishes between the type of self-discrepancy that would be associated 
with either guilt or shame: Shame will ensue if an act is construed as undermining that which one 
aspires to (i.e., ideals or goals); guilt will ensue if an act is construed as flouting a personally 
accepted standard for how one ought to be (i.e., norms or prohibitions) (Teroni & Deonna, 2008). 
Although self-discrepancy theory appears prima facie appealing and has been validated by some 
research (Monteith et al., 1993; Plant & Devine, 1998), not all experimental studies have found 
support for it (Ozgul, Heubeck, Ward, & Wilkinson, 2003; Phillips & Silvia, 2005; Tangney et 
al., 1998). Some of these claims are considered in more detail in the Discussion of Study 2.  












into their self-concepts and therefore serve as a personal should standard (Allport, 1954; Devine, 
1989; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980), it follows that low-prejudice individuals should experience 
specific feelings of guilt and self-criticism when they transgress their personal standards. Several 
theorists outside of the prejudice domain have also argued that one would feel accountable and 
guilty following the transgression of one‟s own, internalized, moral standards  (Ausubel, 1955; 
Carver & Scheier, 1990; Hoffman, 1975). From the above, it thus appears reasonable to suggest 
that low-prejudice individuals view their nonprejudiced values as moral standards that they strive 
to uphold. Moral standards upheld in this way have been termed prescriptive moral regulation, 
because the focus is on what we should do, rather than proscriptive moral regulation, where the 
focus is on what we should not do (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Recently, Sheikh 
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that specific types of transgressions are differentially related to 
judgments of guilt versus shame: Transgressions that were more likely to represent prescriptive 
moral violations predicted ratings of guilt, whereas transgressions that were more likely to 
represent proscriptive moral violations predicted ratings of shame. Taken together, research 
suggests that low-prejudice individuals should experience specific feelings of guilt and remorse 
when they transgress their own internalized moral standards.  
Devine et al. (1991) tested this prediction by obtaining information from participants on 
how they should respond, according to personal standards, and how they actually would respond, 
in contact situations with Black people and homosexual men. She demonstrated that only low-
prejudice participants with large discrepancies in should-would responses experienced the more 
specific compunction-related feelings of guilt and self-criticism. In contrast, high-prejudice 
participants with such discrepancies experienced only global discomfort, but not guilt. In keeping 
with Higgins‟s (1987) theory, high-prejudice participants‟ personal standards appeared to be 
based on society‟s conceptions to respond without prejudice, rather than on their own. Low-
prejudice participants also demonstrated significantly higher levels of internalization of their 
personal standards than high-prejudice participants, i.e., these standards were important and 
central to their self-concept, and they were committed to responding in accordance with them.  
In subsequent research by Monteith and colleagues (1993), they were able to corroborate 
these findings of differential affective reactions in response to prejudice discrepancies for high- 
and low-prejudice individuals. In particular, they replicated these response tendencies in 











men (Monteith, 1993). Deceiving participants into believing that they responded in a discrepant 
manner thus had the same effect, in terms of affective responses, as imagined scenarios. 
 
Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice  
Motivations to respond without prejudice, however, are complex and can stem from 
conceptually distinct sources. People may be motivated primarily by sincere changes in their 
personal attitude (i.e., they may be internally motivated), or they may be motivated primarily by 
external pressures and social desirability concerns (i.e., they may be externally motivated). Plant 
and Devine (1998) devised self-report measures, the Internal and External Motivation to 
Respond Without Prejudice scales (IMS/EMS), to tap into these two distinct sources of 
motivation. They predicted that qualitatively different patterns of emotional distress would result 
from discrepancies of failing to live up to both one‟s own and others‟ standards, as a function of 
the source of motivation to respond without prejudice. Based on Higgins‟s (1987) self-
discrepancy theory, they argued that (a) people should experience feelings of guilt and self-
contempt when their actual responses violate an own-based should standard, but that (b) when 
actual responses violate a society-based should standard, feelings of impending punishment 
would ensue (i.e., fear and anxiety).  
To test these hypotheses, Plant and Devine (1998) assessed should-would discrepancies 
as in previous studies (e.g., Devine et al., 1991), but with participants evaluating their 
discrepancies according to standards prescribed either by themselves (i.e., personal) or by their 
university campus (i.e., societal). Results for the group who assessed discrepancies from 
personal standards are particularly relevant for the present discussion, and are therefore 
discussed in more detail. In line with expectations, participants with high internal motivation 
(IMS) scores were associated with less prejudiced should responses. In addition, larger 
discrepancies between should and would responses for these individuals were associated with 
more negative self-directed affect (i.e., guilt). In contrast, high external motivation (EMS) scores 
were associated with more prejudiced would responses. Taken together, those individuals who 
had high IMS as well as high EMS scores were most likely to have large should-would response 
discrepancies, and were therefore more likely to experience elevated levels of self-directed 
negative affect (i.e., guilt and self-criticism). Individuals with high IMS and low EMS scores, on 












negative self-directed affect. According to Devine and Monteith (1993), the latter may be 
individuals who have developed the ability to consistently respond in agreement with their 
nonprejudiced standards (see also Plant & Devine, 2000). Conversely, individuals who are high 
in both internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice appear to be more likely to 
respond in discrepant ways from their personal standards, and therefore experience specific 
feelings of guilt as a result of this personal failure (Plant, Devine, & Brazy, 2003). Such 
individuals are concerned about others‟ perception of themselves, especially if their behaviour 
reveals prejudice.  
The specific findings described above are consistent with more general theories of 
motivation and internalization, which state that goals and values are more successfully pursued 
the more internalized or self-determined they are (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Kelman, 1958; Meissner, 
1981; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Self-determination theory, for example, p sits that people may vary 
in the reasons they have for adhering to certain goals or values on a continuum of self-
determination: At the lowest end, external reasons reflect primarily external motivations for 
behaviour and concerns about others‟ approval, while identified reasons constitute the opposite 
end and reflect highly internalized, self-determined, motivations (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & 
Connell, 1989). Inbetween these two extremes are moderately self-determined, or introjected, 
motivations for pursuing goals and values; these are characterized as regulation based on a 
combination of internal and external motivations. Introjected responses are therefore argued to 
be better maintained than less self-determined or external responses, yet this type of regulation is 
not completely integrated with the self and is therefore thought to be unstable and likely to break 
down in challenging situations (Deci & Ryan, 2000).  
Devine and colleagues tested these predictions in the context of racial bias (Devine, 
Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). They obtained participants‟ responses on an 
explicit (self-report) measure of prejudice, in which responses are easy to control, as well as on 
two implicit measures of prejudice (an evaluative priming task and the Implicit Association 
Test), in which responses are more difficult to control. Devine et al. demonstrated that the most 
highly self-determined participants (i.e., high IMS/low EMS) were very effective at regulating 
their prejudiced responses on both the explicit as well as on the implicit measures. In contrast, 
high IMS/high EMS individuals were effective at regulating their prejudiced responses on the 











controlling prejudiced responses on the implicit measures. Similar results were obtained by 
Amodio and colleagues, who demonstrated the moderating effects of internal and external 
motivation to respond without prejudice on physiological and neural measures assessing 
automatic (implicit) levels of affective race bias (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008; 
Amodio et al., 2003). Despite nonprejudiced self-reports, high IMS/high EMS participants 
exhibited larger levels of automatic affective race bias than those participants who were 
primarily internally motivated (i.e., high IMS/low EMS).  
The cumulative program of research by Devine, Plant, and colleagues therefore suggests 
that, although all high-IMS individuals share internalised egalitarian beliefs, those also high in 
EMS are more prone to discrepancies between their actual and desired behaviours, and are 
therefore more likely to experience specific feelings of guilt and compunction. In addition, these 
individuals find it particularly hard to regulate their prejudiced responses on less controllable or 
implicit measures of prejudice. Although most of the research reported above pertained 
specifically to racial prejudice, similar findings of discrepant should-would, or explicit-implicit 
response biases, have also been reported in other social domains, e.g., sexuality, gender, weight, 
and disability (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Devine et al., 1991; Nosek et al., 2007; Pruett & 
Chan, 2006; Rojahn, Komelasky, & Man, 2008).  
 
The Implicit Association Test 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a reaction-time task designed to measure the 
strengths of automatic associations between mental representations of objects (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). A large body of literature suggests that many cognitive processes 
that affect behaviour operate unconsciously or implicitly and are inaccessible to observation by 
the actor (Dovidio et al., 2002). Implicit cognitive measures can therefore be differentiated from 
self-report (or explicit) measures in that they are able to expose the strength of mental 
associations without depending on introspective access (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald 
et al., 2002). In this way, implicit measures can identify an individual‟s implicit attitude toward 
out-groups, regardless of whether an individual desires to expose those attitudes.  
 The IAT has become a popular instrument in the study of implicit social cognition due to 
its ease of administration, large effect sizes, and fairly good reliability compared to other implicit 












implicit attitudes to a wide variety of social concepts (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Nosek et al., 
2007). The basic principle of the IAT rests on the assumption that behavioural responses (i.e., 
key presses) to concepts that are strongly associated in memory should be faster than to those 
that are only weakly associated (Greenwald et al., 1998).  
While performing the IAT, one is required to rapidly categorize stimulus items 
(exemplars) that appear in the centre of a computer screen into one of four superordinate 
categories. This sorting is done through use of two response keys. The four categories usually 
consist of two target concepts, e.g., “insect” and “flower”, as well as two attributes, e.g., “good” 
and “bad”. Association strengths are assessed by comparing the speed of categorizing stimulus 
items in two different sorting conditions, namely congruent and incongruent. The congruent 
condition consists of those trials where categories that are more strongly associated for the 
majority of respondents share a response key, e.g., “insect” and “bad”, or “flower” and “good”.  
Likewise, the incongruent condition consists of those trials where categories that are less 
strongly associated share a response key, e.g., “insect” and “good”, or “flower” and “bad”.  
Respondents usually find it easier, and are therefore faster, at categorizing items where strongly 
associated concepts are paired (i.e., congruent trials) than when weakly associated concepts are 
paired (i.e., incongruent trials). The implicit response bias between the two concepts is based on 
this performance difference in reaction time.  
A standard IAT procedure consists of five steps (or blocks) of sorting trials (see Nosek, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005 for more details). Steps 1 and 2 involve learning how to correctly 
sort the concept and attribute dimensions individually. Step 3 is the first block where concepts 
and attributes are paired so that one key serves as the correct response for both categories (e.g., 
“insect or bad” and “flower or good”). In Step 4, respondents learn to switch the spatial locations 
of the concepts. Finally, Step 5 is the second concept-attribute pairing stage, where concepts and 
attributes are paired in the new configuration (e.g., “flower or bad” and “insect or good”). Steps 
3 and 5 thus provide the critical reaction-time data to calculate what is typically referred to as the 
IAT effect – an estimate of the difference in association strengths (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003).  
Because of the prominence of literature on racial prejudice, one of the most well-known 
IATs is one that measures bias on race (Baron & Banaji, 2006). Other popular IATs look at 











as social group stereotypes, e.g.,  pairings between gender  and career, and between race and 
weapons (Nosek et al., 2007).  
 
Study Rationale  
Previous research has demonstrated that low-prejudice individuals typically experience 
guilt when they transgress their well-internalized moral standards. Moreover, these feelings of 
guilt also ensue in hypothetical situations, or when participants are deceived into believing that 
they have transgressed their personal standards (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002). Most 
relevant to the current investigation is a recent study by Amodio and colleagues (2007), who 
employed false physiological feedback to induce specific feelings of guilt in low-prejudice 
individuals. In their study, White participants were shown a series of multiracial faces (White, 
Asian, and Black) while their EEGs were being recorded. After the picture viewing task, 
participants were presented with bogus feedback about their brain-waves, which indicated 
negative responses toward Black faces, but not toward White or Asian faces. Both self-report 
data and shifts in electrical cortical asymmetry confirmed the elicitation of guilt. The context of 
perceived prejudice therefore holds merit as a reliable method to induce guilt.   
In the present fMRI study, a modified version of the Implicit Association Test was 
employed as the primary instrument to elicit guilt, as well as pride, in low-prejudice individuals. 
Instead of calculating actual IAT results, however, the paradigm consisted of pre-programmed 
bogus feedback for all IATs. The IAT was considered an appropriate instrument of deception 
because the real test outcome is difficult to predict, and because people are not typically able to 
fake their responses without significantly increasing their error rates (Kim, 2001, cited in Devine 
et al., 2002). Pride-eliciting IATs were programmed with feedback in line with participants‟ self-
standards, i.e., that they are non-prejudiced. Guilt-eliciting IATs were programmed with 
feedback contrary to participants‟ self-standards, i.e., that they are prejudiced. The paradigm was 
therefore based on the assumption that pride ensues when our actions conform to or uphold a 
personal moral value, whereas guilt ensues when we fail to do so or act counter to our moral 
values (Zahn, Moll et al., 2009). A neutral IAT condition, containing only neutral feedback, was 
included to serve as a control condition.  
A pilot study conducted in the UCT Department of Psychology indicated that the IAT 












insights gained from the pilot study, especially in terms of selection criteria for participants, are 
described in more detail in Appendix D. Drawing on data from the pilot study, individuals were 
selected for the fMRI study based on specific demographic inclusion criteria, as well as several 
individual difference characteristics (e.g., low prejudice and high BIS sensitivity). These 
selection criteria enhanced the plausibility and success of the manipulation, because selected 
participants would be more likely to (a) respond in a way consistent with the pre-programmed 
IAT feedback, and (b) experience specific emotions of guilt, according to Higgins‟ self-
discrepancy theory. 
The current study was divided into three stages: The first two stages involved participant 
selection procedures, and the last stage comprised the actual fMRI study. More specifically, 
Stage I consisted of the initial recruitment and screening of a large pool of participants using a 
web-based survey, and Stage II consisted of a final screening session for selected participants 
from Stage I. Participants who adhered to all screening criteria from Stages I and II proceeded to 
Stage III.  
 
Anticipated Results 
 Because previous moral emotion studies primarily made use of paradigms that assessed 
evaluative processes of moral emotions or moral judgments, I did not have a definitive 
hypothesis regarding the neural activity that would be associated with current experiences of 
guilt and pride. Based on theoretical assumptions, I postulated that neural activity during the 
guilt-elicitation would be associated with increased activity in ToM areas, including the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), temporal poles, posterior 
cingulate, and precuneus. Because the emotion induction was expected to be both arousing and 
self-relevant, I also anticipated activation in areas associated with increased emotional arousal, 
such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and subcortical areas such as the amygdala 
(Phan, Taylor et al., 2004). Finally, based on data from Study 1, which suggested that the initial 
guilt reaction functions as a punishment cue that disrupts ongoing action, I anticipated marked 
ACC activation because of its strong association with BIS-related conflict-monitoring (Amodio, 
Master et al., 2008; Botvinick et al., 2004). 
 In terms of neural activation during the pride elicitation, I also expected to see significant 











positive affect, namely the mesolimbic reward pathway and its projections to the basal forebrain, 
e.g., the ventral striatum (Phan et al., 2002; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009). Because the pride-elicitation 
was expected to be less arousing and self-reflecting than the guilt-elicitation, however, I did not 
expect to see strong mPFC activation, nor activation in areas associated with increased emotional 
arousal. 
Stage I: Web-based Survey 
A large web-based survey was conducted to identify suitable participants for the fMRI 
study. Screening procedures are commonplace in emotion elicitation research, where it is of 
paramount importance that participants experience the specific emotions under investigation 
(e.g., Boiten, 1996; Reiman et al., 1997). The present measures were aimed at identifying 
individuals likely to have the desired affective responses following bogus feedback of implicit 
prejudice.    
To be eligible for participation in the fMRI study, volunteers had to comply with certain 
demographic inclusion criteria. In addition, because the IAT emotion manipulation paradigm 
used in the fMRI study depended on participants holding egalitarian self-standards, participants 
were screened with a commonly-used measure of prejudice, namely the rating thermometer 
(Herek, 2000). Specifically, based on IAT topics selected for the fMRI study, participants were 
asked to indicate their attitude toward Black people, disabled people, homosexual people, and 
Jewish people. Only participants with a positive attitude toward all of these social groups were 
eligible. Furthermore, based on Plant and Devine‟s (1998) research, selected participants had to 
be high in both internal (IMS) and external (EMS) motivation to respond without prejudice. 
Finally, based on data from the IAT pilot study, participants with high BIS sensitivity were 
favoured because high BIS scores were positively correlated with self-reported guilt as well as 
pride. 
The cover story conveyed to students who participated in the web-based survey was that 
it was a study to assess the prejudice tendencies among a university student population. 
Participants were also informed of a possible fMRI follow-up, and were asked to indicate their 
availability for this study.  The only initial criterion for participation in the survey was that all 
participants were female. An all-female sample was chosen for the fMRI study to avoid 












likelihood of intense emotional experiences (Shields, 1991).  
Because the selection criteria for the fMRI study were rather stringent, a large sample of 
participants were recruited for the initial web-based survey. The diagram presented in Figure 7 



















Figure 7. Flowchart detailing the number of participants at every experimental stage. 
Method 
Participants  
A large sample of female students (N = 445), aged between 18 and 25 years, participated 
in the study by completing the 30-min web-based survey. Participants were recruited through 
web-based notification, by way of the Student Research Participation Programme‟s website, as 
well as noticeboards in the UCT Psychology Department.   
Stage I: Web-based survey 
 
Participated: N = 445 
Stage II: Final Screening 
 
Participated: N = 41 
 
Screening measures I 
Stage III: fMRI Study 
 
Participated: N = 25 
 











 All participants who completed the survey in full received course credit via the 
Department of Psychology‟s Student Research Participation Programme. All study procedures 
were approved by the Research Ethics Committees of the UCT Department of Psychology and 
the UCT Faculty of Health Sciences.  
Screening Measures I  
Demographic detail. Basic demographic details were requested from all participants who 
completed the survey (Appendix E). These included: sex, age, home language, handedness, race, 
religious denomination, attitude toward religion, and sexual orientation. In addition, participants 
were required to answer the following three questions: (i) Have you ever dated someone of the 
opposite race?, (ii) Do you have close gay or lesbian friends?, and (iii) Do you have close friends 
or family of a different race?
7
  
Demographic inclusion criteria included being White, English-speaking, right-handed, 
non-Jewish, heterosexual, and having a neutral or positive attitude toward religion in general. 
Prejudice measures. Rating thermometers (e.g., Herek, 2000) required participants to give 
a single attitude rating for the following social groups: Blacks, homosexuals, Jews, and disabled 
people. A thermometer rating of 0˚ indicated an extremely unfavorable (cold) attitude toward a 
particular group, whereas a rating of 100˚ indicated an extremely favourable (warm) attitude 
toward that group. Any rating between 0˚ and 100˚ was permissible. Thermometer ratings of      
≥ 60˚ for all social groups were required to be eligible to participate in the fMRI study. An 
example of a rating thermometer is presented in Appendix F. 
Motivation to respond without prejudice. The Internal and External Motivation to 
Respond Without Prejudice scales (IMS/EMS; Plant & Devine, 1998) consists of 10 items 
designed to assess various personal (i.e., internal) and social (i.e., external) reasons people may 
have for trying to respond in a non-prejudiced manner toward Blacks. Participants respond by 
indicating their level of agreement with each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 9 (strongly agree). The scales show good convergent and discriminant validity, and are 
internally consistent with alpha levels ranging from .76 to .85. Both IMS and EMS scales have 
also been shown to have reasonable test-retest reliability over 9 weeks, with r = .77 and r = .60 
respectively (Plant & Devine, 1998). 
                                                 












The IMS/EMS was originally devised to assess participants‟ motivation to respond without 
prejudice toward Black people. In the present study, I adapted the original scales to assess 
motivations to respond without prejudice toward homosexuals, by substituting the word “Black” 
with “homosexual” in all statements (see Pruett & Chan, 2006, for a similar adaptation of these 
scales). To reduce the time taken to complete the online survey, IMS/EMS scales were not 
included for disabled or Jewish people.  
Because those who are internally motivated to respond without prejudice should be more 
prone to experience specific feelings of guilt following a personal moral transgression (Higgins, 
1987; Plant & Devine, 1998), it was of primary importance to select high IMS individuals. 
Participants with high IMS as well as high EMS scores were chosen, however, because such 
individuals have been shown to be less effective in regulating their responses on more difficult or 
implicit measures of prejudice (Amodio et al., 2003; Devine et al., 2002). High IMS/high EMS 
individuals are thus more prone to discrepant prejudice responses and to feelings of guilt. 
Behavioural activation and inhibition. Individual differences in behavioural approach 
and inhibition sensitivity were assessed using the Behavioural Inhibition System and 
Behavioural Activation System scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994). Participants with high 
BIS sensitivity were selected above those with low BIS sensitivity, based on findings from the 
pilot study. 
Social desirability. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960) was included as an estimate of tendency toward social desirable responding. The 
MCSDS is a 33-item true-false inventory that measures the degree to which individuals feel the 
need to describe themselves in socially desirable terms (e.g., „I have never lied‟). It therefore 
assesses the extent to which someone is willing to give what he/she deems to be a socially 
appropriate, rather than an honest, response. The set of items appearing on the full 33-item 
MCSDS has good internal consistency, with alpha levels in two different samples of .73 and .74, 
respectively (Barger, 2002). To minimize time, a 10-item short form, namely the M-C 2 (Strahan 
& Gerbasi, 1972), was employed in the current study. This version of the MCSDS has also been 
reported to have good internal consistency (α = .88) (Fischer & Fick, 1993).  
Higher scores on the M-C 2, indicating a higher anxiety about social disapproval, were 
preferred. Individuals high in social desirability should be more concerned with the public 











more likely to experience positive affect in situations where they responded in a culturally 
appropriate manner (e.g., the pride-elicitation condition), and negative affect in situations of 
social disapproval (e.g., the guilt-elicitation condition). 
Results 
Screening Data 
From the total sample of N = 445, the following groups were excluded: Blacks (n = 60); 
Coloureds (n = 81); Asians/Other (n = 46); homosexuals/bisexuals (n = 38); left-handers (n = 
43); Jews (n = 32); atheists or participants with a negative attitude toward religion (n = 64); 
participants with home languages other than English (n = 6); and participants who did not want 
to be contacted for further participation (n = 34). After these exclusions, 154 individuals 
remained as potential participants for further study.  
From this group, 56 with a thermometer rating below 60˚ for any of the four social 
groups were also excluded (Table 9). Differences in thermometer ratings between excluded and 
included participants were statistically significant for all social groups assessed (ps < .001).  
 
Table 9 
Thermometer Ratings for Excluded and Included Participants, Ranging from 0˚ (Very 
Unfavourable) to 100˚ (Very Favourable)  
 Thermometer Ratings 
Selection Criteria Black people Disabled people Homosexuals Jewish people 
Included (n = 98): 83.52 (13.01) 89.18 (12.68) 83.98 (11.75) 90.20 (11.60) 
  Excluded (n = 56): 53.84 (15.43) 71.34 (19.67) 53.21 (19.67) 63.93 (20.24) 
Note. Means are presented, with standard deviations in parentheses.  
Calculation of the Composite Index  
For each of the remaining 98 participants, a composite index score was calculated such 












composite score was calculated as a % value by attributing different weights to the following 
questionnaire measures: IMS (weight = 2), BIS (weight = 2), EMS (weight = 1), and MCSDS 
(weight = 1). A Total EMS score was calculated for each participant, which consisted of the 
combined EMS scores for Blacks and homosexuals. Similarly, a Total IMS score was calculated 
for each participant. The creation of Total EMS and Total IMS scores was validated by the fact 
that EMS scores (r = .75, p < .001), as well as IMS scores (rs = .57, p < .001), were highly 
correlated with each other.   
The assigned weights were based upon theoretical inferences described earlier. In short, it 
was of primary importance to select high-IMS participants who were also high in EMS. 
Furthermore, high BIS sensitivity was imperative, because such individuals appeared to be more 
susceptible to the specific emotion induction based on data from the pilot study. Finally, some 
degree of social desirability concern was deemed favourable for the current emotion elicitation 
paradigm. The formula for calculating the composite index was as follows:  
 
Composite Index (100%) = 33.3%IMS + 33.3% BIS + 16.6%EMS + 16.6% M-C 2 
 
None of the questionnaire measures in the composite index were significantly correlated 
with each other (ps > .2), suggesting that all measures assessed largely independent constructs 
(Table 10). In particular, only a small negative correlation was found between the EMS and 
MCSDS (r = -.12, p = .23). This is in line with previous findings, and suggests that the EMS 
assesses a more specific concern with others‟ appraisal of prejudiced responses, rather than a 
general concern with social evaluation per se (Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998).  
Table 10  
Zero-order Correlations Among Questionnaire Measures in the Composite Index   
 1 2 3 
    
1. IMS    
2. EMS -.01   
3. BIS -.08  .11  
4. MCSDS  .01 -.12 .05 
    












Stage II: Final Screening 
To select participants for the fMRI study, a final screening session was arranged with 
suitable participants from Stage I.  The main purpose of this screening was to ensure that all 
selected participants met safety and study criteria for the MRI scan. The session included 
obtaining details from participants of all current and previous medical conditions that may affect 
the central nervous system. In addition, a depression inventory was administered to screen out 
participants with noteworthy depressive symptoms. Finally, a comprehensive consent form 
detailing all fMRI procedures was presented to participants to ensure that they fully understood 
all particulars of the study before signing up for further participation. 
Method 
Participants 
From the remaining 98 participants, those who had the highest scores on the composite 
index (using a cut-off of 65%), and who did not answer “yes” to all of the following questions: 
(i) Have you ever dated someone of the opposite race?, (ii) Do you have close gay or lesbian 
friends?, and (iii) Do you have close friends or family of a different race? were contacted for 
participation in this final screening session. Of the 48 participants contacted, 41 attended the 
screening session.  
The purpose of the screening session was to exclude any participant who had a personal 
history of neurological or psychiatric illness and substance abuse, suffered from moderate to 
severe depression, used a y medication that could stimulate/inhibit the central nervous system, 
or was unsuitable to undergo an MRI scan. 
All participants received additional course credit via the Department of Psychology‟s 
Student Research Participation Programme. 
Screening Measures II  
MRI suitability. A standard MRI screening (see Appendix G) assessed suitability to 
undergo an MRI scan. The form contained several items to ensure that participants did not have 
any metal objects or implants in the body, and did not suffer from any other medical conditions 












screened for possible pregnancy, large tattoos, and claustrophobia through self-report. 
Medical history and psychoactive medication. A standard self-report questionnaire (the 
same one as in Study 1) was used to ensure that participants did not suffer from any previously 
diagnosed neurological, psychiatric, cardiovascular, or substance use disorders. Participants were 
also required to list all current prescription medication. Those taking medications affecting the 
circulation, as well as any medication for depression or anxiety in the previous 6 months, were 
excluded. Contraceptive medication, however, was permitted. 
Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) 
was used to assess the presence of any depressive symptomatology. Because the affective 
characteristics associated with depression might have interfered with emotional processing, 
participants with depression scores ≥ 20 (the cut-off score between mild and moderate 
depression) were excluded.  Although participants who exceeded the threshold for mild 
depression (i.e., a score of 14 or above) were thus admitted, it has been demonstrated that BDI 
scores in nonclinical populations are more likely to reflect general anxiety than clinical 
depression (Gotlib, 1984). 
Procedure 
Participants were contacted telephonically or by email to arrange an appointment for the 
30-min screening session. Participation in this final screening session, as well as the fMRI study, 
was entirely voluntary; students were thus free to decline from further participation at any point. 
Informed consent (Appendix H) was obtained according to procedures approved by the 
UCT Faculty of Health Sciences, and all fMRI procedures were thoroughly explained. 
Results 
Of the 41 participants who attended the final screening session, 12 were excluded based 
on the presence of metal in the body (n = 6), a high BDI-II score (n = 1), use of psychoactive 
medication (n = 2), a neurological history (n = 2), and being left-handed (n = 1).  The remaining 












Screening Measure Performance 
To illustrate the efficacy of the method employed for participant selection, questionnaire 
measure scores were compared between participants that were selected for the final screening 
session (n = 41), and those who were not selected or who did not want to participate further in 
the study (n = 57). Independent t-tests were thus performed for each screening measure.  
Table 11 shows that all questionnaire means were higher for the sample that was selected 
for final screening compared to the one that was not. These differences reached statistical 
significance for BIS, EMS, and M-C 2.    
 
Table 11 
Comparison of Screening Measure Scores for Selected and Unselected Participants  












Selected (n = 41) 
Mean (SD) 








      
Total IMS (20) 14.67 (1.80) 14.31 (1.77) -.99 .33 .10 
BIS (28) 24.78 (2.26) 22.47 (3.39) -4.04 <.001*** .38 
Total EMS (20) 10.75 (3.20) 9.38 (3.19) -2.09 .04* .21 
M-C 2 (10) 5.39 (1.66) 4.23 (1.54) -3.58 .001** .34 
      
Note. IMS = Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice; BIS = Behaviour Inhibition 
System; EMS = External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice; M-C 2 = Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (short form).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Discussion 
The data presented above show that screening procedures were successfully employed to 
identify demographically suitable, low-prejudice participants for the fMRI study. All selected 
participants had a fairly positive attitude toward all social groups assessed, as measured by 
various rating thermometers. In addition, selected participants scored significantly higher on 
three other screening measures (BIS, EMS, MCSDS) compared to those who were not selected. 












high in external motivation to respond without prejudice. Participants were also high in internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice: The IMS mean for the current sample (M = 7.34) was 
very similar to a previous study (M = 7.15), where a group of high-IMS participants were 
specifically selected for participation (Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2006). 
The reason that IMS scores did not differ significantly between those selected for further 
participation and those not selected might be ascribed to the fact that low IMS individuals had 
already been excluded based on their thermometer rating scores. The IMS has consistently been 
shown to be highly correlated with commonly-used self-report measures of prejudice, e.g., the 
Attitude Toward Blacks Scale (ATB; Brigham, 1993), such that individuals who indicate 
significant levels of prejudice also have low internal motivation to respond without prejudice 
(Amodio et al., 2003; Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998). Consistent with these findings, 
Total IMS scores in the present study were significantly correlated with all rating thermometer 
scores (ps < .001) in the original sample of 154. Exclusion of prejudiced individuals, based on 
their thermometer rating scores, therefore also largely excluded those with low internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice.  
Besides the benefit of being able to control for individual difference characteristics in the 
participant sample, a stringent selection process like the one described above may also be 
associated with some disadvantages. The most obvious disadvantage may be related to logistics, 
i.e., the time and effort necessary to screen such a large volume of participants. In addition, 
however, there may also be other drawbacks associated with screening tools. For example, by 
using inappropriate or inaccurate screening tools one may inadvertently select individuals who 
are more likely to experience a non-target emotion (e.g., shame instead of guilt). The sample 
may also become unrepresentative of the general population if the screening tools are too 
stringent, which may in turn affect the generalisability of the resulting data. Finally, self-reported 
data obtained by screening tools may be affected by participants‟ a priori theories of behaviour, 
rendering the data inaccurate.  
In the case of fMRI investigations, however, the advantages of employing rigorous 
screening criteria may outweigh the disadvantages, because of the expensive nature of MRI data 
collection. This is especially true for emotion manipulation paradigms, where the data obtained 












Stage III: fMRI Study 
The fMRI paradigm was based on a similar procedure as the pilot study. As in Study 1, 
this procedure also depended on deception to facilitate real and current emotion elicitation. 
During the scanning session, participants performed various different IATs, followed by pre-
programmed performance feedback. The feedback they received therefore had no relation to 
their actual task performance; this fact was not known to participants, however. While most IAT 
feedback was in line with participants‟ beliefs about themselves (i.e., that they are non-
prejudiced), some feedback suggested unconscious prejudice against a social group. Careful 




Twenty-five healthy, right-handed females between the ages of 18 and 25 years (M = 
19.32, SD = 1.03) participated in the fMRI study. Measures of depression and trait affective style 
for all participants were collected before the fMRI experiment at the final screening session 
[BDI- II, M = 6.64, SD = 5.02; PANAS, Positive Affect: M = 35.76, SD = 3.79; Negative Affect: 
M =16.96, SD = 3.98]. The duration of the entire experimental procedure, including an IAT 
practice session and final screening performed by the radiographer, did not exceed roughly 2hrs. 
Participants received financial compensation, as well as course credit via the Department 
of Psychology‟s Student Research Participation Programme, for taking part in the study. In 
addition, all participants received a compact disc with a 3D image of their own brain. All study 
procedures were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the UCT Faculty of Health 
Sciences. 
Data from 3 participants were excluded before statistical analysis because of OFC signal 
loss (n = 1); and post-experimental interviews that suggested the emotion manipulation was not 
successful (n = 2), i.e., these participants did not believe that the manipulated IAT feedback 













Experimental Design and Setting  
The research design was that of a cross-sectional within-subjects social psychology 
experiment. This design was chosen because repeated-measures designs can control for sources 
of unwanted variability between individuals, especially in the fMRI context where the nature of 
the fMRI signal (no absolute zero point) may lead to confounding effects. One may thus view 
participants as serving as their own controls. Repeated-measures designs are routinely used in 
fMRI because of their greater power to detect effects, and because they are more economical in 
terms of cost (Britton, Phan et al., 2006; Reiman et al., 1997; Takahashi et al., 2004). 
The fMRI study took take place at the Cape Universities Brain Imaging Centre (CUBIC) 
at Tygerberg Hospital. 
fMRI Paradigm 
IAT topics. The fMRI protocol consisted of six different IATs, two each of three different 
stimulus conditions (Neutral, Positive, and Negative). Distinctions between these stimulus 
conditions were created through the type of IAT topic, as well as through pre-programmed 
response outcomes. More specifically, the Neutral condition consisted of IATs on neutral topics 
(e.g., facial hair), for which no publicly endorsed right or wrong response exists; in contrast, the 
Positive and Negative conditions consisted of IATs on more sensitive social topics (e.g., race and 
sexuality). The IAT feedback, which consisted of structured sentences, was also tailored 
according to the specific stimulus condition: Whereas feedback in the Neutral and Positive 
conditions indicated no significant preference for either category, feedback in the Negative 
condition stated that participants‟ test results revealed significant prejudice against the target 
social group. 
The two IAT topics in the Negative stimulus condition were race and disability. These 
IATs tested participants‟ unconscious prejudice against Black people and 
physically/intellectually disabled people, respectively. The bogus feedback participants received 
in the Negative condition, which suggested unconscious prejudice, was employed to induce guilt 
in self-proclaimed low-prejudice individuals. Race and disability, in particular, appeared to be 
topics well-suited for the Negative feedback condition based on findings from a mass internet 
study (Nosek et al., 2007). In that study, which consisted largely of a White and female sample‟s 











effects of the social domains tested. Whereas a strong implicit preference for White and Abled 
people were thus observed from the IAT data, there was only a weak positive correlation 
between self-reported (i.e., explicit) and implicit attitudes toward these social groups (Nosek et 
al., 2007). Monteith and colleagues have also reported that many people can feel their racial bias 
when performing the IAT (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). 
The two IAT topics in the Positive stimulus condition were religion and sexuality. These 
IATs tested participants‟ unconscious prejudice against Judaism (versus Other Religions) and 
homosexual people, respectively, with pre-programmed feedback confirming participants‟ 
beliefs that they were not prejudiced against these social groups. Feedback sentences were 
structured to contain positive and praiseworthy personal characteristics so that participants would 
experience positive emotions of pride and satisfaction. Religion and sexuality IATs appeared to 
be well-suited for the present study‟s Positive feedback condition. In the Nosek et al. (2007) 
study, the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes among the social domains 
tested was the strongest for sexuality (r = .43), followed by Judaism (r = .38). Less discrepant 
prejudice responses thus existed between individuals‟ self-reported and implicit attitudes toward 
gay and Jewish people. If one assumed that participants in the present study would also have less 
discrepant implicit-explicit responses toward gay and Jewish people, receiving positive feedback 
for these IAT topics would thus enhance the plausibility of the manipulation.  
Finally, the two IAT topics in the Neutral stimulus condition were facial hair and glasses. 
These IATs tested participants‟ preference for people with facial hair versus those without, and 
their preference for people with glasses versus those without. Although feedback in the Neutral 
condition also indicated no specific preference for either of these features, no positive or 
negative affect was expected in this condition because of the triviality of the subject matter, i.e., 
no specific preference was socially desirable. It was also articulated to participants before the 
scanning session that the outcome of these specific IATs did not really matter because there was 
no specific socially desirable response that applied.  
IAT stimuli. fMRI stimuli for each IAT involved words and images that participants had 
to sort into categories as quickly as possible. Words (i.e., attributes) were categorised as either 
„good‟ (e.g., joy, love, peace, pleasure), or as „bad‟ (e.g., agony, terrible, awful, hurt); images 
consisted of pictures or symbols of people from each social category. For example, in the race 












and without glasses were used.
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IAT task. I programmed all IATs using E-Prime software, version 1.1 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.; Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002a; 2002b). Each IAT in the 
current fMRI paradigm consisted of a shortened version of the standard IAT format: It included 
only the two critical blocks of trials (i.e., Steps 3 and 5), where concepts and attributes are paired 
(Nosek et al., 2005). During a pre-fMRI practice session, however, participants were given an 
opportunity to familiarise themselves with a more standard version of each IAT that consisted of 
the regular five steps. Each of the IAT blocks in the fMRI paradigm consisted of 20 trials of 
stimulus items that participants had to sort as quickly as possible (the design was thus self-
paced). The order of presentation of congruent and incongruent blocks were furthermore 
counterbalanced across different IATs to reduce any order effects (Nosek et al., 2005). Correct 
responses had the effect of making the stimulus disappear, and were f llowed by a 350-ms 
fixation cross before the next trial. A red error sign appeared on all trials where participants 
failed to categorize the stimulus correctly (i.e., pressed the wrong response key), but disappeared 
as soon as a correct response was given.  
Immediately after completing the IAT button-press task (lasting approximately 80 s), a 
result sentence (Result 1) appeared for 6 s, which indicated the outcome of the specific IAT.  
This was followed by one of three sentences that appeared for a further 5 s on the screen (Result 
2), which depended on the stimulus condition: (i) “This is a regular/neutral response.”, (ii) “This 
is a low-prejudice/positive response!”, or (iii) “This is a high-prejudice/negative response!” 
Finally, three formally structured sentences appeared on a new screen for 19 s (Result 3). These 
sentences presented more extended feedback on how IAT results may be interpreted in terms of  
  
                                                 
8I acquired additional normative data for all IAT images in an independent study prior to the 
fMRI experiment (Appendix I). During this study, 41 participants rated all images according to 
three affect dimensions: valence, arousal, and dominance. The rationale for performing this study 
was twofold: (i) to confirm that all selected IAT stimuli were sufficiently neutral to prevent 
unwanted emotional reactions from being evoked during the IAT button-press task; and (ii) to 
exclude the possibility that picture stimuli presented across different stimulus conditions differed 
significantly in their affective dimensions. Data from this pilot study confirmed that selected IAT 
stimuli satisfied these criteria (see Appendix I for more detail); all stimuli were consequently 











the participant‟s attitude and personality, and served to maintain/intensify the induced emotion. 











Figure 8. Illustration of the sequence of events of a single IAT during fMRI data collection. 
 
 
All IAT result sentences were constructed to be similar in length, word structure, and 
readability across experimental stimulus conditions (see Appendix J). Results 1 and 3 were 
presented on a single frame in white font on a black screen, while Result 2 was either yellow, 
green, or red, depending on the IAT stimulus condition. Examples of IAT feedback sentences in 
each experimental condition are presented below: 
 
Neutral Stimulus Condition (Glasses IAT) 
Result 1:  Your data suggest little to no automatic preference for people with glasses 
compared to people without glasses. 
Result 2: This is a regular/neutral response. 
Result 3: Generally, people with no preference for people with or without glasses: 
» Feel neutral about people who regularly wear glasses. 
» Won‟t always notice if someone changes their glasses. 















{ ≈ 40 s } { ≈ 40 s } { 6 s}  { 19 s } 
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Positive Stimulus Condition (Sexuality IAT)  
Result 1:  Your data suggest absolutely no automatic preference for Straight compared to 
Gay people. 
Result 2: This is a low-prejudice/positive response! 
Result 3: Generally, people with no automatic preference for Straight compared to Gay 
people:  
» Try to be unbiased and positive toward gay people. 
» Will react positively to a homosexual person in company. 
» Are not judgmental toward people who are gay.  
 
Negative Stimulus Condition (Race IAT) 
Result 1:  Your data suggest a significant automatic preference for White compared to Black 
people. 
Result 2: This is a high-prejudice/negative response! 
Result 3: Generally, people with an automatic preference for White compared to Black 
people:  
» Are more afraid of Black people than White people. 
» Can‟t help having stereotypical thoughts about Black people. 
» Think Black people are generally less intelligent than White people. 
Subjective Responses 
Emotion ratings. Subjective responses to IAT feedback were obtained during the scanning 
protocol to verify the elicitation of target emotional states. Participants were required to rate how 
much they had experienced each of 8 emotional qualities (anger, anxiety, pride, satisfaction, 
embarrassment, guilt, shame, and general arousal) after each IAT. Ratings were made on Visual 
Analog Scales (VAS), which were presented after each functional run of four different IATs. 
Each VAS consisted of a 10cm ruler marked from 0 (not at all) to 9 (very much), such that 
participants could make their ratings of experienced affects at any point along this continuous 
line. The presentation of all emotion items were randomized to prevent any order-effects.   
Manipulation check. Upon completion of the study, participants were again shown a list 











as well as the intensity level, on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much),  
they experienced most after each IAT in the scanner. For example, they were asked to indicate 
which emotion they experienced most prominently after the race IAT, and to rate the intensity of 
this emotion. The list of emotions included the same ones assessed during the scanning session; 
in addition, there was a neutral option if no particular emotion was felt.    
Physiological Measure 
 During the fMRI protocol, heart rate was continuously recorded as an objective measure of 
emotion elicitation. Heart rate was calculated from pulse intervals recorded by a built-in 
peripheral pulse oximeter (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany), placed over 
participants‟ left ring finger. The device measures infrared light attenuation due to 
oxy/deoxyhaemoglobin and essentially provides a blood flow profile. Data from only 16 
participants were deemed reliable due to inherent difficulties in collecting analyzable 
physiological recordings inside an fMRI scanner.  
Procedure 
 On arrival at CUBIC, I informed participants of the study procedures and instructed them 
to read through their consent documents again. These documents assured them that they were 
under no obligation to participate and were free to withdraw from the study at any time. Each 
participant then viewed a PowerPoint slide presentation on a computer monitor, the purpose of 
which was to familiarize them with the Implicit Association Test. The slide presentation 
introduced the different IAT topics, as well as the structure of feedback that they would 
encounter during the scanning session. The true purpose of the experiment, however, was 
concealed to ensure efficient emotion elicitation and avoid demand characteristics. To heighten 
the realism of the emotion manipulation, I delivered the following cover story: 
“You have specifically been selected for this study based on your explicit responses 
to questionnaires in the online survey. According to those questionnaires, you 
indicated that you have a positive attitude toward most social groups. In this study, 
we are interested in identifying the brain activations associated with low prejudiced 
behaviour. You therefore fall in our low-prejudice group and are also more likely to 












a later time, we will also investigate how the high-prejudice group respond to these 
same tasks. Our hypothesis concerns the activity of the amygdala, a primitive organ 
in your brain, which we think should be less reactive in low-prejudiced than high-
prejudiced individuals.  
So today we will test your implicit attitude, which is real and cannot be faked, 
toward these various social groups with the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT 
can be seen as the „gold-standard‟ in prejudice research, because it measures our 
unconscious or implicit associations, rather than our conscious or explicit thoughts 
about things. Although implicit responses are often similar to explicit responses, this 
is not necessarily always the case. However, don‟t worry too much about it - so far 
everyone has done fine on these tests.” 
 
 Participants were then given time to practise a standard version of each of the six IATs they 
would encounter during the scanning session. They were encouraged to respond as fast as they 
could without making too many mistakes. Before proceeding to the scanner, a radiographer once 
again ensured that all MRI safety precautions were adhered to.  
 Once inside the scanner, the radiographer equipped participants with earplugs (to reduce 
the noise of the scanner) and MRI-compatible headphones (to enable communication between 
the participant and the experimenter), and attached the pulse oximeter to participants‟ non-
dominant hand. Head stabilization was achieved using foam padding within the head cradle, and 
participants were instructed to avoid head movements during the scanning procedures. They 
were then instructed to relax and close their eyes for a 9-min period during which localization 
and structural MRI data were obtained. Immediately thereafter, participants proceeded with the 
IAT protocol.  
 All stimuli were viewed through a mirror system mounted to the head coil, with a data 
projector connected to a desktop outside the scanner sending stimuli to this mirror system. E-
Prime software was used to display stimuli during the scanning session and record participants‟ 
reaction times and subjective response data via a response box. Two variants of each of the six 
different IATs were presented, resulting in 12 IATs in total. The experimental design was 
blocked, so there were thus four IATs/blocks for each of the three stimulus conditions (i.e., 











functional runs per scan, such that each run contained at least one Neutral, one Positive, and one 
Negative stimulus condition (see Figure 9). 
To prevent any order effects, three counter-balanced presentation orders were devised so 
that every 4
th
 participant received the same order of IATs (Figure 9). The only other constraint in 
these IAT sequences was that a Neutral condition IAT was always presented first.  
 
IAT Code: Facial hair Glasses Sexuality Religion Race Disability 




IAT Sequence 1: 1   4   2   5   6   3   5   1    3   2   6   4 
IAT Sequence 2: 2   3   6   4     1   5   2   4     5   1   3   6 
IAT Sequence 3:  2   5   3   6    4   1   3   5    2   6   4   1 
 
Figure 9. Diagrammatical representation of the various IAT sequences that were employed in the 
fMRI protocol. Neutral stimulus condition: facial hair and glasses IATs; Positive Stimulus 
condition: sexuality and religion IATs; Negative Stimulus condition: race and disability IATs. 
 
Each IAT consisted of a self-paced button-press task followed by result sentences (i.e., 
Feedback) that were of fixed duration (illustrated in Figure 10). All IATs were interleaved with 
20-s fixation periods, while an initial 20-s fixation epoch served as the baseline. During 
presentation of IAT feedback, participants were instructed to simply pay attention, and were told 
that no response was required. Upon completion of a functional run, participants rated how they 
felt while viewing their IAT results during each of the preceding IATs. They performed emotion 
ratings for each presented emotion on the visual analog scales. This was followed by a 20-s rest 
period before the next functional run commenced. The maximum time spent in the scanner never 
exceeded approximately 50min. 
  




















Figure 10. Block design paradigm as an example of one functional run in the fMRI study.  
Base: baseline, fix: fixation, Neu: Neutral, Neg: Negative, FB: feedback  
 
  Upon completion of the scanning procedures, participants were asked to describe how 
they felt about their IAT results, and if any results contradicted their own expectations. They 
were then asked to indicate which particular emotion they exp rienced most during each specific 
IAT feedback condition (this served as the Manipulation Check). Post-experimental emotion 
ratings, however, were obtained before the real purpose of the investigation was overtly stated. 
Through careful enquiry, I also determined whether the participant was suspicious of any part of 
the experimental procedure, or believed that IAT results were pre-programmed. Each participant 
was then thoroughly debriefed as to the actual intention of the investigation and great care was 
taken to ensure that all participants left in a positive frame of mind. In particular, participants 
were informed that all IAT results – those indicating prejudice as well as those indicating no 
prejudice, were pre-programmed, and that deception was necessary to ensure that the emotions 
they experienced were elicited naturally. 
fMRI Image Acquisition 
A 3.0 T Siemens Allegra head-only system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, 
Germany) was used for data acquisition. At the outset of each session, a high-resolution T1-
weighted anatomical scan (3D mprage sequence, 1x1x1 mm
3 
resolution, 160 slices ~ 9min) was 
obtained.  Whole-brain functional echoplanar image volumes (T2*-weighted epi-BOLD, TE = 
30ms, TR = 2s, 34 interleaved slices, 3 mm thick, gap 0.9 mm, 200 x 200 mm field of view, 
matrix 64 x 64, orientation approximately parallel to the AC-PC line) were then acquired using 





























blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast while participants performed the task. Functional 
runs started with four steady state volumes that were discarded prior to data analysis to allow for 
T1 equilibration effects. A series of approximately 300 volumes of measurement were acquired 
during each of the three functional runs (~10 min each).  Each run comprised 4 different IAT 
topics, with at least one IAT from each of the three stimulus conditions (i.e., Neutral, Positive 
and Negative), plus one extra. This design, instead of one featuring only 3 IATs per run, i.e., 1 x 
Neutral, 1 x Positive and 1 x Negative, was preferred to make the order appear less apparent to 
participants. The IAT task was set up to trigger automatically at the start of each measurement. 
At the termination of each run, however, the scanner was stopped manually because the design 
was self-paced.  
Statistical Analysis  
Behavioural and subjective emotion data. To investigate possible differences in task 
performance during fMRI data acquisition, mean response times to IAT stimuli were compared 
between the three different stimulus conditions.  
In terms of subjective response data, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed on arousal ratings to detect significant differences in subjective arousal between the 
baseline and IAT stimulus conditions. More specific emotion ratings acquired during the 
scanning procedure were examined using a 3 (stimulus condition: Neutral, Positive, Negative) x 
4 (emotion type: social positive affect, social negative affect, anger and anxiety) repeated-
measures ANOVA. Emotion ratings for IATs from the same stimulus condition were thus 
grouped together. The social positive index consisted of mean ratings for pride and satisfaction, 
while the social negative index consisted of mean ratings for guilt, embarrassment, and shame. 
These emotion indices were created to reduce the number of dependent variables for data 
analysis. Post-hoc contrasts were employed to detect significant changes in subjective responses 
between stimulus conditions.  
One-way (emotion type: social positive affect, social negative affect, anger, and anxiety) 
repeated-measures ANOVA and post-hoc analyses tested whether target emotions were elicited 
most strongly in each stimulus condition. Paired t-tests were used to detect significant 
increases/decreases in ratings of target emotions from baseline. Finally, manipulation check data, 













Physiological data. Heartbeats were counted during the first 20 s of each IAT feedback 
condition and compared to the baseline fixation period (20 s) of the same run. HR change scores 
were thus computed by subtracting the mean baseline fixation value from the mean value for 
each specific feedback condition. These physiological change scores were then averaged within 
a priori stimulus conditions for each participant, first within each run, and then across all runs. 
Changes in HR for each feedback condition were examined using a one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA and post-hoc analyses. 
fMRI data analysis. I performed all fMRI data analyses with Brain Voyager QX, version 
2.1.2 (Brain Innovation B.V., Maastricht, The Netherlands). Functional images were corrected 
for different slice acquisition times using cubic spline interpolation, based on information about 
the TR (2000ms) and the order of slice scanning (ascending, interleaved). Images were also 
temporally smoothed with a high-pass filter (GLM with Fourier basis set) of two cycles. 3D 
motion correction was applied to detect and correct any inter-scan head movement by spatial 
alignment of all volumes of a participant, relative to the first volume of the functional run. 
Translation and rotation parameter estimates were inspected and all data with motion exceeding 
3 mm displacement or 3.0º rotation were rejected. Two runs, one from participants 15 and 22, 
each exceeded these motion criteria and were excluded from subsequent analyses. Each 
participant‟s functional data sets were co-registered with her high-resolution anatomical MRI, 
rotated into the AC-PC plane and spatially normalized to the standard Talaraich brain template to 
allow for group analysis. Normalised 4-D volume time course (VTC) files were thus created for 
each functional run of participants. 
Functional data were analyzed using standard neuroimaging methods on the basis of the 
General Linear Model (GLM) (Friston et al., 1994). Seven predictors corresponding to known 
experimental blocks were entered into the model: IAT button-press task, IAT feedback 
predictors (i.e., Neu FB, Pos FB, and Neg FB) and fixation predictors (i.e., Neu Fix, Pos Fix, and 
Neg Fix). In addition, the six motion parameters, calculated during realignment, were also used 
in the model as additional predictors of no interest to remove variations in signal due to 
movement artifacts. In order to account for haemodynamic delay and dispersion, each of the 
predictors were derived by convolution of an appropriate boxcar waveform with a double-gamma 











feedback during which emotion elicitation was expected. Feedback periods lasted 30 s and 
consisted of Results 1, 2, and 3 (see Figure 8).  
To assess relative differences in activation between stimulus conditions, a random effects 
analysis was performed. This analysis provides a good generalization to the population from 
which data are obtained, because the error variance is estimated for each condition of interest 
across subjects, rather than across scans (Holmes & Friston, 1998). At the first level, parameter 
estimates (beta coefficients) of block-related activity were obtained for each voxel in the brain. 
Statistical maps of the t-statistic were then created for each contrast of interest and analysed at the 
second level using a random-effects ANOVA. To assess specific condition effects, the contrasts of 
Neg FB minus Neu FB (i.e., guilt) and Pos FB minus Neu FB (i.e., pride) were performed. In 
addition, because the effects of an emotion manipulation may continue beyond stimulus 
presentation (compare Study 1, i.e., the post-emotion manipulation period), contrasts between 
condition specific fixation periods (i.e., Neutral, Positive, and Negative) were also performed.  
For the whole-brain analysis, significant clusters of activation were detected using a 
statistical threshold corrected for multiple comparisons using the False Discovery Rate method  
p(FDR) < .10 (Genovese, Lazar, & Nichols, 2002), and cluster size threshold of 2 contiguous 
voxels. To confirm whether the percent signal increase in activated areas extended over the 
entire measuring period, event-related averaging plots were inspected.   
To confine the cortex volume to relevant brain areas and increase the power of the 
analysis, a mask was created from the contrast Neg FB minus IAT (button-press task) in the 
random effects analysis, using a corrected threshold of p(FDR) < .10, and cluster size threshold 
of 8 contiguous voxels. (Similar activations were obtained for the Pos FB minus IAT contrast. 
Because these areas of activation were slightly smaller, however, the Neg FB minus IAT contrast 
was used to create a mask of maximum size.) Areas of decreased activation (e.g., motor areas 
activated by the IAT button-press task) were deleted from the mask. The mask was then applied 
to the cortex volume and the random-effects analysis was again performed. For the mask 
analysis, significant clusters of activation were detected using a corrected threshold of p(FDR) < 
.10, and cluster size threshold of 2 contiguous voxels. Areas of significant activation were 
labelled using a human brain atlas (Duvernoy, 1999).  
I also conducted correlational analyses to demonstrate a more direct link between 












subjective emotional reports. Following suggestions by Vul et al., (2009), subjective emotion 
ratings were correlated with fMRI brain activations of regions that were independently selected, 
based on functional constraints. That is, analyses were performed to detect linear relationships 
between mean β-values (i.e., effect sizes representing the percent signal changes) of those 
regions of increased activation uncovered during the whole-brain and mask analyses, and 
subjective emotion ratings for each subject.  
Results 
Behavioural Data: Response Time 
Behavioural data from IATs were analyzed to verify that participants were appropriately 
engaged in the task. During the scan, participants responded via button press to sort different 
IAT images and attributes into appropriate categories. Table 12 presents the mean response times 
to IAT stimuli across stimulus conditions. 
 All response time data complied with assumptions of parametric data. The one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA for response time detected significant differences between stimulus 
conditions, F(2,42) = 5.36, p = .008, η
2
 = .20. Post-hoc contrasts indicated that response times to 
stimuli from the Negative IAT condition were significantly faster than response times to stimuli 
from the Neutral (p = .009, r = .53), as well as the Positive (p = .04, r = .44) IAT conditions. 
Response times did not differ between the Positive and Neutral IAT conditions (p = .19, r = .23). 
 
Table 12 




IAT button-press sorting task 
Neutral Positive Negative 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  
    
Response time (ms) 724.97 (135.76) 711.64 (119.96) 691.93 (108.66) 













Subjective Emotion Data 
 Within-scan emotion ratings. One participant did not complete within-scan emotion 
ratings correctly, and so her data were excluded from all subsequent analyses. Subjective 
emotion ratings obtained during the IAT protocol are presented in Table 13.  
The one-way ANOVA for subjective arousal detected significant differences between 
baseline and experimental conditions, F(3,60) = 25.88, p < .001, 
2
 = .56. Post-hoc contrasts 
indicated that arousal ratings were significantly lower than baseline in the Neutral and Positive 
IAT conditions (p < .001, r = .70 and p < .01, r = .54), while they were significantly higher than 
baseline in the Negative IAT condition (p = .002, r = .63). Arousal ratings for the Negative IAT 
condition were also significantly higher compared to that of the Neutral and Positive IAT 
conditions (ps < .001, rs > .75). 
 
Table 13 
Emotion Ratings From 1 (Not At All) to 9 (Very Much) at Baseline, and After the Three 
Experimental Stimulus Conditions (N = 21)  
 
 Baseline Neutral IAT Positive IAT Negative IAT 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
      
Arousal  4.63 (1.55) 3.39 (1.46) 3.76 (1.75) 5.96 (1.31) 
Pride  4.49 (1.50) 4.90 (1.52) 6.04 (1.39) 2.34 (0.86) 
Satisfaction  4.68 (1.34) 5.15 (1.25) 6.06 (1.45) 2.38 (0.98) 
Anxiety  5.17 (1.50) 3.33 (1.66) 3.34 (1.46) 5.83 (1.66) 
Anger  1.83 (1.43) 2.17 (1.45) 2.10 (1.29) 5.19 (1.60) 
Embarrassment  2.49 (1.72) 2.34 (1.32) 2.11 (1.28) 6.60 (1.29) 
Guilt  2.14 (1.61) 2.15 (1.34) 2.20 (1.40) 6.73 (1.76) 
Shame  2.06 (1.62) 2.22 (1.30) 2.26 (1.30) 6.43 (1.47) 
      
Note. Emotion ratings were obtained during the scan, after each completed run of IATs. 
 
The two-way (stimulus condition x emotion type) repeated-measures ANOVA detected a 
significant main effect for stimulus condition, F(2,40) = 58.79, p < .001, 
2
 = .75. Post-hoc 
contrasts revealed significant differences in emotion ratings between the Negative and Neutral 
IAT conditions, F(1,20) = 80.38, p < .001, r = .89, as well as between the Negative and Positive 












conditions (p = .15, r = .31).  
The main effect for emotion type was also significant, F(1.75, 35.08) = 10.95, p < .001, 

2
 = .35, indicating that quantitative emotion ratings differed significantly across the four 
emotion types. Because Mauchly‟s test was significant and the assumption of sphericity was 
therefore violated, 2(5) = 30.11, p < .001, the degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .59).  
Finally, there was a significant interaction between stimulus condition and emotion type, 
F(2.34, 44.77) = 79.13, p < .001, 
2
 = .80. (Because Mauchly‟s test was again significant, 2(20) 
= 93.47, p < .001, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied, ε = .37). Emotion ratings 
therefore varied depending on the stimulus condition (Figure 11).  
 
  Figure 11. Interaction graph for the two-way repeated-measures ANOVA. 
 
To break down the interaction, several post-hoc comparisons were performed. Significant 
interactions were revealed when comparing the Negative IAT condition to the Neutral IAT 
condition for social negative affect (i.e., guilt, embarrassment, and shame) compared to anxiety 
(p < .001, r = .76), anger (p = .001, r = .67), and social positive affect (p < .001, r = .93). 
Looking at the interaction graph (Figure 11), these effects reflect the fact that social negative 
affect increased significantly more than anxiety, anger, and social positive affect in the Negative 
      Social Positive 
      Anxiety 
      Anger 











IAT condition compared to the Neutral IAT condition. Very similar interaction effects were 
found in the Negative IAT condition compared to the Positive IAT condition, i.e., social negative 
affect again increased significantly more than anxiety, anger, and social positive affect (ps ≤ 
.001, rs > .66). 
Remaining contrasts revealed significant interactions when comparing the Positive IAT 
condition to the Neutral IAT condition for social positive affect (i.e., pride and satisfaction), 
compared to social negative affect (p = .001, r = .64), anxiety (p = .001, r = .64), and anger (p = 
.001, r = .66). In terms of the interaction graph (Figure 11), these effects reflected that social 
positive affect increased significantly more than social negative affect, anxiety, and anger in the 
Positive IAT condition compared to the Neutral IAT condition.   
One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs confirmed that target affects were elicited more 
strongly than any other emotion in each stimulus condition. For the Negative IAT condition, the 
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA for emotion type was significant, F(2.04, 40.87) = 47.12, p 
< .001, 
2
 = .70 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction, ε = .68). Bonferroni post-hoc tests were 
selected because they are likely to control the Type I error rate (Maxwell, 1980). These indicated 
that ratings of social negative affect were significantly higher than anger (p = .001, r = .63) as 
well as social positive affect (p < .001, r = .90), while the comparison between social negative 
affect and anxiety almost reached significance (p = .054, r = .54) (Figure 12). 
Similarly, for the Positive IAT condition, the one-way repeated-measures ANOVA for 
emotion type was significant, F(1.61, 32.21) = 56.27, p < .001, 
2
 = .74 (Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, ε = .54). Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that ratings of social positive affect were 
significantly higher than anxiety, anger, and social negative affect (ps < .001, rs > .80). The one-
way repeated-measures ANOVA for the Neutral IAT condition was also significant, F(1.78, 
35.62) = 32.08, p < .001, 
2
 = .62 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction, ε = .59). This condition had a 
similar emotion profile to that of the Positive IAT condition, because social positive affect in this 
condition was also rated as significantly higher than all other emotions (ps < .01, rs > .65) 
(Figure 12).  
From the above analyses, it could be concluded that social negative affect was rated the 
most highly in the Negative IAT condition, while social positive affect was rated the most highly 
in both the Positive and Neutral IAT conditions. To explore these results further, paired t-tests 












affect indices, from baseline to the respective IAT condition.  
 
 
Figure 12. Means for ratings of affect in each IAT stimulus condition during the fMRI scan. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
  
In the Negative IAT condition, guilt (M = 6.73, SD = 1.76), embarrassment (M = 6.60, 
SD = 1.29), and shame (M = 6.43, SD = 1.47) all increased significantly from baseline, ts(20) > 
8.7, ps < .001, rs > .85. T-test results could therefore not differentiate between these highly 
correlated negative emotions (rs > .65, ps ≤ .001). In the Negative IAT condition, pride was 
negatively correlated with guilt (r = -.66, p = .001), embarrassment (r = -.72, p < .001), and 
shame (r = -.50, p = .02). Similarly, in the Positive IAT condition, pride (M = 6.04, SD = 1.39) 
and satisfaction (M = 6.06, SD = 1.45) increased significantly from baseline, rs(20) > 3.8, ps = 
.001, rs > .65, and were also significantly correlated with each other (r = .75, p < .001). In the 
Neutral IAT condition, however, there were no significant increases in either pride or satisfaction 
from baseline (ps > .16, rs < .30).  
These results indicated that participants reported significantly increased guilt, 
embarrassment, and shame in the Negative IAT condition, while they reported significantly 
increased pride and satisfaction in the Positive IAT condition. Although ratings of pride and 















increase in positive affect from baseline in this condition.     
Manipulation check. The manipulation check after the scanning procedure was 
employed to verify that target emotions were successfully elicited during the fMRI paradigm. 
Participants were required to state which emotion (from a list of 8), and with what intensity 
(from 1 to 5), they experienced most during the feedback period for each IAT. The manipulation 
check was especially important because within-scan emotion ratings could not distinguish 
between guilt, shame, and embarrassment in the Negative IAT condition, or between pride and 
satisfaction in the Positive IAT condition. Participants were required to state which emotion(s) 
they experienced predominantly during IAT feedback. Differences between shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment were explained to participants where necessary. 
Table 14 gives the percentages of participants who reported experiencing a particular 
emotion during the presentation of each IAT‟s feedback. Emotion ratings for IAT topics in the 
same stimulus condition were very similar and therefore averaged together. When considering 
the percentage values, it is clear that participants felt mostly neutral in the Neutral IAT condition, 
but experienced predominantly guilt in the Negative IAT condition, and predominantly pride and 
satisfaction in the Positive IAT condition. Mean intensity ratings (from 1 to 5) for these emotions 
were as follows: Guilt (M = 3.88, SD = 0.85), pride (M = 3.83, SD = 0.66), and satisfaction (M = 
3.57, SD = 0.64). Participants furthermore reported that they found the IAT feedback convincing 
and were generally unsuspicious in terms of their IAT results (only 2 participants indicated some 
suspicion during the experimental paradigm).  
Taken together, subjective emotion data confirmed that participants experienced mostly 
social negative affect and anxiety during the Negative IAT condition, and social positive affect 
during the Positive IAT condition. Post-experimental manipulation data verified that, when 
asked to select one emotion, most participants indicated that guilt was the emotion they felt most 
in the Negative IAT condition. For the Positive IAT condition, participants selected either pride 
or satisfaction as the emotion they experienced most. During the Neutral IAT condition, 















fMRI Manipulation Check Data: Experienced Affect in Response to Various IAT Stimulus 
Conditions (N = 22)  





Neutral Anxiety Satisfied Pride Guilt Embarrassed Shame Anger 








































































         
Note. Predominant emotions in each IAT stimulus condition are in boldface. M = mean. 
Physiological Data 
 Figure 13 presents changes in HR across all three experimental runs in response to the 
different IAT feedback conditions. A linear valence effect could be identified, such that the 
highest HR reactivity was associated with the Positive IAT feedback condition, while the lowest 
HR reactivity was associated with the Negative IAT feedback condition.  This pattern of HR 
responses was also observed in each individual run of the fMRI paradigm (Table 15).   
The one-way repeated measures ANOVA for HR reactivity detected statistically 
significant differences, F(2,30) = 5.74, p = .008, 
2
 = .28. Post hoc contrasts indicated that HR 
reactivity during the Negative IAT feedback condition was significantly lower than HR reactivity 
during the Positive (p = .003, r = .68), as well as Neutral (p = .036, r = .51) IAT feedback 
conditions. HR reactivity during the Positive and Neutral IAT feedback conditions did not differ 

















Means and Standard Deviations of Participants‟ Heart Rate Responses to Positive,  





IAT Feedback Condition 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  
    
Run 1 2.50 (4.22) 2.50 (5.29) 0.53 (4.64) 
Run 2 2.91 (5.57) 1.78 (4.00) 1.36 (4.40) 
Run 3 2.16 (3.51) 1.78 (3.84) -1.13 (3.35) 
    
 
 Zero-order correlations were performed to assess the association between HR reactivity 
and subjective emotion reports. After the removal of two outliers, there was a significant positive 
linear relation between ratings of guilt and overall HR reactivity in the Negative IAT condition (r 
= .56, p = .03). Ratings of pride were not significantly associated with HR reactivity in the 













Whole-brain analysis. The random-effects ANOVA yielded statistically significant 
results of which the specific contrast effects are described below. At a corrected threshold of 
p(FDR) < .10, the contrast for guilt (i.e., Neg FB – Neu FB) produced significant activation in 
two regions within the superior frontal gyrus/dorsomedial PFC, as well as in supragenual ACC 
(supraACC), and pregenual ACC (pACC) (Table 16 and Figure 14). Event-related averaging 
plots for these areas confirmed that the signal increase extended over the entire 30-s feedback 
period, thus starting at Result 1 and continuing to the end of Result 3 (Figure 15). No significant 
activations were observed for the Neg Fix – Neu Fix contrast.   
At a corrected threshold of p(FDR) < .10, the contrast for pride (i.e., Pos FB – Neu FB) did 
not reveal any significant activation clusters. Even at a more relaxed threshold of p < .001 
(uncorrected), no significant activation clusters could be distinguished for either the Pos FB – 
Neu FB contrast, or the Pos Fix – Neu Fix contrast. These results implied that the Positive and 
Neutral IAT conditions were too similar to yield significant differences in neural activation. 
Because the contrast for pride did not result in significant brain activation, a conjunction 




Regional Activations for the Guilt Condition (Neg FB > Neu FB) 
Brain regions L/R Coordinates Voxels Max t 
  x y z   
       
1. Superior frontal gyrus 
and supraACC  
L -4 28 30 408 6.04 
2. Superior frontal gyrus L -4 43 18 153 5.48 
3. pACC  L -7 34 15 184 4.96 
       
Note. Talaraich coordinates and t-score refer to the peak of each brain region. A corrected 
threshold of p(FDR) < .10 and cluster size threshold of 2 contiguous voxels was employed. 














         
       
  
 
      
 
Figure 14. Images showing brain activations for guilt in the Neg FB – Neu FB contrast. 
Activated areas were in the A) superior frontal gyrus/supragenual ACC (label a) and superior 
frontal gyrus (label b), and B) pregenual ACC (label c). Significant differences were 



























Figure 15. Event-related averaging plots indicating the percent signal change for the regions 
activated by the Neg FB – Neu FB contrast. A) superior frontal gyrus and supragenual ACC      
(-4,28,30), B) superior frontal gyrus (-4,43,18), and C) pregenual ACC (-7,34,15) (see Table 16). 
Superior frontal gyrus/supraACC Superior frontal gyrus 













Mask analysis. The mask that was created from the contrast Neg FB – IAT included most 
of the PFC, large areas of the temporal lobes bilaterally, the posterior cingulate and precuneus, as 
well as subcortical areas (Figure 16). Areas that were more active during the performance of the 
IAT (i.e., those showing deactivation), were not included in the mask. The final mask consisted 
of ~194 924 voxels. 
 
 
     
 
        
 
Figure 16. Brain activation clusters for the contrast Neg FB – IAT, which were used to create a 
mask. Significant differences occurred at a threshold of p(FDR) < .10, and cluster size threshold 













The random-effects analysis in the reduced cortex volume produced highly significant 
results. The contrast for guilt (i.e., Neg FB – Neu FB)  now yielded significant activation in 
several areas, including the mPFC and ACC, left anterior insula and lateral orbital 
gyrus/ventrolateral PFC, right posterior insula, right hippocampus, right mediodorsal thalamus, 
precuneus, and posterior cingulate gyrus (Table 17 and Figure 17).  
The contrast for Neg Fix – Neu Fix also produced significant activation in several areas, 
including the mPFC, left and right anterior middle temporal gyri, left posterior middle temporal 
gyrus (lateral and mesial), left and right angular gyri (also known as the posterior STS), posterior 
cingulate, left OFC, and left DLPFC (Table 17).  
The Positive IAT condition compared to the Neutral IAT condition still did not result in 















Mask Analysis: Regional Activations for the Negative IAT Condition (i.e., Guilt) Relative to the 
Neutral IAT Condition 
Brain regions L/R Coordinates Voxels Max t 
 
 x y z   
Neg FB minus Neu FB       
       
mPFC and ACC L/R -4 28 30 9450 6.04 
Posterior insula R 32 -20 6 137 4.20 
Hippocampus R 23 -23 -12 136 4.54 
Thalamus R 3 -23 3 55 4.82 
Anterior insula and ventrolateral PFC L -36 19 0 683 4.43 
Posterior cingulate L/R -4 -20 33 1665 4.30 
Precuneus L/R -1 -68 21 824 3.74 
Precuneus/posterior cingulate  L -13 -47 30 73 3.57 
       
Neg Fix minus Neu Fix       
       
mPFC (mostly left) L/R -7 25 51 5362 5.02 
Middle temporal gyrus (anterior) R 53 7 -21 469 4.06 
Middle temporal gyrus (anterior) L -52 4 -21 313 4.94 
Middle temporal gyrus  
(posterior, mesial) 
L -49 -35 -3 453 4.65 
Middle temporal gyrus  
(posterior, lateral) 
L -61 -41 -9 420 3.89 
Angular gyrus (posterior STS/TPJ) L -40 -64 30 1906 5.29 
Angular gyrus (posterior STS/TPJ) R 44 -59 30 330 3.74 
Posterior cingulate L/R -4 -17 33 310 3.52 
Middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) L -47 1 39 195 3.66 
Ventrolateral PFC L -49 25 -3 397 3.72 
Note. Talaraich coordinates and t-score refer to the peak of each brain region. Significant 
activations are reported at a corrected threshold of p(FDR) < .10, and cluster size threshold of 2 












            
  
            
  
            
 
Figure 17. Mask analysis: Images showing brain activation in the Neg FB – Neu FB contrast. 
Activated areas included the A) mPFC, posterior cingulate and precuneus, B) left anterior insula 
and ventrolateral, PFC C) right hippocampus and thalamus, and D) right posterior insula. 
Significant differences were recognised at a corrected threshold of p(FDR) = .10 and cluster size 





















Correlational analysis. Pearson‟s correlation coefficients were computed to assess linear 
relationships between subjective emotion ratings and fMRI signal changes in regions of 
significant activation during the Negative IAT condition (i.e., guilt). All parameter estimates for 
Neg FB – Neu FB, as well as subjective ratings of guilt, were normally distributed (assessed 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests). Regions of interest uncovered during the whole-brain and 
mask analyses were also correlated with each other to obtain a better understanding of the linear 
relationships between brain areas during a current guilt experience. Because so many 
correlations were computed, only those significant at the 1% level (i.e., p < .01) were interpreted. 
Highly significant negative correlations were observed between subjective ratings of guilt 
and the degree of activation in the pACC (r = -.70, p < .001), as well as the right posterior insula 
(r = -.57, p = .007) (Figure 18).  Other negative emotions (anxiety, embarrassment, and shame) 
were also negatively correlated with activity in the pACC (rs < -.63, ps < .01); however, guilt 
was the only negative emotion that correlated significantly with activity in the right posterior 
insula (at the 1% level).  
 
   
Figure 18. Plots and regression lines of correlations between emotion ratings and fMRI signal 
changes in specific brain regions. Self-ratings of guilt for the Negative IAT condition were 
negatively correlated with the degree of activation in the pACC (x = -7, y = 34, z = 15; 184 
voxels, r = -.70, p < .001), and the right posterior insula (x = 32, y = -20, z = 6, 137 voxels, r =    
-.57, p = .007). 
  












As can be seen in Table 18, fMRI activations indicated that the pACC and right posterior 
insula were also significantly correlated with each other (r = .58, p = .006). Interestingly, ratings 
of pride, which decreased during the Negative IAT condition, were linearly related to activity in 
the right posterior insula (r = .64, p = .002). 
 Other brain regions that showed significant linear relationships were the mPFC, which 
was positively correlated with the precuneus and posterior cingulate regions (rs > .55, ps < .01), 
while the precuneus and posterior cingulate were significantly correlated with each other (r = 
.75, p < .001) (Table 18). 
 
Table 18 
Zero-order Correlations Among Regions of Significant Activation for the Negative IAT 
Condition (i.e., Guilt) Relative to the Neutral IAT Condition  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
Whole-brain analysis           
           
1. Superior frontal 
gyrus/supraACC  
      
    
2. Superior frontal 
gyrus 
 .37      
    
3. pACC   .16 .22         
       
    
Mask analysis           
           
4. mPFC and ACC .71*** .70***   .58**        
5. Posterior insula (R) -.08 .21   .58** .18       
6. Hippocampus (R) -.36  -.14 .34  -.02 .21      
7. Thalamus (R) .04 .08 .30 .27 .50 .26     
8. Anterior insula and 
ventrolateral PFC (L) 
.31 .38 .27 .53 .19 -.34 .14   
 
9. Posterior cingulate .20 .46 .38  .57** .16  .38 .15 .25   
10. Precuneus  -.02 .44 .26 .40 .08  .40 .10 .22 .75***  
11. Precuneus/posterior 
cingulate 
.11   .58** .27 .35 .24 -.21 .12 .35   .29 .47 
           
Note. supraACC = supragenual ACC; pACC = pregenual ACC; R = right hemisphere; L = left 
hemisphere.  












Individual differences: BIS/BAS. As in Study 1, subjective emotion ratings of guilt 
were correlated with participants‟ scores on the BIS/BAS scales to determine the relations 
between BIS sensitivity, BAS sensitivity, and experimentally-induced affect. In addition, 
participants‟ BIS and BAS scores were correlated with the degree of activation in the pACC, 
and in the right posterior insula. 
Participants‟ scores of BIS and BAS were uncorrelated in the fMRI participant sample (r 
= -.09, p = .69). Consistent with findings from Study 1, higher BIS scores were positively 
associated with subjective ratings of guilt, although this correlation did not reach significance. 
Significant negative correlations, however, were detected between BIS scores and areas that 
were associated with subjective ratings of guilt, i.e., the pACC and right posterior insula (Table 
19). BIS was not significantly associated with activity in any other brain region. 
In contrast, BAS was significantly correlated with self-reported guilt, such that lower 
ratings of BAS were associated with higher ratings of guilt (r = -.62, p = .003) (Table 19). In 
addition, BAS was positively correlated with signal changes in both the pACC (r = .68, p = 
.001), and the right posterior insula (r = .48, p = .03), but not with activity in any other brain 
region. Taken together, these findings suggest that, irrespective of BIS sensitivity, those 
participants with lower BAS sensitivity were more likely to experience intense guilt.  
 
Table 19 
Correlations Between BIS and BAS Sensitivity and Self-reports of Guilt, as Well as Signal 
Changes in Specific Brain Regions  
 Guilt pACC Posterior insula (R) 
    
BIS   .24 -.44* -.44* 
BAS -.62**  .68**  .48* 
    














I conducted an fMRI study to examine the neural correlates of feelings of guilt. In a novel 
departure from previously published studies, the paradigm employed elicited this moral emotion 
in real-time and as a salient affective state relevant to the participant. To this end, the paradigm 
made use of preprogrammed feedback of either high or non-existent prejudice on an implicit 
attitude task designed to elicit guilt (as well as pride) in low-prejudice individuals.  
As hypothesized, the guilt condition produced increased BOLD responses in areas 
implicated in the neural substrates of mentalising, as well as in anterior paralimbic structures 
associated with increased emotional arousal. In particular, anterior medial frontal activation (BA 
9/32) during guilt suggests that participants engaged in heightened self-reflection, whereas 
dorsomedial (BA 8/9) and ventrolateral PFC (BA 47) activation may be associated with the 
processing of socio-emotional cues that signal punishment or unacceptable social behaviour. 
Moreover, prominent conflict-related supragenual ACC activity suggested that acute guilt is 
associated with the interruption of ongoing behaviour. Contrary to predictions, no significant 
temporal lobe activations were detected during the guilt condition; these were observed during 
the Negative fixation period directly following the emotion induction, however. A noteworthy 
finding was the significant negative association between self-reports of guilt and the degree of 
activation in the pregenual ACC (pACC), which may point to individual differences in the 
regulation of negative affect. Finally, there were no significant fMRI activations associated with 
the pride condition, suggesting that this emotion manipulation was either not intense enough, or 
not sufficiently different from the Neutral IAT condition, to evoke specific neural activations. 
In summary, the direct, real-time elicitation of guilt was associated with a network of 
neural activation in areas consistently implicated in previous imaging studies of moral emotion 
elicitation. These areas have, however, never before all been activated by a single elicitation 
paradigm in a single study. Moreover, the distributed pattern of neural areas activated during 
guilt gives credence to the notion that guilt is a multi-faceted construct, including self-reflection, 
heightened arousal, mentalising, the interruption of ongoing behaviour, and affect regulation, 
which together may serve to guide and direct moral behaviour in complex ways. 
 
Efficacy of the Emotion Elicitation Paradigm 











investigation, it was necessary to confirm that target emotions of guilt and pride were elicited 
successfully. Unlike most previous fMRI designs, where participants were only asked to rate 
their emotional experiences post-hoc (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Kédia et al., 2008; Moll et al., 
2007; Takahashi et al., 2008; Takahashi et al., 2004; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009), emotion ratings in 
the current study were obtained during the scanning procedure. Subjects were furthermore 
required to rate several emotions in addition to target affects, and were questioned about their 
subjective experiences, in order to obtain rich qualitative data on the nature of the elicited affect. 
Subjective emotion reports indicated that the paradigm was successful in eliciting 
specific emotions of guilt, and to a lesser extent pride: Not only did target emotions increase 
significantly from baseline to the respective IAT stimulus conditions, but they were also the most 
salient emotions experienced during the Positive and Negative IAT conditions, respectively. In 
the Negative IAT condition, high ratings of guilt were also associated with high ratings of 
embarrassment and shame. Embarrassment and shame were thus also felt, despite the fact that 
participants reported almost uniformly (during the manipulation check) that guilt was their 
overriding feeling during the Negative IAT feedback period. Similar findings, namely of 
elevated ratings of guilt, shame, and embarrassment in response to stories portraying victim-
based moral transgressions, were reported by Finger et al. (2006). Finger et al., however, 
indicated that the presence of an audience resulted in significantly higher ratings of 
embarrassment and shame in response to moral transgressions, while it did not impact 
significantly on ratings of guilt. Ratings of embarrassment and shame in the present investigation 
may therefore have been augmented by a „public‟ factor, because participants were aware that 
their performances were being monitored outside the scanner. The co-occurrence of guilt with 
other negative emotions is considered in more detail in the General Discussion. 
In the Positive IAT condition, participants reported mostly increased pride and 
satisfaction, similar to emotional reports from Study 1, and post-experimental reports verified 
that participants experienced heightened pride in response to Positive IAT feedback. In the 
Neutral IAT condition, however, participants also rated pride and satisfaction as the emotions 
they experienced most, even though pride and satisfaction did not increase significantly from 
baseline in this condition. While most participants reported feeling neutral in response to Neutral 
IAT feedback, quite a few also reported that they did not distinguish considerably between the 












because that is how they believed they “should be.” The Neutral IAT condition was thus 
perceived by some participants as more positive than intended. The similarity in subjective 
emotion profiles between the Positive and Neutral IAT conditions probably prevented a clear 
distinction between these two conditions; the paradigm was therefore unsuccessful in identifying 
neural activations associated with pride. 
Because an important aim of the current investigation was the creation of an improved, 
ecologically valid, method for the elicitation of guilt and pride within an fMRI environment, the 
employed paradigm warrants closer inspection. In terms of pride, several authors have argued 
that we may feel pride when we uphold or act in accordance with our personal moral values 
(Haidt, 2001; Hume, 1739/1984; Moll, Zahn et al., 2005; Zahn, Moll et al., 2009). This response 
is also predicted by Duval‟s objective self-awareness theory, which states that congruity between 
self and some personal standard should result in positive affect (Duval & Silvia, 2002; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). In terms of theoretical considerations, it is therefore unclear why the paradigm 
did not succeed in producing strong positive affect. The most feasible explanation may be that 
participants experienced the Positive IAT condition as a cognitively pleasing condition, rather 
than a true positive emotion-evoking condition (Levenson, 2003). 
In terms of guilt, because experimental reports for self-discrepancy theory have been 
inconsistent, it was necessary to investigate some of those claims in more detail. To recap, 
Higgins‟s self-discrepancy theory predicts that discrepancies between actual/own versus 
ought/own standards will result in vulnerability to feelings of guilt, whereas discrepancies 
between actual/own versus ideal/other standards will result in vulnerability to shame (Higgins, 
1987, 1999). Because participants in the current study were selected to have high internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice, their integrated, nonprejudiced values are believed to 
have served as a personal should standard (Devine et al., 1991), making them more prone to 
experience guilt, instead of shame, when transgressing their personal standards. Tangney et al. 
(1998), however, argued that self-discrepancies of all kinds should result in shame, not guilt, 
because of shame‟s association with global negative self-evaluation, while guilt‟s focus is on 
behaviour (Lewis, 1971). Their results tended to support this notion, and generally failed to 
provide support for Higgins‟s predictions, namely that distinct self-discrepancies are 
differentially related to shame and guilt. At least three issues, however, are worth pointing out 











In the first instance, all self-reported self-discrepancies (e.g., actual/own:should/own, 
actual/own:ideal/other, etc.) were highly correlated, raising concerns as to whether the scales 
used were able to measure the distinct constructs that lie at the heart of self-discrepancy theory. 
In this regard, Tangney et al. (1998) suggested that priming procedures that activate self-
discrepancies and thus increase their accessibility, may be more suitable to detect differences 
between different self-discrepancies (e.g., Strauman, 1992). The current IAT paradigm could 
certainly be argued to be in line with such an approach, because it was designed to activate self-
discrepancies of an actual/own versus should/own nature.  
Second, in Tangney et al.‟s study, tendencies to experience guilt and shame were 
measured through use of the TOSCA, which measures guilt and shame proneness. As explained 
in Study 1, guilt and shame proneness are entirely different constructs to frequency-based 
constructs of guilt and shame. Because Higgins‟s (1987) postulations predict that self-
discrepancies are differentially linked to “chronic tendencies to experience guilt and shame” 
(Tangney et al. 1998, p. 265), frequency measures, such as the Guilt Inventory, may be more 
appropriate in evaluating Higgins‟s claims.  
Finally, Tangney et al. (1998)‟s overriding, and rather simplifying, account of the role of 
the self in separating guilt from shame may not be entirely accurate in its interpretation, nor is it 
the only determining factor that distinguishes these two frequently confused affective states (see 
Teroni & Deonna, 2008). In particular, H.B. Lewis‟s (1971) original thesis highlights the 
different foci of evaluation in shame and guilt, rather than just the presence or absence of the 
self, because the self is implicitly implicated in both emotions. Notably, guilt has intimate 
connections with responsibility and control, such that one only feels guilty over those actions in 
which one is somehow implicated (Lamb, 1983). A self-discrepant action can thus result in 
shame or guilt, depending on one‟s focus of evaluation: If the action is perceived as having a 
negative import on the global self, shame should ensue; by contrast, guilt should ensue if one 
views only the action one did in a negative light, without it impacting on the self as a whole 
(Teroni & Deonna, 2008). Whether shame or guilt ensues is, in fact, where self-discrepancy 
theory comes into play, i.e., transgressions that undermine one‟s ideals are associated with 
shame, whereas transgressions that violate a personal or societal norm are associated with guilt 
(Teroni & Deonna, 2008). Tangney et al. (1998)‟s claims that all self-discrepant acts should be 












Taken together, despite a lack of irrefutable evidence for guilt and shame‟s relation to 
distinct self-discrepancies, self-discrepancy theory has become part of mainstream theorising 
about guilt and shame (Teroni & Deonna, 2008). Moreover, in line with the current study‟s 
approach, Tangney et al. (1998) suggested that specific discrepancy-emotion relations may be 
more readily detected when individuals with large magnitudes of self-discrepancies are selected 
for participation (cf. Houston, 1990).  
 
Physiological Data 
 HR data obtained during IAT feedback indicated that the lowest HR reactivity was 
associated with the Negative IAT condition (i.e., guilt), while the highest HR reactivity was 
associated with the Positive IAT condition (i.e., pride). Because a counterbalanced order of 
presentation was followed, these data could not be explained by any order effects; besides, others 
have failed to find physiological differences due to the order of presentation of neutral, positive, 
and negative stimuli (Frazier et al., 2004). A more feasible explanation, therefore, is that the 
magnitude of HR change was determined primarily by the valence of IAT feedback.  
HR has a more complicated association with subjective experience than, for example, 
SCL, which has long been considered one of the most sensitive measures of emotional arousal 
(Cacioppo & Tassinary, 1990). Although the recall of both positive and negative experiences 
may lead to increases in HR, which suggests an association with arousal, HR reactivity during 
visual perception is considered to be primarily determined by valence, such that unpleasant 
stimuli effect relatively greater HR deceleration (Lang et al., 1993). My finding of a positive 
association between HR reactivity and the pleasantness of IAT feedback is therefore consistent 
with previous studies that made use of either emotive pictures or film stimuli to elicit emotion 
(Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1990; Britton, Taylor et al., 2006; Frazier et al., 2004; Greenwald, 
Cook, & Lang, 1989; Lang et al., 1993).  
HR responses obtained during the current fMRI paradigm, however, were in sharp 
contrast to the findings of Study 1, where Guilt condition participants displayed the highest HR 
reactivity, while Pride condition participants displayed only low cardiovascular arousal. 
Although the physiological responses of Study 1 and 2 therefore appear to be incongruous, they 
may be explained by a closer inspection of the two emotion manipulation paradigms that were 











any emotional response is highly context dependent (Stemmler et al., 2001), making it difficult 
to compare physiological responses from tasks that differ in their physical contexts, or in the 
contextual demands of the emotion eliciting event. Differences between the emotion elicitation 
paradigms of Study 1 and 2 are considered in the General Discussion. 
 
Neural Activations During the Negative IAT/Guilt Condition 
 To verify that neural activations detected during the Negative IAT feedback condition 
were not confounded by effects of task difficulty during the preceding IAT button-press task, 
response times to all IAT stimuli were analysed (Chen et al., 2008). Although response times to 
stimuli in all experimental conditions were fairly similar, participants on average responded 
faster to stimuli in the Negative IAT stimulus condition. The most likely explanation for this 
finding is that the Negative IAT sorting condition was easier. While it may also be possible that 
the Negative IAT condition stimulated enhanced attention and therefore better task performance 
(to avoid further negative feedback), this explanation is unlikely, because faster response times 
during Negative IATs were observed even before a feedback pattern could be established. 
Because Negative IATs could therefore not be viewed as more difficult than Neutral IATs, 
neural activations observed during Negative IAT feedback could not be attributed to any 
additional cognitive demands during those periods.   
Only one previous neuroimaging study has looked directly at brain activations associated 
with the transient experience of self-relevant guilt (Shin et al., 2000). Shin and colleagues, 
however, made use of a script-driven imagery paradigm during which participants recalled a 
previously experienced guilt episode. Despite significant differences between the emotion 
elicitation paradigm employed by Shin et al. and the current investigation, remarkable 
similarities in terms of brain activation patterns are observed: Both studies detected significant 
neural activation in anterior paralimbic structures, including the supragenual ACC and left 
anterior insula/ventrolateral PFC. Several areas, in particular the medial prefrontal cortex, 
however, were additionally recruited during the current guilt manipulation. The current study‟s 
prominent mPFC, ACC, and insula activations are also consistent with the notion that impaired 
processing in these areas contribute significantly to diminished self-conscious emotional 
responding in patients with frontotemporal lobar degeneration (Sturm et al., 2008).  












of previous moral emotion imaging studies, an important observation is made: The current 
emotion elicitation paradigm produced significant activations in areas associated with increased 
emotional arousal (e.g., ACC, insula, thalamus) (Critchley, 2005; Phan, Taylor et al., 2004), 
while studies that employed emotive sentences or vignettes to elicit moral emotions frequently 
did not obtain activation in these areas (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Finger et al., 2006; Takahashi 
et al., 2004, 2008). Another readily apparent observation, compared to previous investigations 
(e.g., Finger et al., 2006; Kédia et al., 2008; Shin et al., 2000; Völlm et al., 2006; Zahn, Moll et 
al., 2009), is that temporal lobe activations were not observed during the current guilt 
manipulation, but occurred afterward, during the Negative IAT fixation period. The 20-s fixation 
periods after IAT feedback may be likened to the post-emotion manipulation periods of Study 1, 
because they also occurred directly after the emotion manipulation and were of a similar length. 
The fMRI paradigm could therefore also be employed to detect neural activations after the guilt 
induction, given that emotional responses may persist after the emotion stimulation period 
(Garrett & Maddock, 2001).  
Frontal lobe and ACC areas. In contrast to the three discrete frontal/paracingulate areas 
detected in the whole-brain analysis, the area of activation in the reduced cortex volume (i.e., the 
mask analysis) encompassed one large area of activation within the mPFC. This area extended 
upward to include dorsomedial PFC, downward to include ventromedial PFC, and posteriorly to 
include supragenual anterior cingulate cortex (using the nomenclature of Northoff et al., 2006; 
Figure 19). Rather than making global inferences about the nature of this large mPFC activation, 
however, the three distinct activations observed during the whole-brain analysis, namely the 
superior frontal gyrus/supraACC (-4,28,30)
9
, superior frontal gyrus (-4, 43,18), and pregenual 
ACC (-7,34,15), will be considered in more detail because they pertain to more circumscribed 
anatomical areas within the frontal lobes. 
 
                                                 












Figure 19. Schematic illustration of cortical midline structures. MOFC: medial orbital prefrontal 
cortex (BA 11, 12), VMPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex (BA 10, 11), PACC: pre- and 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24, 25, 32), SACC: supragenual anterior cingulate 
cortex (BA 24, 32), DMPFC: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (BA 9), MPC: medial parietal cortex 
(BA 7,31), PCC: posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23), RSC: retrosplenial cortex (BA 26, 29, 30) 
(adapted from Northoff et al., 2006). 
 
The first, more dorsal, superior frontal gyrus/dorsomedial PFC activation (BA 8/9) 
detected in the present investigation corresponds to the more posterior, cognitive area of rostral 
medial frontal cortex (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Dorsomedial together with ventrolateral PFC (BA 
47), which was also activated during the present Negative IAT/Guilt condition, have been 
observed in several studies investigating neural responses to socially inappropriate or 
embarrassing scenarios (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004; Zahn, Moll et al., 
2009). Finger et al. (2006) extended previous accounts by suggesting that activation in these 
areas pertain to the behavioural response demands of an event, rather than the specific event per 
se. They assessed neural activations associated with moral and embarrassing/social 
transgressions in the presence or absence of an audience. Results showed increased activity in 
left dorsomedial and ventrolateral PFC only when there was a need for behavioural change, thus 
social/embarrassing transgressions with no witnesses to the event did not activate these areas 












behavioural motivation to bring about restitution or appeasement actions (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; 
Tangney et al., 1996), Finger et al. (2006) interpreted enhanced activity in dorsomedial and 
ventrolateral PFC as signaling inappropriate or unacceptable social behaviour, which is thought 
to result in the initiation of alternative motor responses. In this way, behaviour is changed away 
from that which prompted the aversive response, to a more beneficial option.  
The above interpretation of the role of dorsomedial and ventrolateral PFC activation 
during moral transgressions is consistent with previous imaging work on more basic response 
reversal paradigms: Neural activation associated with a change in response also typically 
includes the dorsomedial and ventrolateral PFC (Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; 
O'Doherty, Critchley, Deichmann, & Dolan, 2003; Remijnse, Nielen, Uylings, & Veltman, 
2005). These areas are, however, not only active during cognitive tasks of changing 
reinforcement contingencies (O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Rolls, 
2000), but are also active in response to social cues that modify current behavioural responses 
(e.g., Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003; Shafritz, Collins, & Blumberg, 2006). To explain the profound 
social interaction problems of neurological patients with OFC damage, Blair and Cipolotti 
(2000) formulated the social response reversal model. According to this model, OFC patients 
may have reduced ability to activate representations of situations that have previously been 
associated with negatively-valenced reactions from others, or these representations can no longer 
modify their current behaviour in situations where it is required. Their patient with bilateral OFC 
damage was impaired at identifying social transgressions, as well as at altering his behaviour in 
response to socially aversive cues, such as angry and disgusted facial expressions. 
The distinct connectivity and function of ventrolateral PFC in diverse imaging paradigms 
lend further support to the notion that aversive moral and social emotions may serve as social 
cues that generate alternative motor responses. Notably, lateral compared to medial OFC 
receives more multimodal sensory-related inputs (Carmichael & Price, 1996), and appears to be 
more involved in changing responses under unexpected circumstances (Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 
2000). Lateral OFC is also commonly activated by negative emotional expressions (Basile et al., 
2011; Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek, 
1998), incongruent IAT trials (Chee, Sriram, Soon, & Lee, 2000; Luo et al., 2006), and 
importantly, is activated in response to a wide range of punishing stimuli (Kringelbach & Rolls, 











Ventrolateral PFC therefore appears sensitive to cues of punishment or negative emotional 
reactions from others, which signal to us that our current behaviour is socially unacceptable and 
should be curtailed or changed (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004).  
Taken together, dorsomedial and ventrolateral PFC activation during guilt may be 
responsible for processing specific social, contextual, and emotional cues to modify current 
behaviour (Finger et al., 2006). This interpretation is compatible with Moll and colleagues‟ view 
of the PFC as being involved in the context-dependent representation of events during moral 
cognition (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005), as well as with evidence from disorders affecting the frontal 
lobes, where affected patients typically act in ways that are not socially acceptable (Eslinger, 
Flaherty-Craig, & Benton, 2004; Miller, Darby, Benson, Cummings, & Miller, 1997; Tranel, 
1994). 
 The second superior frontal gyrus activation (BA 9/32; -4, 43, 18) falls within the more 
anterior part of rostral frontal cortex, which has been associated with emotional tasks (Amodio & 
Frith, 2006). This activation, in fact, has very similar peak coordinates to the area suggested by 
Steele and Lawrie (2004) to be concerned with emotion (mean Talaraich coordinates ±5, 46, 18), 
based on a comprehensive meta-analysis of emotion-inducing and cognitive task imaging 
studies. It also corresponds closely to the area of maximum activity detected during „real-time‟ 
mentalising tasks, namely the anterior paracingulate cortex bilaterally (-10, 50, 30 and 8, 54, 12) 
(Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002). A similar area (-8, 42, 20) 
has also been implicated in inferring the communicative intentions of another, for example, 
judging someone as being deceptive (Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004). 
 Anterior rostral frontal cortex (BA9/32) therefore appears intimately involved in emotion 
induction on the one hand, but also in more abstract mentalising processes, on the other hand. 
Amodio and Frith (2006) integrated these accounts by arguing that this area is not necessarily 
involved in intrinsic emotional processing per se, but rather plays a crucial role in our ability to 
reflect on how we (and others) perceive ourselves, particularly with regard to „hot‟/emotional 
mental states. Supporting this explanation, Ochsner et al. (2004) found activation within anterior 
rostral frontal cortex to be associated with assessing one‟s own emotional state, which is very 
similar to assessing self-knowledge. Imaging studies of self-referential tasks have also 
consistently pointed to the involvement of mesial aspects of BA 8, 9, and 10 for spontaneous as 












Northoff et al., 2006). Finally, Johnson (2002) detected anterior mPFC activity specifically in 
relation to self-reflective thought, in a task where participants were required to evaluate their 
own abilities, traits, and attitudes. I therefore propose that activity in the anterior rostral frontal 
cortex during the current Negative IAT/Guilt condition stemmed from participants‟ engagement 
in self-reflection.   
The first ACC activation reported in the present study, i.e., supragenual ACC (BA 32) 
(using the nomenclature of Northoff et al., 2006), is located approximately 30 mm above the 
anterior commissure–posterior commissure (AC–PC) plane, directly above the genu of the 
corpus callosum. This area is situated just posterior to Steele and Lawrie‟s (2004) boundary that 
separates the cognitive (dorsal) and emotional (ventral) divisions of the ACC. The current 
supraACC activation may therefore be described as more cognitive in function (Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000). The second ACC activation is located 15 mm above the AC-PC plane, slightly 
dorsal to the subgenual cingulate, and directly anterior to the genu of the corpus callosum. It 
therefore corresponds to pregenual cingulate cortex (pACC) (Johansen-Berg et al., 2008), and 
may be associated more with emotional processing (Amodio & Frith, 2006).  
The more dorsal ACC activation (supraACC, BA 32) observed in the present study has 
also previously been detected in association with moral transgressions, moral emotions, and 
moral judgment tasks (e.g., Greene et al., 2004; Immordino-Yang et al., 2009; Kédia et al., 2008; 
Shin et al., 2000). Moreover, in moral judgment tasks, enhanced ACC activity is associated with 
longer reaction times and increased decision difficulty in response to complex moral dilemmas 
(Greene et al., 2004), while it does not activate in response to simple ethical decision-making 
(Heekeren et al., 2003). ACC activity also appears to be modulated by emotional valence: It has 
been associated with the regulation of negative emotional stimuli (Mak, Hu, Zhang, Xiao, & Lee, 
2009a; Ochsner, Ray et al., 2004), and is generally more associated with negative than positive 
emotional experiences (George et al., 1995; Prohovnik et al., 2004). Notably, dorsal ACC may 
serve to direct attention toward subjective emotional states (Lane et al., 1998; Phan, Liberzon, 
Welsh, Britton, & Taylor, 2003), and is more consistently recruited in emotion tasks that also 
involve cognitive components (Phan et al., 2002). 
Together, these findings support dorsal/supragenual ACC‟s important role in cognitive 
control, and more specifically, the detection and monitoring of conflicts (Botvinick et al., 2004; 











cognition by continually monitoring response tendencies for competition, and signaling the need 
for enhanced top-down control when conflicts are detected (van Veen et al., 2001). In the 
Eriksen flankers task, for example, increased conflict between intention and behaviour on 
incompatible flanker trials are associated with response errors (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & 
Donchin, 1993). The event-related potential (ERP) associated with such errors, the error-related 
negativity (ERN), has been localized to the ACC (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994) – a finding  
supported by computational models (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), as well 
as neuroimaging studies of the flanker task (Casey et al., 2000; Durston et al., 2003). Amodio et 
al. (2004) have shown that these conflict-detection processes are also sensitive to the automatic, 
but undesired, activation of racial stereotypes in low-prejudice individuals.  
In the present study, the prominent dorsal ACC activation may thus correspond to 
internal conflict experienced by participants, i.e., between their internalized standards and actual 
prejudiced IAT feedback (see, e.g., Holroyd et al., 2004). This explanation fits well with a 
finding from Study 1, namely that guilt was significantly correlated with BIS sensitivity: Amodio 
and colleagues (2008) recently found BIS (as measured by the Carver and White BIS/BAS 
scales) to be associated with ACC-related conflict monitoring.  
Finally, another function associated with ACC activity is the generation of increased 
autonomic output, e.g., cardiovascular arousal (Critchley et al., 2003). This hypothesis is 
considered in more detail in the General Discussion. It is worth mentioning here, however, that 
the autonomic control account of ACC function is not necessarily distinct from its conflict-
monitoring role: Increased autonomic arousal is a robust feature of increasing cognitive effort. 
Moreover, conflict detection may be coupled with increased negative affect, which is also 
associated with heightened autonomic arousal (McNaughton & Corr, 2004).  
Although activations discussed thus far have corresponded to fairly well-characterized 
regions with regard to their functional specialization, the functional significance of pACC (BA 
24/32) activity in the present guilt manipulation is more debatable. Of interest is the fact that the 
pACC area activated in the present investigation is associated with areas involved in a default, 
self-monitoring, state of brain activation. More specifically, pACC lies within ventral mPFC, 
which typically exhibits decreased activity from baseline during more attention-demanding, 
goal-directed behaviours (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). This decrease, however, has 












demanding task (Simpson, Snyder, Gusnard, & Raichle, 2001), and may even appear as an 
increase if an attention-demanding control task is used as baseline, as in the present situation. 
Gusnard et al. (2001) thus hypothesized that ventral mPFC is involved in assessing the salience 
of emotional stimuli. 
In line with an emotion-processing account, pACC activity in the present investigation 
was intimately related to participants‟ subjective emotional experiences, such that activity in this 
area had a significant negative linear relationship with self-reports of guilt. Increased pACC 
activity thus appeared to inhibit participants‟ affective experiences. Consistent with this 
interpretation, a region slightly inferior to the present pACC activation has previously showed 
enhanced activity when participants were required to decrease their affective responses to 
negative emotional stimuli by using a self-focused strategy (Ochsner, Ray et al., 2004). 
Likewise, in an emotional Go/No-Go task, inhibition for sad faces in the No-Go condition 
preferentially activated pregenual ACC (BA 24/32) (Shafritz et al., 2006). Shafritz et al. (2006) 
reasoned that the unique location of pACC, i.e., at the intersection of dorsal and ventral ACC 
subdivisions (Steele & Lawrie, 2004), placed it in an ideal position to integrate cognitive and 
emotional processes. Perigenual ACC‟s extensive connections to limbic, as well as frontopolar 
and dorsal cingulate areas, support this interpretation (Johansen-Berg et al., 2008), and suggest 
that it may be involved in integrating visceromotor aspects of emotional processing with 
cognitive information. 
In the present context, it may therefore be that (i) participants actively tried to down-
regulate feelings of guilt, perhaps to avoid it from influencing their performance on subsequent 
IATs; and that (ii) those who were better at this emotion regulation, experienced less affective 
distress. In support of this conclusion, areas within the medial and ventromedial frontal cortex 
have been associated with regulating limbic emotion structures (e.g., the amygdala), such that 
enhanced activity in these areas lead to the suppression of limbic structures (Phelps & LeDoux, 
2005). Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) patients, for example, have been associated with 
reduced activation in medial prefrontal areas during exposure to traumatic memories, compared 
to control participants (Bremner et al., 1999). In addition, Rauch et al. (2003) detected decreased 
volumes of pregenual ACC in PTSD patients compared to controls. The present results thus 
provide support for the hypothesis that medial prefrontal dysfunction contributes to the inability 











Finally, because stimuli employed in negative emotion manipulation paradigms may also 
be conceived of as “painful stimuli” (Amodio & Frith, 2006, p. 274), a different way of 
understanding pACC involvement during guilt elicitation may relate to the experience of pain. 
By this notion, increased pACC activity may correspond to the „blocking out‟ of affective pain. 
This interpretation is considered in more detail in the General Discussion. 
Before moving away from the frontal lobes to consider more posterior brain activations, 
it is of interest to observe that no neural activation was detected in the subgenual cingulate cortex 
(SCC) during guilt. While the SCC has consistently been associated with reliving sad memories 
(Liotti et al., 2000; Phan et al., 2002), it has more recently also been associated with feelings of 
guilt when participants imagined performing moral transgressions against a known other (Zahn, 
Moll et al., 2009). In a subsequent study, Zahn and colleagues refined their interpretation of 
activity in this area and suggested that SCC activation reflects individual differences in empathic 
responding, which is an integral component of various moral sentiments (e.g., guilt and 
compassion) (Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2009). Consistent with this interpretation, SCC 
activity has been observed in association with feelings of romantic and maternal love (Bartels & 
Zeki, 2004), as well as during charitable, altruistic decisions to donate money, presumably driven 
by affiliative feelings toward a societal cause (Moll et al., 2006). Zahn and colleagues thus 
argued that activity in this region is driven by attachment-related experiences (Insel & Young, 
2001; Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2009).   
The negative finding for SCC activity in the present investigation may be explained by 
susceptibility artifacts often problematic in ventral frontal areas. Alternatively, if the SCC was 
activated equally in the Neutral IAT condition, it may not have showed up after subtraction. In 
this regard, Moll and colleagues (2007) have shown that neutral agency robustly engages ventral 
and subgenual PFC sectors. A more likely explanation, however, is that the lack of SCC 
activation in the present study is a consequence of the nature of the guilt-eliciting paradigm. The 
paradigms employed by Zahn and colleagues consisted of scenarios describing how you 
personally harm someone familiar to you, or act in a way counter to established social norms 
toward that person (e.g., your mother) (Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2009; Zahn, Moll et al., 
2009). The present paradigm, however, involved the transgression of a personal norm without 
any interpersonal harm. It is likely that areas associated with attachment (e.g., the SCC) may 












the victim. In line with this reasoning, Basile et al. (2011) argued that the SCC is more likely to 
be associated with altruistic than deontological guilt, while deontological guilt in their study was 
associated with a more dorsal ACC activation (-4, 30, 24). Because guilt evoked in the present 
study was more in line with deontological than altruistic guilt, my results fully support the 
distinction proposed by Basile et al. (2011).  
Posterior and subcortical/limbic areas. While the anterior cingulate cortex is 
“executive” in function, the posterior cingulate cortex has been described as “evaluative” (Vogt, 
Finch, & Olson, 1992), because it is associated with the evaluation and monitoring of sensory 
information (Raichle et al., 2001). In terms of emotional processing, the posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex is one of the most consistently activated areas in neuroimaging 
studies of emotion, particularly in response to emotionally salient stimuli (Basile et al., 2011; 
Britton, Phan et al., 2006; Harenski & Hamann, 2006; Maddock, 1999). Its prominent role in 
emotion, together with the hippocampus, appears to involve autobiographical emotional recall. 
For example, the posterior cingulate activates with self-generated emotions and listening to 
autobiographical memory scripts (Damasio et al., 2000; Fink et al., 1996). It may therefore link 
emotion and episodic memory processes (Maddock, 1999). The posterior cingulate is also 
commonly implicated in ToM (Fletcher, Happe et al., 1995), as well as in moral judgment 
(Greene et al., 2004). 
Consistent with the interpretation that the posterior cingulate activation reflects episodic 
memory recall, I also observed significant activation in the right hippocampus during guilt. It has 
been suggested that the posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortices may serve to connect the 
dorsolateral PFC with mesial temporal areas associated with memory, e.g., the hippocampus 
(Goldman-Rakic, Selemon, & Schwartz, 1984). The hippocampus is implicated in the processing 
of  autobiographical memory, and may facilitate the conscious retrieval of salient memories that 
allow previous experiences to influence current behaviour (Casebeer, 2003). Posterior cingulate 
activation was detected in Britton et al.‟s (2006) imaging study in response to social, but not non-
social, film clips. Interestingly, participants in that study reported that some of the emotive film 
clips triggered personal memories associated with the footage. Likewise, in the current guilt 
paradigm, it is possible that participants engaged in self-reflection and remembered personal 
situations where they have responded with prejudice. Recall of emotional memories may thus 











The neighbouring precuneus area is another posterior area that has been implicated in 
moral cognition and ToM (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll, Zahn et al., 2005). For example, in 
Kedia et al. (2008)‟s study of moral emotions that result when “an agent harms a victim”, the 
precuneus was consistently activated in scenarios that also involved someone else, including 
guilt, other-anger, and compassion, but not during scenarios where the self acted as both the 
agent and victim (i.e., self-anger). Like other areas associated with mentalizing, the precuneus is 
likely to have a distinct role in the process of perceiving and reasoning about others (Saxe, 
2006). Together with the posterior cingulate, it appears to be involved in memory, specifically 
affective imagery, in the context of coherent social narratives (Fletcher, Frith et al., 1995). The 
significant positive correlation between blood flow in the posterior cingulate and precuneus areas 
supports this conclusion and suggests that these regions may be functionally connected.  
An important finding of the present study was that the guilt condition was associated with 
significant insular activity: both the left anterior- and right posterior insular cortices showed 
significant activation. The insula is a structure intimately associated with emotional processing. 
Its function as visceral sensory area may serve to represent and evaluate internal feeling states of 
the organism (Craig, 2002; Damasio et al., 2000). The anterior insula is also strongly implicated 
in empathic responding (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Singer et al., 2004). In this regard, 
empathy is believed to automatically evoke a similar feeling state in the observer as in the 
individual being empathized with (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 
2004). 
Consistent with the notion that participants engaged in self-reflection during guilt, 
Reiman et al. (1997) observed that insula activation is more readily associated with evaluative 
and experiential aspects of self-generated, rather than externally-generated, emotions. This 
observation was supported in a subsequent meta-analysis of emotion induction studies (Phan et 
al., 2002). Moreover, Phan et al. (2004) reported increased anterior insula activity in connection 
with increased emotional intensity (regardless of valence), as well as increased personal 
association with experimental stimuli (see also Kircher et al., 2000). With regard to more 
specific affective states, anterior insula activation has been associated with negative emotions, 
e.g., sadness and guilt (Basile et al., 2011; George et al., 1996; Shin et al., 2000), as well as 
aversive stimuli, such as tasting salt (Kinomura et al., 1994). In particular, feeling disgusted or 












(Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 1997; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998; Wicker et al., 2003). 
Taken together, the above accounts underscore the fact that participants were emotionally 
aroused during the guilt manipulation, and found the material self-relevant.  
The anterior and posterior portions of the insula differ considerably in terms of their 
cellular organization and functional connectivity (Mesulam & Mufson, 1982a, 1982b). Whereas 
the anterior insula is agranular and extensively connected to anterior paralimbic and subcortical 
emotion structures (e.g., the amygdala), the smaller posterior portion is granular and shares 
connections with superior temporal, parietal, premotor, and somatosensory cortices (Augustine, 
1996). The posterior portion therefore appears to be more involved in processing somatosensory 
and visceral information from the body, e.g., the experience of physical pain (Peltz et al., 2011; 
Singer et al., 2004). 
The precise functional significance of the right posterior insula activation during the 
current guilt condition, and, in particular, its negative association with subjective reports of guilt, 
however, is unclear. Given the involvement of the right inferior posterior insula in cardiovascular 
control, it may be possible that activation in this area served to adjust autonomic outflow during 
guilt (Williamson, Fadel, & Mitchell, 2006). This interpretation is considered in more detail in 
the General Discussion. 
The thalamus can be described as a central sensory gateway, given its role in relaying 
bodily afferents to higher cortical and subcortical areas (Craig, 2002). Thalamic activation is 
readily observed in emotion induction studies, irrespective of valence or the precise method of 
induction (Britton, Phan et al., 2006; Damasio et al., 2000; Lane, Reiman et al., 1997; Moll, de 
Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002; Reiman et al., 1997). It was therefore not surprising to 
detect activation in this structure during guilt. The negative finding for amygdala activation in 
the present study, however, was more puzzling. While this finding appeared at first to run 
counter to my predictions for guilt, it may be accounted for by several explanations. These are 
considered in the General Discussion. 
Neural activation during the fixation period. I observed significant neural activation in 
several areas during the Negative fixation period compared to the Neutral fixation period. These 
activations were observed despite the fact that participants fixated on a similar cross in both 
conditions, and strongly suggest that the effects of the guilt manipulation extended past the 











ventrolateral PFC, and posterior cingulate) showed significant activation, which were not 
observed during the emotion elicitation period. These areas included the bilateral temporal poles, 
left mesial and lateral middle temporal gyrus, and the bilateral posterior STS/TPJ. Neural 
activations in the mPFC, bilateral posterior STS/TPJ, and anterior temporal poles support the 
notion that participants engaged in (implicit) mentalizing during the Negative fixation condition 
(Frith & Frith, 1999; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
The importance of the temporal lobes in social cognition has been demonstrated in various 
neuroimaging studies, as well as in patients with specific neurological impairment (Frith & Frith, 
2003; Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007; Zahn et al., 2007). Moll and colleagues (2005) argued that 
temporal areas are responsible for storing and extracting socially significant perceptual and 
semantic information from the environment. In particular, they consider the posterior STS a key 
region for storing social perceptual features, which may be gained by extracting various social 
cues from the environment, e.g., facial expressions, eye gaze, and body language (Allison et al., 
2000; Boddaert et al., 2004; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998). The posterior STS 
therefore appears to be active when observing living things, but importantly, is also active during 
the retrieval of previously acquired information about living things (Frith & Frith, 2003).  
Compared to the posterior STS, the anterior temporal lobes are thought to store social 
functional features, which may be defined as context-independent semantic properties of social 
situations (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005). Zahn and colleagues (2007) identified the right anterior 
temporal lobe (aTL, BA38/22) as a neural substrate specialized for the representation of abstract 
functional (i.e., nonsensory) semantic knowledge. This area thus enables us to grasp the meaning 
of social concepts, such as loyalty, honour, tactlessness, and by extension a person‟s social 
behaviour, without sensory detail. The importance of the anterior temporal lobes in storing such 
abstract social semantic representations is underscored by impairments in conceptual knowledge 
and social behaviour in semantic dementia (Bozeat, Gregory, Ralph, & Hodges, 2000; Davies et 
al., 2005), and in patients with anterior temporal lobe resections (Lu et al., 2002).   
In light of the above accounts of the functional significance of anterior and posterior 
temporal areas in social cognition, I expected to find activation in these areas during the guilt 
manipulation. The most feasible explanation for the lack of significant temporal activation 
during guilt, however, is that temporal areas were activated equally during the Negative and 












explanation seems plausible, given that the Neutral IAT condition involved a similar amount of 
social contextual information as the Negative IAT condition.  
Alternatively, participants may have only engaged in mentalising during the fixation 
period. They may, for example, have reflected on the experimenter‟s opinion of their 
performance. Interestingly, the current Negative fixation condition bore a close resemblance to 
the embarrassment condition in the Takahashi et al. (2004) study, with overlapping areas of 
activation in several frontal and temporal regions. As mentioned previously, it may be possible 
that participants experienced heightened embarrassment because they were concerned about 
others‟ evaluation of their performance (Finger et al., 2006). Nevertheless, increased activation 
in the posterior cingulate, together with other well-established ToM areas, support the view that 
participants engaged in continued self-reflection and mentalising during the post-manipulation 
period (Johnson et al., 2002).  
 
Behavioural Motivation 
In contrast to findings from Study 1, self-reports of guilt in the current fMRI study were 
not significantly correlated with BIS sensitivity, but showed only a weak positive relation. 
Higher BIS scores, however, were significantly associated with decreased activity in the pACC 
and right posterior insula. By comparison, correlations between BAS sensitivity and guilt 
showed a strong inverse relationship, such that lower BAS scores were associated with higher 
self-reported guilt. BAS scores were also positively associated with signal increases in the 
pACC and right posterior insula. 
While the lack of association between BIS and guilt may appear to contradict the 
findings of Study 1, they may be explained when one considers the original selection criteria. In 
Stage I of the fMRI study, individuals with high BIS sensitivity were explicitly chosen for 
further participation above those with low BIS scores. This selection criteria resulted in a 
relatively narrow range of BIS scores across participants at the higher end of the scale‟s 
distribution (Range = 10, SD = 2.76, compared to Study 1: Range = 14, SD = 3.88). By 
comparison, because selection criteria was not specific for BAS sensitivity, BAS scores were 
much more distributed (Range = 17, SD = 3.67), and may therefore have had a bigger effect on 
the levels of experimentally-induced guilt than BIS scores. A more detailed discussion of guilt‟s 












The current fMRI study consisted of a carefully designed paradigm, based on 
psychological theory as well as data from a pilot study, to ensure effective and specific moral 
emotion elicitation. The experimental conditions were matched in terms of the valence and 
arousal values of IAT stimuli (Appendix I), as well as the complexity of IAT feedback sentences 
(Appendix J), to ensure that task-related effects did not interfere with emotion activation results. 
A number of study limitations, however, should be considered. 
The biggest limitation of the present investigation was the lack of power of the paradigm 
to discriminate successfully between the Positive and Neutral IAT conditions. While the pride 
manipulation appeared successful, based on subjective emotion ratings, no significant neural 
activation was detected in the Positive IAT condition. It may be possible that the feedback period 
over which emotion was measured was too long to detect significant brain activation associated 
with pride. In this regard, a recent fMRI study reported that participants found it easier and were 
more effective at regulating positive than negative emotion (Mak et al., 2009a). Alternatively, it 
may be that the emotion elicited in the Positive IAT condition was either not intense enough, or 
not sufficiently different from the Neutral condition, to detect significant neural activation. This 
lack of differentiation was also evident in the physiological data analysis: HR reactivity during 
the Positive IAT condition was not significantly different from that in the Neutral IAT condition.  
Because the present study failed to detect significant brain activation associated with 
pride, it should be noted that some previous imaging studies also failed to detect significant 
neural activation, or detected only minimal brain activation, in association with positive affect 
(see, e.g., George et al., 1995, 1996; Takahashi et al., 2008). Positive emotion, in general, 
therefore appears to be associated with less brain activation than negative emotion, or is less 
intense when evoked by typical neuroimaging manipulations. To enhance the statistical power of 
neuroimaging analyses, it may be beneficial to search within predetermined regions of interest 
when investigating neural areas associated with positive affect (e.g., Zahn, Moll et al., 2009).  
Technical limitations in the current study included the limited physiological data that I 
was able to capture during the fMRI paradigm. Because of a lack of available fMRI-compatible 
devices, I was not able to record electrodermal activity. Furthermore, because of the relatively 
short emotion elicitation periods (30 s), I was only able to calculate HR reactivity, and not 












interpretation of significant brain activations observed during guilt, as well as more 
comprehensive comparisons with physiological data from Study 1.  
Another technical limitation was the difficulty in detecting neural activation in anterior 
temporal and orbitofrontal areas, due to signal dropout in these areas. Although Shin et al. (2000) 
did not detect OFC activation in their PET study of guilt either, techniques tailored to optimize 
the detection of signal in areas associated with magnetic susceptibility artifact, e.g., z-shimming, 
should perhaps be explored in future (Glover, 1999). Such techniques are, however, often 
associated with other limitations, e.g., temporal resolution (Zald, 2003).   
A common confounding factor of moral emotion elicitation studies is that the purity of 
the emotional state is often compromised, because the paradigm may also evoke other (basic) 
emotions in parallel (Takahashi et al., 2004). Activations in the current Negative IAT condition 
may thus have reflected changes in other emotions in addition to guilt. Although the Negative 
IAT condition was marked by high self-ratings of guilt, several other negative emotions, 
including embarrassment, shame, anxiety, and anger were also elevated in this condition. In this 
regard, anxiety has also previously been associated with paralimbic activation (Chua, Krams, 
Toni, Passingham, & Dolan, 1999; Kimbrell et al., 1999), while anger has been associated with 
left OFC/ventrolateral PFC activation (Dougherty et al., 1999; Kimbrell et al., 1999). As argued 
in Study 1, however, these emotions may form part of the emotional profile of guilt, and may 
only be separated out from activations associated with “pure” guilt in an experiment where these 
emotions are elicited separately.    
Finally, a common limitation of all fMRI studies of emotion, yet worth mentioning again, 
is the influence that the artificial nature of the MRI surroundings may have on effective emotion 
elicitation. Lying on one‟s back while focusing on not moving, and with loud hammering noises 
in the background, is bound to impact on the nature of the emotion elicited. These particular 
confounds, in addition to technical constraints in the kinds of stimuli that can be used, and 
difficulties in staging ecologically valid paradigms within the MRI chamber, will continue to 
beleaguer future fMRI studies of emotion. Continued and innovative efforts at overcoming these 













This thesis was designed with the aim of empirically disentangling the physiological and 
neural substrates of guilt in order to inform our theoretical understanding of this complex moral 
emotion. To accomplish this goal, I developed two novel paradigms for the real time elicitation 
of guilt, with pride serving as a contrasting positive moral emotion. Both paradigms were 
devised to be emotionally arousing, self-relevant, and in particular, afford participants with 
agency. Personal agency was deemed especially important given the fact that guilt (but not 
shame) is considered to have intimate links with responsibility and control (Lamb, 1983). Both 
paradigms also necessitated a degree of deception in order to elicit natural and intense emotional 
responses that would be unbiased by desirability concerns.  
The emotion elicitation paradigm in Study 1 consisted of a social psychology experiment 
imbued with high ecological validity, in that the laboratory scenario was representative of the 
kind of psychological stressors individuals might encounter in real life (Cacioppo et al., 1994). 
This approach is of great value because results are more predictive of cardiac reactivity patterns 
in response to real emotion-inducing situations, and may inform current theorizing on the impact 
of guilt and pride on our psychological well-being. Guilt was elicited based on the perception 
that one has done something “bad”, i.e., a specific act (taking money that does not belong to 
you), that impacted negatively on someone else (the research assistant was dismissed) (Lindsay-
Hartz, 1984). 
The fMRI emotion elicitation paradigm employed in Study 2 was based on findings from 
literature on prejudice and self-discrepancy theory: Guilt was elicited in low-prejudice 
individuals by subjecting them to a task in which they received discrepant implicit prejudice 
feedback about themselves. A relatively stringent screening procedure helped to identify suitable 
participants for this study: individuals with strong internalised, nonprejudiced, ought standards 
(high IMS), but with naturally occurring large discrepancies between their actual and ought 
responses (high EMS), who have been shown to be likely to experience strong guilt (Higgins, 
1999; Higgins et al., 1986; Plant & Devine, 1998). In addition, high BIS-sensitive individuals 
were selected based on data from a pilot study, as well as Study 1.  
Because the fMRI paradigm satisfied most conditions that have been proposed to increase 
the likelihood of specific discrepancy-affect relations, e.g., a large magnitude of  self-












self-discrepancy to the person possessing it (Higgins, 1999), there was sufficient reason to 
believe that the paradigm would be effective in eliciting specific emotions of guilt. In addition, 
the nature of the “transgressions” in the Negative IAT condition was more consistent with 
failures of prescriptive than proscriptive moral regulation, which has recently been associated 
with guilt (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Prescriptive morality‟s focus is on what we should 
do rather than on what we should not do, and is therefore associated with prosocial behaviour and 
the presence of a desired goal (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). In the current context, participants‟ 
desired goal probably would have been to possess a truly low-prejudice attitude toward different 
social groups, and to act accordingly. This assumption was supported by self-reports obtained 
after the emotion manipulation: participants reported wanting to change their behaviours 
subsequent to the experiment to achieve their personal goal of being nonprejudiced. 
 
Subjective Emotional Experience 
Emotional reports obtained from participants in the current investigation provided 
valuable insights into the subjective experience of guilt. Consistent with past research (Izard, 
1991), guilt was associated with various other negative emotions (e.g., disgust, anger, anxiety, 
and shame), which are likely to be significant motivations in the guilt situation. The particular 
emotion profile associated with guilt, however, is liable to change from one situation to the next. 
For example, in the Shin et al. (2000) study, where participants were required to recall a personal 
episode of guilt, higher levels of sadness were reported compared to findings from Study 1. By 
comparison, the experimental situation in Study 1 may have led to augmented levels of anxiety 
and disgust: participants possibly experienced frustration at being unable to repair the situation 
immediately. In this regard, both Tangney et al. (1992) and Izard (1991) have commented on the 
potential agony one may experience when reparation (after wrongdoing) is blocked for one 
reason or another. This increased agony is thought to result from cognitive preoccupation and 
rehearsal of the guilt-inducing situation. 
Regarding the fMRI study, participants also experienced heightened embarrassment and 
shame in addition to guilt. This co-experience, as mentioned above, may have been due to 
participants‟ awareness of others monitoring their performance (Finger et al., 2006; Smith et al., 
2002), despite the fact that the public nature of their performance was not emphasized to them. 











during the Negative IAT condition. During post-experimental interviews, a number of 
participants qualified this anger in terms of feeling angry at themselves. Similar findings have 
been reported by Kédia et al. (2008): their participants rated self-anger nearly as high as guilt in 
response to guilt-eliciting scenarios. These findings may be explained by the accepted view that 
guilt is a mixed feeling of self-anger and compassion, but cannot be reduced to one or the other 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Ellsworth & Tong, 2006).  
Finally, an interesting finding of the present research was that guilt had a significant 
negative linear relationship with pride in both studies: as guilt increased, pride decreased. One 
may presume that ameliorative behaviours associated with guilt also serve to restore one‟s pride 
and self-esteem. Some evidence for the reverse relationship was also found in Study 1: Pride 
participants reported significantly reduced guilt from pre- to post-manipulation, which 
demonstrates the positive effects of pride on psychological well-being.  
While subjective reports from both experiments supported the notion that participants 
experienced guilt rather than shame, the case for „pure‟ guilt resulting from a social transgression 
is questionable. In moral transgression, for example, a person may feel guilty for violating a 
social standard while at the same time feeling shameful about his/her own shortcomings. Based 
on subjective data and post-experimental interviews obtained in the present investigation, I 
believe that guilt is often not as distinct from shame as put forth by  June Tangney and 
colleagues (1996, 2007), and that some element of shame may often be present in a prototypical 
guilt response. The intensity of this shame, and whether or not the guilt response becomes 
maladaptive, however, may vary from person to person (see, e.g., Eisenberg, 2000; Orth et al., 
2006).  
Lewis (1971) argued that guilt and shame are difficult to tease apart when a situation 
elicits both emotions, because in such a situation the two states tend to blend together and are 
then typically labeled as “guilt.” Others have argued that guilt and shame probably do not co-
occur, but may be experienced sequentially or in close contiguity. Clinicians, for example, often 
observe patients “flip flopping” between guilt and shame (Kubany & Watson, 2003). Guilt and 
shame may also be difficult to separate because guilt- and shame-related cognitions may be held 
simultaneously, although it is only those beliefs that are activated in consciousness, with 
accompanying negative affect, that define the active emotional state (Kubany & Watson, 2003).  












to say “guilt” when they mean “shame” in everyday situations (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Guilt 
may thus be perceived to be a more positive, or desirable, emotion than shame. Unfortunately, 
researchers are entirely dependent on subjective emotion reports, which are only as accurate as 
the participant‟s understanding, and disclosure, of his/her own feelings. In light of these 
considerations, it is not possible to state unconditionally that guilt was the overriding emotional 
response in the present investigations. Great care was taken during post-experimental interviews, 
however, to distinguish between guilt and shame, based on theoretical formulations.  
Post-experimental interviews from Study 1 also suggested that the duration of the guilt 
response varied significantly between individuals: Whereas some participants reported that they 
rationalized their behaviour straightaway and concentrated on the remaining tasks, others 
reported feeling “confused,” “distracted,” and “bad” until the end of the experiment. These 
differences may reflect emotion regulatory attempts of participants, which are likely to be 
enhanced in the presence of another or in the context of overt observation, as in the present 
scenario (Buck, Losow, Murphy, & Costanzo, 1992). Skin conductance decay data also 
confirmed huge individual variability in regulating the guilt response after the emotion 
manipulation. Judgments on the adaptive/maladaptive nature of guilt should therefore also 
consider individual differences in emotion regulatory ability, which may be associated with both 
normal and pathological variation in well-being (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
 Finally, both studies described here were characterised by a notable difficulty in eliciting 
strong pride that was distinct from the neutral condition: While self-report ratings were 
indicative of significant increases in pride, Study 1‟s discriminant function analysis failed to 
distinguish between the Neutral and Pride conditions, and Study 2 failed to detect significant 
differences in neural activation between the Neutral and Positive IAT conditions. By 
comparison, strong guilt was elicited in both studies. These findings may perhaps be attributed to 
the fact that the emotion paradigms were more specifically tailored toward the elicitation of guilt 
than that of pride.  
They may also, however, reflect innate differences in our degree of response activation to 
positive and negative stimuli (for a review, see Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). The “negativity 
bias” is a term coined to describe the phenomenon that organisms react more strongly (in terms 
of physiological, cognitive, behavioural, and emotional responses) to negative compared to 











& Gardner, 1999; Miller, 1961; Taylor, 1991). It is therefore also much easier to evoke negative 
than positive affect in experimental manipulations.  
A different innate tendency, however, has been termed the “positivity offset”, which 
refers to the stronger activation of (positive) approach versus avoidance motivational output at 
very low levels of arousal (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). The possible evolutionary benefit here 
may be that organisms are wired to approach novel objects in the absence of threat, which 
facilitates environmental exploration. In experimental situations, the positivity offset may 
manifest itself in biasing the evaluation of affectively neutral stimuli as mildly positive, thereby 
making it more difficult to discriminate between a positive and neutral condition. To overcome 
this inherent positivity offset, positive conditions should be designed to be sufficiently arousing, 
while neutral conditions may have to be slightly negative. 
 
The Physiology of Guilt and Pride 
Study 1 was a novel investigation of the physiology of a psychologically real guilt 
response. Results indicated that guilt is marked by strong physiological arousal and a 
cardiovascular response of reciprocal vagal withdrawal and cardiac sympathetic activation.  The 
cardiac sympathetic effects (i.e., PEP shortening), however, continued longer and became more 
pronounced around 90 s after the emotion manipulation. By comparison, the pride response was 
characterized by mild cardiac reactivity and transient non-cardiac somatic arousal, as evidenced 
by the shift from HF to LF power. Because Pride participants displayed no PEP shortening (i.e., 
cardiac SNS arousal), the increase in LF power was interpreted as reflecting baroreflex-mediated 
vagal modulation (Moak et al., 2009), brought about by somatic SNS activation of vasomotor 
nerves.  
The central finding of Study 1 was thus the distinct SNS activation patterns for guilt and 
pride. Although one would intuitively imagine that SNS-mediated arousal results in a unitary 
response, which is also the basic tenet of Walter Cannon‟s (1927) theory of undifferentiated 
autonomic arousal, mounting evidence points to the existence of discrete and highly patterned 
autonomic responses, also within the ANS axes (i.e., PNS and SNS) (Morrison, 2001). 
Accordingly, an extensive array of functionally distinct SNS responses may be distinguished to 












The present findings suggest that different organ functions may be modulated 
differentially during different emotional reactions, possibly to provide an adaptive advantage for 
the individual. Although previous research has suggested that different, organ-specific SNS 
activation patterns operate during mental compared to physical stressors (Wallin et al., 1992), the 
current results provide compelling evidence of differential SNS activity during discrete emotional 
reactions. Whereas the experience of guilt appeared to produce both cardiac and somatic SNS 
arousal, the current data suggested that SNS arousal associated with pride was not cardioselective 
in this way.  
Few studies have looked specifically at changes in HRV, especially in the low frequency 
range, during discrete emotional states. The dearth of such HRV data may be attributed largely to 
the short measuring periods typically employed to capture an emotional response at its peak 
intensity, which is often inadequate for frequency analyses (Task Force, 1996). Nevertheless, my 
finding of respiratory-mediated vagal unloading during guilt and pride is consistent with 
previous reports detailing decreased RSA amplitude following exposure to either positive or 
negative emotional stimuli (Frazier et al., 2004; Rainville et al., 2006; Ravaja, 2004; Ritz, 
Alatupa, Thons, & Dahme, 2002). This response purportedly reflects competent engagement 
with the environment, enabling an individual to respond rapidly in either approach- or 
withdrawal-related fashion, without the need to deploy the slower-acting SNS (Porges, 1995, 
2001). In a similar vein, Beauchaine (2001) argued that vagal withdrawal reflects nonspecific 
emotional responsiveness. Excessive vagal withdrawal, however, is nonadaptive and appears to 
be related to emotional lability of a fight-flight nature (Beauchaine, 2001; Yeragani et al., 1993). 
The pride response was, arguably, physiologically less pressing than guilt: total HRV was 
not reduced in this condition, indicative of preserved physiological flexibility (Porges & Byrne, 
1992). The pronounced shift to LF power in Pride participants also mimicked a response 
previously observed during the positive emotion of appreciation (McCraty, Atkinson, Tiller, 
Rein, & Watkins, 1995). In McCraty et al.‟s appreciation condition, participants were required to 
sincerely feel appreciation or another positive emotion toward someone by focusing on their 
heart. A strong increase in spectral power was observed around 0.1Hz (Mayer waves), which is 
similar to the LF peak of 0.096 ± 0.02 Hz measured in the Pride participants here.  
Pride‟s physiological response may also be argued to reflect its psychological function, 











LF power at the expense of HF power in the cardiac spectrogram have been described recently as 
a measure of decreased chaos (i.e., less influence from HF breathing rate changes that are 
unpredictable or chaotic in nature) in the cardiovascular system (Wu et al., 2009). The lesser 
contributions of HF, and concomitant greater contributions of LF, to cardiac spectral power 
during pride should therefore decrease the homeostatic demands on the body and facilitate 
positive affect. In the present manipulation, pride thus served to decrease the inherently chaotic 
HF power but not the total power in HRV, and furthermore increased somatic SNS arousal. This 
transient non-cardiac SNS arousal in pride can be viewed as „being in the zone‟, i.e., SNS-
aroused but not stressed, relaxed yet focused – a pleasurable feeling that should encourage future 
pride-eliciting behaviours. 
By comparison, the reduction in HRV across the TF band, coupled with the increased 
sympathetic activity experienced by the Guilt participants, resembles an overall stress response 
pattern (e.g., Friedman & Thayer, 1998). This response may have been augmented, however, by 
the experimental context. Stemmler (1989) has argued against absolute emotion specificity, 
promoting instead the view that the specific context counts. According to the component model 
of somatovisceral response organization (Stemmler, Aue, & Wacker, 2007; Stemmler et al., 
2001), variation in an emotional response may be brought about by both the physical context as 
well as the contextual demands of the situation. The latter includes any motivational and 
behavioural demands necessitated by the momentary situation. The presence of another person, 
for example, may influence expressive behaviour because of learned display rules. In this regard, 
the presence of unfamiliar others has been shown to attenuate emotional expressivity, i.e., 
increased suppression (Buck et al., 1992). 
Taking these considerations into account, it may be possible that participants in the Guilt 
condition experienced an amplified physiological response because they were unable to speak or 
to rectify the situation immediately. Suppression, or keeping affect (negative or positive) from 
being expressed, has often been reported to correspond with greater magnitudes of sympathetic 
arousal (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Roberts, Levenson, & Gross, 2008). This amplified response 
is thought to arise because curtailed emotional expression may be associated with effort and 
therefore greater energy expenditure (Ochsner & Gross, 2004). No amplified cardiovascular 
sympathetic arousal or physiological cost, however, was observed in the Pride participants, 












A final consideration in terms of the physiological responses associated with guilt 
concerns the fact that some emotions may be associated with a broader range of possible context-
bound action sequelae than others, and therefore also with more variable patterns of autonomic 
activity (Lang et al., 1990). The complex emotion of guilt is likely to fall into this domain of 
emotions, such that the specific scenario may dictate the appropriate course of action to follow, 
and thus the concomitant ANS responses. 
  Physiological responses in Study 1 compared to those in Study 2. In contrast to Study 
1, the Negative IAT/Guilt condition in the fMRI paradigm of Study 2 was associated with the 
lowest HR reactivity, while the Positive IAT/Pride condition was associated with the highest HR 
reactivity. As mentioned previously, the disparity between HR data from Study 1 and 2 may be 
explained by a careful consideration of differences between the two emotion elicitation 
paradigms.   
The first important distinction between Study 1and 2 is that participants were in different 
body positions. Participants in Study 1 were in an upright position, which is associated with 
orthostatic (postural) stress and increased sympathetic tone, whereas participants in Study 2 were 
in a supine position, which is associated with more room in the vasculature (i.e., no orthostatic 
stress), higher vagal tone, and lower HR in general (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993; 
Hatch, Klatt, Porges, Schroeder-Jasheway, & Supik, 1986). Because of these postural differences 
in the tonic autonomic control of the heart, it cannot be assumed that emotional responses in both 
studies would have had the same impact on measures of cardiac reactivity (Cacioppo et al., 
1994).  
A supine body position may furthermore affect behavioural motivation of an emotion, 
which is also associated with distinct physiological responses (Stemmler et al., 2007). Higher 
levels of motivational activation associated with preparation for action, for example, are 
accompanied by greater cardiac acceleration (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Harmon-Jones 
and Peterson (2009) recently showed that anger‟s characteristic greater left than right frontal 
cortical activity, which is associated with approach motivation (E. Harmon-Jones et al., 2009), 
was significantly reduced when participants were in a supine body position, compared to when 
they were sitting upright. The body position, however, did not affect participants‟ subjective 
experience: anger ratings did not differ between upright and supine body positions.  











physiological and neural response systems, and should be taken into account whenever 
emotional responses obtained during the assumption of different body postures are compared. 
A second distinction between Study 1 and Study 2 involves differences in the physical 
surroundings of the two emotion manipulations. Compared to the quiet research laboratory of 
Study 1, the unfamiliarity of an MRI scanner, including the enclosed space and loud noises, may 
have had a marked influence on emotion physiological responses. Support for the fact that 
participants experienced these two environments differently stems from self-report ratings of 
anxiety obtained at baseline: Whereas average baseline anxiety ratings for Study 1 participants 
ranged from 2.88 to 3.50 (on a scale of 1 to 9) across experimental conditions, the average 
baseline anxiety rating for the fMRI study was 5.17 (also on a scale of 1 to 9). Higher baseline 
levels of arousal in the fMRI study may thus also have impacted on further autonomic arousal.    
Finally, an important distinction between Study 1 and 2 involves the emotion 
manipulation itself. Study 1 was based on a 90-s interpersonal induction technique with high 
ecological validity. By comparison, the emotion manipulation in Study 2 depended on 
participants‟ perception of a 30-s visual feedback presentation, which may be more similar to 
paradigms where participants view emotive film footage/pictures. The emotion manipulation in 
Study 2, however, also had a strong internal component, because emotion elicitation depended 
on self-reflection, rather than explicit positive or negative visual stimuli. Nevertheless, Study 2 
required visual orienting, which is associated with well-characterized autonomic correlates, 
including cardiac deceleration and moderate electrodermal increases (Graham, 1979; Lang et al., 
1997), which would have influenced the overall autonomic response. Cardiac deceleration 
associated with orienting to an event or stimulus is regarded as an indication of heightened 
attention and sensory processing (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert et al., 2001), and may reflect 
increased vagal efference to moderate sympathetic output in the service of enhanced attentional 
allocation (Porges, Doussard-Roosevelt, Portales, & Greenspan, 1996). 
As mentioned previously, HR is closely associated with valence during the perception of 
emotional stimuli: Positive stimuli are associated with HR acceleration or modest deceleration, 
whereas negative stimuli are associated with greater HR deceleration (Lang et al., 1993). The 
main purpose of visual feedback in Study 2, however, was to provide participants with 
“performance-related” feedback. Performance monitoring has also been associated with 












feedback-related negativity (FRN) brain potential (Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004), 
elicits greater HR slowing than positive feedback (Somsen, Van der Molen, Jennings, & van 
Beek, 2000). Van der Veen, Crone, and colleagues have shown that the cardiac response to 
performance-related feedback is determined by the affective valence of the feedback, especially 
when performance-based expectations are violated, and that HR slowing is associated with 
remedial action on later trials (Crone et al., 2003; van der Veen, van der Molen, Crone, & 
Jennings, 2004). This group has also demonstrated that the degree of cardiac slowing is highly 
context-sensitive, such that HR deceleration also reflects the information value of the feedback 
(Crone, Bunge, de Klerk, & van der Molen, 2005). Crone at el. (2005) suggested that the brain 
systems giving rise to error-related cortical activity may be the same neural substrates that also 
underlie heartbeat slowing, and may therefore center on rostral anterior cingulate structures (for a 
review, see van Veen & Carter, 2006). 
It should be noted that the data presented above on feedback-related cardiac activity were 
based on phasic HR responses, and may therefore not apply directly to data from the current 
investigation. Fowles (1988) has also suggested, however, that HR is sensitive to the valence of 
the feedback signal (reward versus punishment), based on his observations of tonic HR levels.  
In light of the above considerations, it is clear that the physiological activation in 
response to emotion manipulations in Study 1 and 2 were influenced by vastly different internal 
and external factors, which may account for the very different response patterns observed. 
Moreover, the data reviewed above strongly predict the decelerative HR trend observed during 
the negative IAT performance feedback. It is important to note, however, that subjective reports 
of guilt were not associated with this cardiac slowing during the Negative IAT condition; rather, 
there was a significant positive association between guilt and HR reactivity.  
Lang and colleagues have described the HR response to aversive stimuli in terms of 
different stages that unfold sequentially (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert et al., 2001; Lang et al., 
1997). According to their model, the cardiac response is initially characterized by an attentional 
bradycardia, but evolves to acceleration once the stimulus is perceived as threatening or 
unpleasant, indicating heightened SNS arousal. Incorporating this thinking, it may be that the 
single HR measurement obtained in the current study also consisted of two stages. In this vein, 
participants who experienced more guilt may have manifested a higher second-stage HR 











guilt, given the fact that these response patterns may be affected by individual difference 
characteristics (Sánchez-Navarro, Martínez-Selva, & Román, 2006). Additional support for the 
notion that higher guilt was associated with higher cardiovascular arousal is gained from fMRI 
activation data, which is discussed in the next section. These assumptions are inconclusive, 
however, and will need further validation, especially in light of the limited physiological data 
obtained during the fMRI study, and the relatively small number of participants for whom good 
HR data were available.  
Neural activation associated with physiological responses. The vast majority of studies 
employing functional neuroimaging techniques have had a strong focus on identifying neural 
correlates associated with higher-order human functions, such as decision-making, language, and 
memory. In the enthusiasm to better understand those cognitions that define us as human beings, 
however, the investigation of more low-level functions (e.g., those that control and represent 
bodily states), have received comparatively less attention (Critchley et al., 2003; Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004). Growing evidence from neuroimaging, lesion, and 
cortical stimulation studies provide compelling evidence for the notion that descending signals 
from higher cortical areas in humans are also intimately associated with cardiovascular control 
(Colivicchi, Bassi, Santini, & Caltagirone, 2004; Oppenheimer, Gelb, Girvin, & Hachinski, 
1992; Williamson, McColl, & Mathews, 2003). Disentangling areas associated with afferent and 
efferent ANS responses from those associated with concurrent task- or emotion-related changes 
is a challenging undertaking, however.  
In light of this relatively gray area in our understanding of cortical functioning, some 
neuroscience researchers have directed their recent efforts toward identifying brain regions 
involved in the modulation of PNS and SNS outflows to the body (e.g., Critchley, 2002; 
Critchley, Corfield, Chandler, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000; Critchley et al., 2003; Critchley, 
Melmed, Featherstone, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002; Lane et al., 2009; Saper, 2002; Williamson et 
al., 2006). These investigations highlight a network of forebrain regions, including the mPFC, 
ACC, insula, thalamus, and amygdala, with significant influence on autonomic arousal and 
cardiovascular control. The ACC, ventral mPFC, and insula, especially, have received 
considerable attention. 
Whereas cognitive interpretations of rostral ACC function predominate in the brain-












peripheral autonomic arousal responses (Critchley, 2005; Critchley et al., 2003; Zahn, Grafman, 
& Tranel, 1999). ACC activation associated with autonomic arousal, however, does not 
consistently map onto a particular area of this large cortical structure. Functional imaging studies 
investigating cortical areas associated with ANS responses point to a functional dissociation 
between the subgenual and dorsal ACC (Critchley, 2004). Whereas the dorsal ACC typically 
activates during effortful or attention-demanding tasks, the subgenual ACC shows deactivation 
during such tasks (Paus, Koski, Caramanos, & Westbury, 1998; Raichle et al., 2001). For 
example, dorsal/supragenual ACC activation has been associated with increased HR, arterial 
blood pressure, and electrodermal activity during both mental and physical tasks, suggesting a 
role in modulating sympathetic outflow (Critchley et al., 2000; Critchley et al., 2003; Nagai, 
Critchley, Featherstone, Trimble, & Dolan, 2004). By this notion, prominent supraACC activity 
detected in the current Negative IAT/Guilt condition may also reflect increased SNS output (e.g., 
electrodermal activity) during the emotional response.   
In contrast, the ventromedial PFC has been associated with vagal efferent outflow to the 
heart, such that suppression of activity in this area elevates cardiovascular arousal (Gianaros, 
Van Der Veen, & Jennings, 2004; Wong, Massé, Kimmerly, Menon, & Shoemaker, 2007). 
Ventromedial prefrontal areas (including ACC) furthermore have strong anatomical connections 
with subcortical autonomic control centers, permitting fast influence of the prefrontal cortex on 
the autonomic system (Barbas, Saha, Rempel-Clower, & Ghashghaei, 2003). The mediodorsal 
thalamic nucleus (activated in the present investigation) also forms part of this medial network 
relaying cortical visceromotor output to autonomic structures (Öngür & Price, 2000). 
Although more ventral prefrontal areas have thus been implicated in PNS modulation, 
Matthews and colleagues found a slightly more dorsal area within the left perigenual ACC (-12, 
37, 8) to be significantly correlated with high frequency HRV (Matthews, Paulus, Simmons, 
Nelesen, & Dimsdale, 2004). In their study, participants performed a counting Stroop task that 
was associated with task-induced changes in autonomic activity. Of particular interest to the 
present investigation is the fact that the area identified by Matthews et al. corresponds very 
closely to the pACC area also identified in the guilt condition of the current study (-7, 34, 15), 
suggesting that it too may have played a role in parasympathetic modulation. Moreover, Lane et 
al. (2009) recently identified a similar area within rostral ACC (-6, 48, 8) to be significantly 











They suggested that this area may be involved in “coordinating autonomic adjustments 
associated with maintaining a self-focused mental state” during emotion or non-emotional tasks 
(Lane et al., 2009, p. 221). Given the significant negative linear relationship between pACC 
activity and subjective reports of guilt, it could be deduced that greater guilt was associated with 
increased withdrawal of parasympathetic tone.  
As mentioned previously, parasympathetic withdrawal is readily associated with both 
positive and negative emotions. In addition, the association between guilt and vagal withdrawal 
is in line with data from Study 1, where subjective reports of guilt were significantly associated 
with various measures of HRV. The relation between decreased activity in the pregenual ACC 
and decreased vagal efference during guilt therefore appears to be plausible, yet this 
interpretation remains inconclusive in the absence of any explicit HRV and respiratory frequency 
data obtained during the fMRI paradigm.  
An alternative functional account of pACC activity during guilt may involve the 
experience of affective pain. Sander and colleagues, for example, reported decreased perigenual 
ACC activity during a post-exercise ischemia condition, which was not associated with any 
significant HR changes (Sander, Macefield, & Henderson, 2010). Because decreased perigenual 
ACC activity could therefore not be associated with vagal withdrawal, they interpreted the fall in 
its activity as indicative of negative affect associated with muscle ischemia. This interpretation is 
considered in more detail later in the discussion. 
Correlational data obtained in the current investigation indicated a significant positive 
association between neural activity in the pACC and right posterior insula, suggesting increased 
functional connectivity between these areas during the guilt induction. There is also considerable 
previous evidence indicating substantial anatomical connections between the ACC and insular 
cortices (Carmichael & Price, 1995; Taylor, Seminowicz, & Davis, 2009). Given the fact that 
both the pACC and right posterior insula were negatively correlated with self-reports of guilt, but 
positively associated with each other, it is possible that they were involved in a similar function 
during emotion evocation. 
The insula is another area consistently implicated in the representation as well as 
modulation of cardiovascular autonomic states (Critchley, 2005; Williamson et al., 1997). It 
therefore not only receives and represents visceral afferent information from the body (Cechetto 












discrete regions of the insula, for example, has been associated with distinct changes in 
autonomic responses, e.g., heart rate and blood pressure (Cechetto & Chen, 1990; Oppenheimer 
et al., 1992). The insula is thus considered part of a central command system, also involving the 
mPFC, which acts to interpret sensory input and elicit appropriate ANS adjustments (Williamson 
et al., 2006; Williamson et al., 2003).  
Data from functional imaging studies, however, cannot distinguish between sensory 
representation of autonomic changes and visceromotor generation of such changes. Furthermore, 
insular involvement during changing autonomic states may reflect SNS arousal, PNS 
withdrawal, or a combination of the two. Zhang and Oppenheimer (1997), for example, detected 
both sympathoexcitatory and sympathoinhibitory neuronal units within the insula. Deciphering 
the precise function of enhanced insular activity in neuroimaging investigations is therefore an 
intricate task.  
The right posterior insula is often associated with homeostatic and cardiovascular control 
(Hanamori, 2005; Zhang, Rashba, & Oppenheimer, 1998). Cardiac dysregulation and increased 
risk of cardiac arrhythmias, for example, have been reported after right insular stroke (Cheung, 
Hachinski, & Cechetto, 1997; Colivicchi et al., 2004). Oppenheimer et al. (1992) associated the 
right insula with central SNS regulation, because stimulation of the right insula in five epileptic 
patients was associated with tachycardia and hypertension. Several findings, however, point to a 
possible cardioinhibitory role of the right posterior insula, i.e., its association with lower HR 
reactivity. For example, Critchley et al. (2000) found a significant negative covariation between 
activity in the right posterior insula (42, -14, 4) and HR, such that lower activity in this area 
corresponded with raised HR. Similarly, Gianaros and colleagues (2004) found increased HR to 
be associated with decreased activity in the right posterior insula during various working 
memory tasks. Finally, a recent study directly demonstrated the cardioinhibitory effect of the 
right posterior insula in an epileptic patient with a potentially damaged right posterior insula (Al-
Otaibi, Wong, Shoemaker, Parrent, & Mirsattari, 2010). Al-Otaibi et al.‟s patient exhibited 
reduced HR responses as well as nearly absent right insular activation during a handgrip task, 
compared to control subjects. In particular, however, stimulation of his right posterior inferior 
(but not superior) insular cortex, during both rest and exercise, was accompanied by significantly 
suppressed HR responses. Notably, the particular area of stimulation in this study was more 











account for the different findings. Al-Otaibi et al. concluded that the posterior inferior sector of 
the right insula may serve an important cardioinhibitory role, i.e., parasympathetic modulation of 
HR.  
Taken together, the data reviewed above suggest the right posterior insula has a strong 
association with cardiovascular regulation. Its architecture, however, appears to be complex, 
with distinct regional subdivisions subserving different ANS control functions (Al-Otaibi et al., 
2010). Given the limited physiological data obtained during the present investigation, the precise 
functional significance of the right posterior inferior insula activation during guilt is difficult to 
pinpoint. Increased activity in this area (as well as in the pACC), however, coupled with the 
decreased HR reactivity during the guilt manipulation, appear most consistent with a 
cardioinhibitory effect. Partial support for this interpretation stems from the fact that both areas 
had a weak negative correlation with the overall HR reactivity during the Negative IAT 
condition (rs > -.32, ps < .26). These correlations also reached significance for HR data from 
Run 2 (rs > -.60, ps < .03).  
Similar to the pACC, increased activity in the right posterior insula (i.e., increased 
cardio-regulatory control) was associated with reduced self-reports of guilt. Given that emotion 
regulation consists of both automatic and intentional processes that affect the emotional 
experience (Gross, 1998), HRV has been suggested to be an important resource that can be 
drawn upon to support emotion regulation (Thayer & Lane, 2009). Accordingly, increased vagal 
tone or parasympathetic inhibition during an emotional response may reflect enhanced 
autonomic flexibility, and therefore represent an individual‟s ability to modulate emotional 
responses to meet contextual demands (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). By this notion, some 
participants in the guilt condition may have been better at inhibiting a less beneficial response in 
the scanner, for example, feeling very emotional and guilty, in favour of a more beneficial 
response. Not surprising, therefore, was the fact that increased activity in the right posterior 
insula was also associated with higher ratings of pride following the guilt induction.    
Physiology of guilt and pride in terms of health. A growing body of research is 
delineating how psychological factors impact physical as well as mental health, with discrete 
emotions and their associated physiological responses considered key in this by now well-
recognized link (Dickerson, Gruenewald et al., 2004; Kring & Bachorowski, 1999; Lerner et al., 












In terms of guilt‟s effects on health, the observed increase in SNS activity may be 
associated with health benefits (e.g., stimulation of the immune system) when experienced 
periodically and followed by rapid recovery (Mayne, 1999). However, emotion-associated SNS 
activation may also be detrimental to health when sustained or experienced chronically. Because 
the SNS is associated with energy mobilization, the energy demands on the system may become 
excessive with extended SNS activation, which in turn may lead to notable pathophysiological 
effects on the cardiovascular system (Fisher, Young, & Fadel, 2009). Compromised vagal 
function (decreased HRV), has also been associated with various psychopathologies and medical 
conditions when prolonged, because of reduced cardioinhibitory control (Thayer & Lane, 2007). 
Although parasympathetic withdrawal during situations of psychological or cognitive challenge 
is associated with behavioural flexibility, excessive vagal reactivity is associated with stress 
vulnerability (Porges, 1992), and may place those individuals with already low baseline RSA at 
particular risk for developing panic attacks (Beauchaine, 2001). Cacioppo (1994) emphasized, 
however, the importance of considering individual differences in cardiac reactivity, and 
highlighted the large interindividual variations in sympathetic and parasympathetic contributions 
to HR reactivity during psychological stress. His findings suggest that cardiovascular reactivity 
mediated by high cardiac sympathetic activation (PEP) is more strongly associated with altered 
immune function and disease pathogenesis than vagal cardiac reactivity (RSA). Individual 
differences in physiological responses may therefore be integral when considering possible 
associations between guilt and disease pathogenesis.  
Nevertheless, a consideration of guilt‟s health consequences ultimately would entail a 
consideration of its duration and frequency: it is the physiological wear and tear that appears to 
be costly for the organism (Ryaff & Singer, 2003). Experiencing intense guilt chronically may 
therefore have cumulative effects on total “allostatic load”, thereby increasing risk for 
cardiovascular disease as well as psychopathology (Harder, 1995; McEwen, 2008).  
Guilt is typically viewed as a psychologically adaptive emotion (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). Although it is certainly not a pleasant emotion phenomenologically, its adaptability may 
stem from its prosocial virtues. Izard (1991, p. 355) argued that “guilt binds the person to the 
source of the guilt and does not subside without reconciliation that tends to restore social 
harmony.” By this notion, the high immediate guilt-related anxiety observed in the present 











turn, may speed cardiovascular recovery. The idea that corrective action is an important 
mechanism to relieve guilt-associated distress is evident in cases where the harm caused is 
irreparable or irreversible. For example, trauma guilt is often associated with heavily exacerbated 
and prolonged guilt (Kubany & Watson, 2003), and guilt has been shown to evoke self-
punishment when there are no opportunities for remedial action (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). 
Compared to guilt, shame is a more dejection-based emotional state and is associated 
with hiding or withdrawing to avoid further humiliation (Ferguson & Crowley, 1997). Several 
theorists have argued that guilt may become maladaptive and related to pathology when it 
becomes fused with shame (Tangney 2007), a sequence of events that may be instigated when 
one decides not to respond positively or prosocially to the guilt-inducing situation. This account 
is consistent with research indicating that beneficial guilt is possible only when people accept 
their failures and transgressions and take appropriate responsibility for their misdeeds. In 
contrast, maladaptive guilt is characterized by chronic self-blame and obsessive rumination over 
one‟s transgressions (Orth et al., 2006). In this regard, rumination has been proposed to mediate 
the effects of stress on health. Ruminative thoughts about past events, for example, have been 
associated with prolonged physiological reactivity and autonomic dysregulation long after the 
source of the stress (Ottaviani, Shapiro, Davydov, Goldstein, & Mills, 2009; Ottaviani, Shapiro, 
& Fitzgerald, 2011). Moreover, Ottaviani and colleagues‟ (2011) results showed that thinking 
about a negative event has cardiovascular consequences of a similar magnitude as the event 
itself, and is associated with increased negative affect and anxiety. It is thus clear why guilt 
associated with chronic rumination may be linked to pathogenic health consequences. 
 In terms of pride, my data provided support for a positive or adaptive physiological 
response: Whereas the increase in SCL and pronounced shift to LF power observed are 
indicative of somatic arousal and alertness, the moderate parasympathetic withdrawal is 
associated with optimal engagement and preparedness to respond (Beauchaine, 2001; Porges, 
1995). Pride participants also exhibited virtually no increase in cardiac contractility, and faster 
recovery of vagal control than participants in the Guilt condition.  
Positive emotions, in general, have received far less attention than negative emotions, yet 
empirical support for their health-promoting effects are accumulating (Tugade et al., 2004). 
Frederickson and Levenson (1998) have proposed that one purpose of positive affect may be to 












homeostasis by relieving an individual of the psychological and physiological sequelae of 
specific action tendencies associated with a foregoing negative emotion. According to 
Fredrickson‟s (2001) broaden-and-build theory of positive emotion, positive affect has the 
potential to reduce autonomic arousal, and, importantly, to broaden cognitive attention and 
stimulate flexible and creative behaviours. 
Positive emotion is also protective, in that it is strongly associated with resilient 
adaptation and coping with stress and adversity (Curtis & Cicchetti, 2007). In this regard, both 
positive social interaction and positive individual traits, e.g., self-esteem, contribute to the 
protective nature of positive affect in resilient adaptation (Garmezy, 1985; Werner, 2000). Given 
pride‟s close association with genuine self-esteem, e.g., as a barometer of an individual‟s current 
social status and acceptance (Tracy & Robins, 2007a, 2007b), positive emotions of pride may be 
instrumental in positive life adaptation. One line of support for the positive health benefits of 
achievement success comes from an interesting study that assessed longevity of Academy 
Award-winning actors and actresses (Redelmeier & Singh, 2001). Results indicated a survival 
advantage of almost 4 years for actors that won an Academy Award versus actors that never got 
nominated. The study‟s findings could not be explained by other factors such as income, 
occupation, talent or chance; instead results pointed to the impact of higher status and success in 
relation to lower mortality rates.  
 
The Neurobiology of Guilt 
The most prominent brain activation observed during real-time guilt in Study 2 were that 
of the mesial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), including activation within the superior frontal gyrus and 
anterior cingulate cortex, predominantly on the left side. These were the only areas that showed 
significant activation at a corrected threshold in the whole-brain analysis, and therefore 
constitute a rather salient response. Determining the precise functional roles of these activations 
during a complex affective state like guilt, however, is no simple matter, given the plethora of 
studies and tasks that typically lead to mPFC activation. Few would disagree, however, that an 
overarching functional role of areas lining the medial wall of the frontal cortex involves social 
cognition (Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
Putative roles of the mPFC in social cognition include its importance in the monitoring 











ability to take another‟s perspective (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007), reasoning involved in 
complex moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2004), predicting the consequences of one‟s 
actions (Moll et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2008), conscious experience, initiation, or modulation of 
emotion (Reiman et al., 1997), inhibition of emotional experience (Ochsner, Ray et al., 2004), 
and the representation of information concerning oneself versus others (Kelley et al., 2002). The 
importance of the mPFC in social cognition is further supported by evidence from populations 
with impaired social functioning. For example, the PFC has been found to be dysfunctional in 
psychopaths or aggressive offenders (Blair, 2010; Raine et al., 1994), and is underactive in 
autistic individuals, who have impaired ToM (Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002). 
Drawing on previous imaging data and meta-analyses of prefrontal and ACC function, I 
have tried to tease apart the functional significance of each of the mPFC activations detected in 
the whole-brain analysis. In the following sections, I elaborate on the putative roles of these 
medial prefrontal areas during guilt, and also discuss in more detail some areas detected in the 
mask analysis. In particular, the insular cortex is discussed as a prominent site for the 
instantiation of emotional feeling states. 
Superior frontal gyrus activations. In terms of the more dorsal PFC activation, i.e., the 
superior frontal gyrus/supraACC (BA 8/9; -4, 28, 30), I have argued that this area, together with 
the ventrolateral PFC (BA 47), may be important in signaling inappropriate social behaviour and 
initiating alternative motor responses (Finger et al., 2006). Ventromedial PFC, in particular, 
appears to be sensitive to cues of punishment and negative emotional reactions from others, 
which in turn serves to alter current behaviour (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Kringelbach & Rolls, 
2003, 2004). Dorsal/supraACC has also been associated with the experience of regret, a feeling 
of responsibility for harm to oneself because of personal decisions (Berndsen et al., 2004). 
Coricelli et al. (2005) found enhanced dorsal ACC activity (10, 24, 34) when participants 
discovered that an alternative action would have led to a more favourable outcome. They argued 
that enhanced ACC activity may serve to assess future outcomes, while evoking behavioural 
adjustments on subsequent trials.  
The above account of the more dorsal, superior frontal gyrus activation during guilt is 
consistent with Amodio and Frith‟s (2006) proposed functional account of the posterior rostral 
medial frontal cortex. After considering data from a host of functional imaging investigations, 












monitoring the outcome of current actions, while continually updating representations of and 
evaluating the merit of future actions. A similar functional account of the PFC has also been 
proposed by Moll and colleagues (2007; see also Wood & Grafman, 2003), who argued that 
strong anterior prefrontal activation during moral emotions might reflect the appraisal of social 
outcomes and future actions. Prosocial emotions, in particular, may involve such appraisals, 
because of their association with socially-valued behaviours aimed at amending mistakes or 
social bonds. The dorsal superior frontal gyrus activation during guilt thus supports enhanced 
cognitive processing during social transgressions, which appears to be important for initiating 
alternative behaviours and evaluating possible future actions.  
Given the substantial neurocognitive literature on the conflict-monitoring role of the 
related dorsal ACC region (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver, Barch, 
Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001), however, it is likely that the supraACC activity detected in the 
present investigation primarily serves to interrupt action (before initiating alternative motor 
responses). In this literature, conflict-related ACC activity is associated with increased reaction 
times and more controlled patterns of response on subsequent performance trials (van Veen et 
al., 2001), the successful inhibition of a prepotent response on No-Go trials in the Go/No-Go task 
(van Veen & Carter, 2002), and the slowing of performance following response errors (Gehring 
& Fencsik, 2001; Kerns et al., 2004). Moreover, cardiac deceleration in response to performance 
errors has been construed as the transient inhibition of ongoing action representations (Jennings 
& van der Molen, 2002). Conflict-monitoring via the ACC is therefore readily associated with 
the interruption of action (Amodio, Master et al., 2008). A region remarkably similar to the 
region identified in the present study (-4, 28, 30) is also consistently activated in studies of 
conflict-monitoring, compare, for example (-3, 32, 31) (van Veen et al., 2001), and (-2, 28, 31) 
(Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999).  
In light of the above, I therefore propose that activation in the superior frontal 
gyrus/supraACC during guilt first serves to stop current behaviour, before alternative motor 
responses are initiated to rectify the harm caused.   
The second superior frontal gyrus activation (BA 9/32; -4, 43, 18) corresponds to an area 
within anterior rostral prefrontal cortex that has been described as having a “uniquely social 
cognitive function” (Amodio & Frith, 2006, p. 270). In particular, Amodio and Frith have 











feelings and intentions.  
In recent years, a growing interest in neurocognitive investigations has involved the 
neural correlates associated with self-related or self-referential processing, which may be 
described as the degree to which individuals perceive concepts to be related to themselves. While 
the question of self has intrigued philosophers and psychologists throughout history (Damasio, 
1999; Descartes, 1641/1993; James, 1892), functional neuroimaging is finally providing some 
testable hypotheses regarding the brain regions associated with self-related processing (Frith & 
Frith, 2003; Kircher et al., 2000; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004).  
In a meta-analysis of self-related neuroimaging studies, Northoff and colleagues (2006) 
highlighted the role of cortical midline structures (CMS) in self-referential processing. They 
described a network in which both ventral (including the pACC) and dorsal (supraACC and 
dorsomedial PFC) areas of the mPFC are key nodes in a neural system subserving explicit self-
association. In terms of these anterior frontal areas, Northoff et al. (2006) expressed a similar 
view to that of Amodio and Frith (2006), namely that the commonly observed activation of 
anterior CMS structures during different emotions probably reflects the high degree of self-
referentiality shared by all emotions, rather than inherent emotional processing occurring in his 
area. As a result, emotions that require less self-reflection may be associated with reduced mPFC 
activation (see, e.g., Britton, Phan et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2008). The involvement of the 
mPFC in self-reflection is also supported by evidence from neurological patients. Patients with 
frontotemporal lobar degeneration, a condition associated with neural loss in the mPFC, show 
profound impairments in the expression of self-conscious emotions, and therefore also processes 
related to self-appraisal (Sturm et al., 2006).   
The posterior cingulate/precuneus is another key area identified by Northoff and 
colleagues (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006) as being involved in self-
referential processing. The posterior cingulate responds when participants engage in self-
reflection (Johnson et al., 2002), view personally familiar faces (Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santiago, 
& Haxby, 2004), and retrieve previous judgments related to the self (Lou et al., 2004). Because 
of dense connections with the hippocampus, Northoff et al. (2006) suggested that this region may 
be important for integrating present and past self-referential stimuli in a temporal context. In the 
present investigation, significant positive correlations between signal increases in the posterior 












connected during guilt. This finding provides compelling support for the interpretation that 
participants engaged in self-reflection during emotion-elicitation, given that increased functional 
connectivity between CMS has been associated with increased self-referential processing (Kjaer, 
Nowak, & Lou, 2002; Lou et al., 2004; Northoff et al., 2006).  
Taken together, significant activation of (and correlation between) CMS in Study 2 may 
represent the high degree of self-association and explicit self-reflection that participants engaged 
in during the guilt condition. Among these midline structures, however, the anterior rostral 
frontal cortex may play a unique role. Amodio and Frith (2006) have suggested that this area 
may not be limited to reflections about our own subjective experience, but may also be involved 
in concerns about our reputation, or the image of ourselves in the minds of others. This 
perception of another‟s view of self has been referred to as reflected self-knowledge (Ochsner et 
al., 2005).  
Anterior rostral frontal cortex may therefore support representations of how (we think) 
others think about us, which is of course an inherent aspect of all self-conscious emotions 
(Eisenberg, 2000). Although the self is the object of evaluation in self-conscious emotions, Leary 
(2004, 2007) stressed the view that these emotions arise from concerns about others‟ evaluation 
of the self, and therefore always involve a real or imagined audience. He argued that reflected 
appraisals, i.e., people‟s beliefs about how they are being evaluated by others, constitute a key 
feature of self-conscious emotions. I therefore propose that the second superior frontal gyrus 
activation (BA 9/32) during guilt reflects participants‟ engagement in self-conscious reflection, 
which involves reflecting upon themselves as well as the image of themselves in the minds of 
others.  
The ACC and subjective evaluation of pain. The third activation in the whole-brain 
analysis corresponded to another area within the anterior cingulate cortex, namely the pregenual 
ACC (pACC). The cingulate cortex is a large structure that may be parsed into different 
cytoarchitectonic and functional subdivisions that subserve a vast array of specialized cognitions 
and bodily functions (Koski & Paus, 2000; Vogt et al., 1992). It is a structure considered to play 
a pivotal role in the integration of cognitive and affective information (Allman et al., 2001), the 
monitoring of subjective feeling states (Craig, 2002), and the generation of autonomic changes in 
the body, as discussed earlier (Critchley, 2005; Critchley et al., 2003).  











al., 2000): the dorsal division is principally involved in the mediation of cognitive processes 
(e.g., modulating attention and monitoring actions), whereas the rostral-ventral division, which 
lies around the genu of the corpus callosum, is associated with affective processing (e.g., 
inducing and regulating emotional responses) (Bush et al., 1998; Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 
1995; Mayberg et al., 1999; Whalen et al., 1998). Since the original dorsal/ventral model of ACC 
function has been proposed, however, a number of neuroimaging findings have been reported 
that cannot be accounted for by this model. In particular, neuroimaging studies of pain are not 
explained by the cognitive-affective account of ACC function (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004).  
The experience of pain can be divided into two distinct dimensions that also map onto 
distinct brain regions, namely unpleasant sensory processing and emotional distress (Price, 
2000). Neuroimaging studies of pain, however, point unexpectedly to the involvement of the 
dorsal/cognitive ACC division in the emotional distress component of physical, social, as well as 
empathic pain (Akitsuki & Decety, 2009; Coghill, McHaffie, & Yen, 2003; Eisenberger et al., 
2003; Singer et al., 2004). To account for these observations, Eisenberger and Lieberman (2004) 
suggested that the function of the ACC may be better described in terms of a conflict monitoring 
system underlying both cognitive and emotional processing. By this model, the ACC has evolved 
as a neural substrate responsible for the detection of cues that may lead to both physical (e.g., 
pain, danger) and emotional (e.g., social separation) harm, which in turn signals the need for 
additional attention and coping mechanisms. In particular, Eisenberger and Lieberman proposed 
that dorsal ACC may be involved in sensorimotor representation of conflict (e.g., unanticipated 
pain), whereas rostral ACC may be more involved when the conflict has a specific object, 
person, or event at its focus (see also Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Both rostral and dorsal ACC 
therefore subserve conflict detection, although they are sensitive to different forms of conflict.  
The functional organization proposed by Eisenberger and Lieberman is conceptually 
consistent with Amodio and Frith‟s (2006) overarching model of medial frontal cortex function. 
Considering data from their meta-analysis, Amodio and Frith proposed that mental 
representations become more abstract and subjective as one moves from posterior to more 
anterior regions within the medial frontal cortex. This reasoning is well illustrated in the context 
of pain. Whereas objective, physical aspects of pain (e.g., temperature) is represented in more 
caudal regions of the ACC, the subjective experience of pain is represented in more anterior 












al., 2004). Subjectively experiencing pain, however, is not the same as thinking about the pain. 
The most anterior rostral ACC appears to be involved in this meta-cognitive process. For 
example, in Singer et al.‟s (2004) study, anterior rostral ACC (-6, 42, 18) was not active during 
the experience of personal pain, but was elicited only when thinking about someone else in pain. 
The most anterior regions of the mPFC/ACC therefore appear to be associated with more 
abstract representations of pain, for example, thinking about the subjective unpleasantness 
thereof.    
Regarding the role of the pACC in the current guilt manipulation, I have argued that 
increased activation in this area may correspond to participants‟ down-regulation of their 
subjective experiences. Because the ACC is a neural substrate intimately associated with the 
experience and regulation of physical and social pain (Davis, 2000; Eisenberger et al., 2003), and 
because thinking about negative emotional experiences may be similar to thinking about pain 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006), an alternative interpretation of the role of the pACC during guilt 
evocation may involve the regulation of affective pain. In this regard, it is of interest that guilt 
shares significant overlap with the experience of pain on several fronts: Pain is also associated 
with affective unpleasantness, enhanced attentional resources, and the interruption of ongoing 
action (Wall, 1999). In addition, guilt and social pain are both associated with anxiety about 
possible social exclusion, threats to interpersonal relationships, and psychological distance from 
close others (Baumeister et al., 1995; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Izard, 1991; Panksepp, 
1998). The link between guilt and pain thus appears to be plausible. 
In light of the above, a different way to conceive of the negative association between 
pACC activity and subjective reports of guilt is to view increased ACC activity as subjectively 
„blocking‟ one‟s pain. Support for this interpretation stems from the fact that increased rostral 
ACC has consistently been associated with a pain-relieving response mechanism during placebo 
and opioid analgesia (Petrovic, Kalso, Petersson, & Ingvar, 2002; Wager et al., 2004), stimulus-
induced analgesia (García-Larrea et al., 1999), as well as hypnosis-induced changes in pain 
perception (Faymonville et al., 2000). For example, in the study by Petrovic et al. (2002), 
reduced self-reported pain during placebo analgesia was associated with increased activity in the 
pACC (18, 32, 14). In a similar vein, Salomons et al. (2004) proposed that rostral ACC plays a 
modulatory role in pain processing based on contextual information, such as the perceived 











stimulus itself. Also consistent with this notion is rostral ACC‟s involvement in the cognitive 
modulation of pain: Increased activity in the perigenual ACC (-10, 32, -2) has been associated 
with reduced perception of painful stimuli during a cognitively demanding task (Bantick et al., 
2002).  
In summary, pACC activity in the current context may reflect a meta-cognitive regulatory 
response to affective pain. Accordingly, some participants responded to the guilt-induction by 
allowing themselves to experience pain, or being unable to cut themselves off from it (i.e., 
decreased pACC), while others were able to block out these feelings more effectively (i.e., 
increased pACC). As explained previously, such a regulatory response may have been mediated 
by increased vagal tone. This explanation is particularly appealing in light of Craig‟s (2003b) 
recent description of pain as a homeostatic emotion that also consists of a feeling and a 
motivation. By implication, individual differences in emotion regulatory capacity, as reflected in 
HRV, may thus also account for individual variation in pain sensitivity, or the ability to regulate 
pain (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). Alternatively, individuals better able to regulate affective 
pain may perhaps have a more effective opioid system to relieve pain (Petrovic et al., 2002), 
given that placebo and opioid analgesia have a shared neural architecture, which is centered in 
the rostral ACC. 
The insula and subjective feeling states. Several influential theories of emotion postulate 
a central role of peripheral autonomic feedback from the body in characterising the active 
emotional state, and by extension, motivational behaviour and self-awareness (Damasio, 1994, 
1999; James, 1884; James, 1894; Lange, 1885). Various structures in the central nervous system 
have been implicated in the generation and representation of such changes in the internal bodily 
milieu (Saper, 2002). In an influential paper, Craig (2002) described the human insular cortex as 
the primary cortical site for the perception and integration of interoceptive (internal) information 
from the body, and its involvement in remapping these signals into conscious affective feelings. 
The insula has, in fact, often been referred to as the viscerosensory or limbic sensory cortex, 
because of its association with visceral sensation (Augustine, 1996; Penfield & Faulk, 1955).  
As the primary interoceptive site, the posterior insula receives homeostatic afferent input 
from muscles and internal organs via the ventromedial thalamic nucleus, and is thought to 
represent this information in a topographic map of the body‟s internal state (Craig, 2002, 2003a). 












insula, particularly on the right side, which is thought to subserve the subjective evaluation of the 
internal state (Craig, 2004; Critchley et al., 2004). Sensory information is also directly relayed to 
the ACC by way of the mediodorsal thalamic nucleus, to produce behavioural drive.  
Whereas the anterior insula is therefore associated with the subjective awareness of the 
emotional feeling, the ACC is associated with autonomic and emotional control (i.e., limbic 
motor cortex). Because an emotion normally consists of both a motivation and concurrent feeling 
state (Rolls, 1999), the insula and ACC are believed to work together to create an integrated 
emotional response with concomitant autonomic effects (Craig, 2002). In a recent perspective, 
Craig (2009) further outlined the function of the anterior insula (often including the frontal 
operculum) as not only subserving the subjective evaluation of bodily states, but as a unique 
cortical substrate that instantiates all subjective feeling. By comparison, increased ACC activity 
associated with emotional responding may facilitate or interrupt ongoing behaviour, whereas the 
absence of such activity may contribute to decreased motivational performance (Critchley et al., 
2003).  
In light of the above, it is reasonable to assume that the left anterior insula and 
ventrolateral PFC activation observed in the current study reflects the subjective feeling state 
associated with guilt. Seeley et al. (2007) found activity in the left anterior insula to be associated 
with both an „executive control‟ network and an emotional „salience‟ network, which suggests 
that this area may underlie bidirectional awareness of emotion and cognitive functions. 
Montague and Lohrenz (2007) also recently provided an intriguing account of the function of the 
anterior insula that is consistent with my findings for guilt. They suggested that activity in the 
anterior insula reflects natural error signals in response to norm violations, which are 
experienced by the individual as unique negative feelings of disgust, pain, or guilt. These error 
signals serve to direct the individual to rectify the norm violations by adjusting subsequent 
behaviour.  
Less clear, however, is the functional significance of the right posterior insula activation, 
and its negative linear relationship with self-reports of guilt. Given the literature on interoception 
reviewed above, it may be that significant activation in the right posterior insula during guilt 
reflects its involvement in the interoceptive representation of bodily afferent information. In 
contrast to the present finding, however, a more dorsal area of the mid/posterior insula is 











& Reiman, 2000). Moreover, an association with afferent bodily feedback would suggest a 
positive, rather than negative, association between activity in the right posterior insula and 
affective reports of guilt. The most plausible explanation of the right posterior insula‟s functional 
significance, therefore, is its putative involvement in cardiovascular control during the emotion 
manipulation, which was discussed earlier. 
In terms of specific emotional feeling states, the left anterior insula activation observed in 
the current study is readily associated with aversive moral emotions, such as indignation or 
anger, and particularly, the intensity of disgust regardless of form (Harrison et al., 2010; Krolak-
Salmon et al., 2003; Moll et al., 2007; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2005; Zahn, Moll et al., 
2009). Although disgust is predominantly associated with viscerosomatic reactions toward a 
class of natural stimuli, it is a complex emotional state also intimately associated with moral 
judgment and behaviour (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). In some situations, it therefore also 
has the characteristics of a „moral emotion‟ (Izard, 1977; Miller, 1997).   
The anterior insula activation during the current guilt condition may suggest a functional-
anatomical correspondence between guilt and disgust or anger. This interpretation is supported 
by subjective self-report data from Studies 1 and 2, where participants commonly expressed both 
disgust and anger (directed toward the self) as emotions intimately associated with the 
experience of guilt. Results from Basile et al.‟s (2011) study furthermore supported a strong 
connection between deontological guilt and activation in the left insula. The authors suggested 
that this form of guilt may be associated with strong aversive affect, such as moral disgust.  
An important distinction between moral disgust and „guilt-associated‟ disgust, however, 
is that the offending agent in interpersonal moral disgust is external, whereas the offending agent 
in guilt is internal or „self‟, with disgust possibly directed toward one‟s bad behaviour. Disgust 
arising in interpersonal situations is associated with the restoration of purity, because the emotion 
initiates behaviours aimed at breaking off contact or removing the disgust-inducing entity (Haidt, 
2003). By a similar notion, disgust associated with one‟s transgression of a social norm may 
serve to remove or renounce the bad behaviour in order to restore a baseline of purity.   
Lack of amygdala activation. Because the current emotion manipulation was designed to 
be emotionally arousing, I anticipated observing significant activation in the amygdala, given its 
role in processing emotionally salient information (Liberzon et al., 2003; Phan, Taylor et al., 












consideration of the literature. Before such consideration, however, it should be noted that this 
finding is unlikely to be a result of susceptibility artifact, because inspection of the cortex mask, 
which was created based on functional activation maps, indicated that the bilateral amygdala was 
included in the analysis. 
The first plausible explanation involves the nature of the emotion stimulus, which has 
been shown to affect amygdala activation. The amygdala, for example, appears to respond 
differentially to internally- and externally-generated emotion. Whereas amygdala activity is 
readily detected in response to salient externally-cued perceptual (especially visual) stimuli 
(Phan et al., 2002; Zald, 2003), it may be less engaged during internally-generated emotional 
responses, for example, recalling a previous life episode (Damasio et al., 2000; Reiman et al., 
1997). Consistent with this notion, amygdala activation was not detected in previous PET studies 
of recall-based guilt (Shin et al., 2000), sadness, happiness or disgust (George et al., 1996; Lane, 
Reiman et al., 1997; Mayberg et al., 1999), or anger (Dougherty et al., 1999). While participants 
in the current study were presented with visual emotion eliciting stimuli (i.e., IAT feedback), the 
emotional response depended on the mental processing of this information, the application of this 
information to the „self‟, and possibly the recollection of previous personal episodes of prejudice. 
The paradigm therefore did not strictly conform to criteria for externally-generated emotion 
elicitation. 
The second plausible task-related factor that may have influenced amygdala activity, is 
top-down cognitive control (Phan, Wager et al., 2004). Tasks requiring increased cognitive effort 
(e.g., reappraisal of stimulus content for self-relatedness) may attenuate amygdala/limbic activity 
(Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner, Ray et al., 2004). In contrast, passive 
emotion conditions (i.e., simply viewing emotional stimuli without performing an additional 
task) are more readily associated with increased amygdala activity (e.g., Harenski & Hamann, 
2006; Lange et al., 2003; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002). Given the significant 
cognitive component of the present paradigm, and evidence suggesting that some participants 
regulated their emotional responses, it is likely that these factors also influenced amygdala 
activity. 
The third plausible explanation involves the fact that amygdala detection may be 
influenced by significant habituation effects. For example, the amygdala demonstrates rapid 











2000). Furthermore, a response may occur transiently at the start of an emotion stimulus, rather 
than being sustained throughout stimulus presentation (Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2002; Zald, 2003). In this regard, more time-consuming induction  methods (e.g., 
emotional recall) may be more susceptible to within-experiment amygdala habituation effects 
than methods employing direct perceptual induction (Breiter et al., 1996). Such habituation 
effects may arise because the amygdala is considered to be more active during the emotion 
induction phase, than during the feeling-phase (Büchel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998). Given 
the temporal characteristics of the current paradigm (i.e., the use of a 30-s block design), 
sustained amygdala activity over an extended period of time would have been necessary to 
observe significant activation in this structure. 
In summary, the literature reviewed above does not preclude the amygdala from being 
active during guilt, but strongly suggests that the detection of amygdala activity during the 
current guilt induction may have been hampered by several factors.  
 
Behavioural Motivation of Guilt 
Guilt has been described as a form of anxiety associated with the threat of social 
exclusion due to misconduct (Baumeister et al., 1995). This anxiety is thought to be adaptive in 
that it promotes reinforcement learning, while simultaneously inhibiting the transgressive 
behaviour (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002). In this way, guilt functions as a punishment 
cue to help the individual respond more carefully in future (Devine et al., 1991). Making 
amends, however, has been suggested as a line of action that may relieve or resolve guilt-
associated distress and “give rise to positive-affect-evoking cognitions that counteract the 
negative affect” (Izard, 1991; Kubany & Watson, 2003, p. 77).  
Whereas guilt proneness has been associated with BAS sensitivity and approach 
orientation (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), the current findings across both Studies in this 
thesis suggest that high BIS-sensitive individuals, as measured by the Carver and White (1994) 
BIS/BAS scales, will experience stronger guilt when they find themselves in a real guilt-evoking 
scenario. This finding provides support for the idea that initial guilt functions as a punishment 
cue (Monteith, 1993), and suggests that current guilt is distinct from questionnaire constructs of 
guilt, which are typically employed to assess guilt-related phenomena.  












events or punishment cues, and that this sensitivity will result in greater negative affect (in this 
case, guilt), as well as increased arousal and the momentary interruption of ongoing action, 
during specific situations of threat. As mentioned in the Literature Review, the association of the 
Carver and White BIS scale with conflict monitoring and the interruption of action (rather than 
behavioural avoidance), has been supported recently by findings from Amodio and colleagues 
(2008). I therefore agree with previous accounts, and argue that guilt-related anxiety, together 
with guilt cognitions, functions as a punishment cue that inhibits ongoing behaviour and 
encourages reparatory behaviour in order to alleviate distress (both personal as well as distress 
caused to another). This view is consistent with the notion that guilt facilitates a multifaceted 
self-regulatory process, starting with behaviour inhibition and transforming into approach-
oriented, conciliatory behaviour when an opportunity for amendment appears (Amodio et al., 
2007). 
The specific nature of the self-regulatory process activated by guilt has been described in 
more detail in relation to prejudice reduction (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002). According 
to this literature, heightened guilt, which is experienced as punishment, is fundamental in 
increasing an individual‟s motivation to reduce personal prejudice. In particular, Monteith (1993) 
presented and tested the following model: Low-prejudice people with well-internalised, 
nonprejudiced beliefs experience conflict when they transgress a personal standard. Awareness 
of the transgression is accompanied by the elicitation of discrepancy-associated affect, i.e., guilt, 
which briefly interrupts ongoing behaviour and motivates a series of responses to help the 
individual respond more effectively in future. The latter includes behaviours aimed at identifying 
environmental stimuli that triggered the discrepant response, e.g., increased attention and 
exploratory-investigative behaviours, and serves to establish cues for control (Monteith et al., 
2002). Importantly, self-focus is significantly increased in the process. 
Increased self-focused attention is also central to objective self-awareness theory, another 
theory on discrepancy-related cognitions and affects, though unspecific in terms of the specific 
nature of the ensuing negative affect (Duval & Silvia, 2002; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
According to this “self theory”, increased self-awareness initiates greater comparison between 
the self and standards the self ought to have, which can motivate behaviours to change the self 
when discrepancies occur (e.g., Duval & Lalwani, 1999). Importantly, the increased self-focus is 











well as the significance of the discrepancy (Phillips & Silvia, 2005). Indirect evidence for a state 
of increased self-awareness following guilt-induction may be derived from the present fMRI 
study: During the Negative fixation period, increased activity in the mPFC and posterior 
cingulate (i.e., cortical midline structures) could be argued to reflect participants‟ increased 
engagement in self-reflection (Northoff et al., 2006). Participants therefore appeared to have 
heightened self-focus even after the emotion induction occurred. 
Taken together, the events triggered by guilt constitute an inhibitory, self-regulatory 
system, which causes future responses to be slowed or inhibited through controlled processing 
(Monteith, 1993). This description shares significant overlap with Gray‟s (1981, 1982) initial 
neuropsychological model of the BIS, which states that discrepant responses are associated with 
the formation of response-contingent punishment cues that are crucial for the organism to gain 
control over (i.e., inhibit) future discrepant responses. The interruption of ongoing action, a 
hallmark of BIS activity (see e.g., Patterson, Kosson, & Newman, 1987), was in fact directly 
evident in Study 1, where one participant took an extended amount of time to carry on with 
unfinished tasks following the guilt induction. Because guilt‟s proposed self-regulatory 
mechanisms in the prejudice literature also have the effect of reducing prejudice and responding 
more appropriately or prosocially in future scenarios (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002), this 
theorizing is consistent with guilt‟s proposed adaptive properties (cf. Tangney & Dearing, 2002). 
Another salient finding from the present investigation was that self-reported guilt was 
negatively associated with BAS in Study 1 and in Study 2, which suggests that low BAS-
sensitive individuals were more likely to report heightened guilt. Given the predictive value of 
BAS on both anger and self-reported frustration (Carver, 2004; Harmon-Jones, 2003), it may be 
that high BAS-sensitive individuals were more inclined to feel angered or frustrated, rather than 
guilty, by the guilt manipulations.  
A different interpretation relates to previous research suggesting strong BAS individuals 
to be insensitive to BIS warnings or cues of punishment, focusing their attention instead on cues 
of incentive (Patterson et al., 1987; Patterson & Newman, 1993). In this regard, Corr (2001) has 
proposed the view that the BIS and BAS have both facilitatory and antagonistic effects: 
facilitatory in the sense that BIS mediates responses to aversive cues and BAS mediates 
responses to appetitive cues, and antagonistic in the sense that high BIS antagonizes or impairs 












behaviour, state appetitive and aversive motivation is influenced by both the BIS and the BAS. 
Accordingly, state negative emotion, for example, should theoretically be highest in high BIS 
and low BAS individuals.  
 BAS scores in the current fMRI study were also positively associated with increased 
activity in the pACC and the right posterior insula. In light of the postulated functional roles of 
these areas described earlier, it is possible that high BAS-sensitive individuals were better at 
regulating negative affect, or more insensitive to subjective pain. In addition, these effects may 
have been mediated in part by decreased emotional state reactivity (i.e., reduced vagal 
unloading) to guilt-evoking stimuli. In this regard, much evidence associates antisocial 
impulsivity (i.e., a proposed overactive BAS) with physiological underarousal (see, e.g., Fowles, 
2000; Knyazev et al., 2002). These are intriguing possibilities that will need further 
investigation. 
Physiological parameters of BIS and BAS responding. Several theorists have argued 
convincingly for physiological markers of BIS and BAS activation during tasks that are designed 
to activate these motivational tendencies (Beauchaine, 2001; Fowles, 1980). Putative 
physiological correlates of BIS and BAS, however, do not always replicate well across studies 
and have been found to be largely uncorrelated with self-reported BIS and BAS (Brenner et al., 
2005; Heponiemi et al., 2004; Knyazev et al., 2002; Morgan, 2006). Because of these 
considerations, the current physiological data in terms of BAS and BIS activation are interpreted 
with caution.  
Before proceeding, I briefly consider relevant changes to the original BIS theory. The 
revised theory makes strong distinctions between anxiety, which is mediated by BIS, and fear, 
which is mediated by a separate fight/flight/freeze system (FFFS) (McNaughton & Corr, 2004). 
According to these current theoretical accounts, BIS is activated when an individual experiences 
conflict between competing motivational tendencies (e.g., approach-avoidance, approach-
approach, or avoidance-avoidance), and is therefore often activated by the simultaneous 
activation of the FFFS and BAS (when they are of similar intensity). BIS activation has the 
effect of inhibiting prepotent behaviour, but also induces anxiety and increased autonomic 
arousal, which facilitates behaviours like risk assessment. BIS is thought to resolve the conflict 
by either engaging the BAS or FFFS, based on evaluation of the reinforcing signals received 











In the case of guilt, the acute emotional reaction intuitively activates both the FFFS (i.e., 
freezing in response to threat detection) and BAS (i.e., behavioural activation or active 
avoidance); it therefore follows that conflict between these systems would result in increased 
BIS activation. This description is consistent with the results for guilt from Study 1: it was 
associated with increased punishment sensitivity (i.e., FFFS), increased BAS activity (i.e., PEP; 
Brenner et al., 2005), increased BIS activity (i.e., SCL; Fowles, 1980), and increased arousal 
(i.e., RSA; Frazier et al., 2004). In addition, anxiety was the second most highly-rated emotion in 
the Guilt condition. Hypothetically speaking, the competition between BAS-mediated appetitive 
motivation and the fight/flight/freeze system may eventually be tipped in favour of approach for 
guilt (i.e., guilt-related amending behaviour), whereas it might be tipped in favour of avoidance 
in the case of shame (see, e.g., Dickerson, Gruenewald et al., 2004). This account of guilt‟s 
motivational direction is in line with Amodio et al.‟s (2007) findings showing that guilt is 
initially associated with reduced approach motivation, followed by increased approach 
motivation during engagement in prosocial activity. 
 Neural correlates of the BIS. According to Gray and McNaughton (2000), the BIS 
depends on a hierarchical system of neural structures involving both subcortical (including the 
amygdala and septo-hippocampal system) and cortical structures (including the PFC and ACC). 
The assignment of functional roles to specific areas associated with BIS activation, however, is 
at present still relatively non-specific, particularly with regard to larger PFC and ACC structures 
(McNaughton & Corr, 2004). The neurocognitive correlates of BIS therefore remains to be 
elucidated in humans, yet strong conceptual similarities between the conflict-monitoring 
accounts of the ACC and the BIS has led to the proposal that BIS detects response conflicts and 
interrupts action via an ACC substrate (Amodio, Master et al., 2008).  
The BIS, for example, has been described as a comparator that scans the environment for 
mismatches between actual and expected stimuli; when a mismatch occurs, it recruits additional 
cognitive resources and takes control over behaviour (Gray, 1982; Monteith et al., 2002). 
Similarly, the ACC is considered essential in detecting events or internal states that signal the 
need for enhanced attention and cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2004). The conflict-
monitoring account of ACC function furthermore highlights its use of error or punishment 
signals to trigger strategic adjustments in cognitive control and adapt future behaviour (see e.g., 












more inhibited or controlled responses in future situations. Lastly, individual difference analyses 
have indicated that conflict-related ACC activity is amplified for individuals high in negative 
emotionality (Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000), a personality trait that corresponds to higher 
dispositional BIS sensitivity (Smillie et al., 2006).  
In light of the above, the prominent conflict-related dorsal/supragenual ACC activity 
detected in the current fMRI study provides further support for the association between acute 
guilt and behavioural inhibition. This ACC activity, which may be associated with conflicting 
response tendencies, possibly serves to engage more regulative dorsal prefrontal areas (Botvinick 
et al., 2004). Interestingly, a much more left-lateralized, dorsal PFC activation was observed 
during the Negative fixation compared to the Negative feedback period, suggestive of more 
cognitive control post-emotion elicitation. Finally, ventrolateral PFC‟s association with 
punishment (e.g., Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004) supports the notion that guilt is experienced as a 
punishment cue.   
 
Sex Differences 
Consistent with past research on emotion, a female-only sample was used in both studies 
of this thesis to reduce possible sex-related variation in emotional responding, and to maximize 
the likelihood of intense emotional experiences (Shields, 1991). The use of a homogenous 
female sample was thought to facilitate the detection of distinct autonomic and neural activation 
patterns associated with guilt and pride. Although guilt and pride have been shown to function in 
the same way for men and women (Monteith et al., 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2008), it is important 
to consider potential sex differences and how they may relate to the present findings. In this 
regard, sex differences pertain to various aspects of the emotional response, including the 
experience (self-report), expression (nonverbal behaviours), and physiology (cardiovascular, 
immune, neural, etc.) thereof (Kring & Gordon, 1998).  
There is a longstanding Western-based stereotype that women are more emotional than 
men (Fischer & Manstead, 2000). A relatively robust finding, for example, is that women are 
more emotionally expressive than men (Gross & John, 1998; Kring & Gordon, 1998). Women 
also typically report more intense emotional experiences (Alexander & Wood, 2000), and often 
react more sensitively than men, that is, they have stronger physiological reactions, especially in 











Gard & Kring, 2007; Nater, Abbruzzese, Krebs, & Ehlert, 2006). Sex differences in emotion, 
however, are considerably more complex than outlined above, and are subject to great variability 
in experimental methods and measures as well as social factors e.g., gender roles and 
socialization histories (Brody, 1997; Grossman & Wood, 1993). 
Considering guilt and shame, extensive research by Tangney and colleagues has indicated 
that females across all age ranges report a greater propensity to guilt and shame than their male 
counterparts (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). This observation may be reflected in findings of 
epidemiological studies, which typically show women to be at a higher risk for developing mood 
disorders, including anxiety and depression, than men (Sachs-Ericsson & Ciarlo, 2000). Women 
are also more prone to ruminate about the causes and consequences of their own negative moods 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). Others, however, contend that it is not sex 
per se, but a particular gendered self-concept that mediates the difference. Evans (1984), for 
example, found feminine gender-typed individuals to experience higher levels of guilt than their 
masculine gender-typed counterparts.  
In a study assessing both guilt-proneness and dispositional guilt between male and female 
college students, Benetti-McQuiod and Bursik (2005) found females to be more guilt-prone than 
males. Males, on the other hand, reported more dispositional guilt. The authors argued that men 
may be more likely to find themselves in actual guilt-inducing situations, because men may be 
less sensitive to others‟ emotions and therefore less aware of the impact of their own behaviours. 
Females, however, are likely to be more attuned to the consequences of their behaviours and 
therefore better at anticipating other‟s reactions, which, in turn, may lead them to be more 
effective at avoiding punishing situations. The latter female personality trait may also be 
associated with higher BIS sensitivity, an interpretation consistent with Carver and White‟s 
(1994) original finding of higher BIS scores for females compared to males. Sex differences in 
guilt and shame, however, have been inconsistent across studies (see e.g., Ferguson & Crowley, 
1997), an issue possibly inflated by the confounding effects of measures assessing different 
facets of guilt and shame (Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 2005; Eisenberg, 2000), as well as 
different characteristics of the samples assessed. 
With regard to pride, evidence suggests that this is an emotion expressed more frequently 
or intensely by males (Collins & Frankenhaeuser, 1989). Pride has become associated with 












higher status in Western (and many non-Western) societies than women (Tracy & Robins, 2008). 
Conversely, women generally have lower self-esteem than men (Robins, Trzesniewski, Tracy, 
Gosling, & Potter, 2002), and may therefore experience pride less frequently and less intensely – 
an interpretation consistent with the present findings. It is impossible, however, to determine 
whether the lower emotional intensity associated with pride in the present research (especially in 
Study 2) was a result of the emotion manipulation method, or sex-related differences in 
emotional responding. 
Sex differences in the physiological domain of emotion also remain unclear (Brody & 
Hall, 2000), with a relative dearth of studies exploring such differences. Women generally 
respond to laboratory stressors with greater HR reactivity (Brenner et al., 2005; Heponiemi et al., 
2004), and show greater electrodermal activity to unpleasant or sad events (Kring & Gordon, 
1998), while men typically show greater blood pressure responses (Steptoe, Fieldman, Evans, & 
Perry, 1996). Various studies have, however, failed to find these particular sex differences in 
physiological responses (Carrillo et al., 2001; Jones et al., 1996; Nater et al., 2006). In addition, 
sex differences in arousal have been shown to be specific to the task, as well as to the particular 
physiological measure (Brody, 1999). For example, one physiological measure (e.g., skin 
conductance magnitude) in a given scenario may show men to be more aroused, while another 
(e.g., facial electromyographic activity) may show women to be more aroused (Lang et al., 
1993). Physiological differences are also affected by an individual‟s emotional style of 
expression (Cacioppo et al., 1992). Although it has often been reported that men are internalizers 
(i.e., heightened physiological arousal without overt emotional expression) and women are 
externalizers (i.e., overt emotional expression without corresponding physiological arousal) 
(Buck, Savin, Miller, & Caul, 1972), some evidence suggests that both men and women also fit 
within the generalizer framework (i.e., expressing emotions across physiological, facial, and 
verbal modalities) (Kring & Gordon, 1998). All of the above factors therefore prevent a simple 
extrapolation of physiological findings from the current female sample to males.   
A possible confounding factor in the literature may be the emotion manipulation itself: 
researchers typically use the same type of emotion-inducing task for both men and women. Some 
evidence suggests, however, that sex differences in physiological arousal disappear when men 
and women are exposed to situations that they find equally important or arousing (Frodi, 1976). 











with typical male gender roles, e.g., physical strength and work-related performance (Efthim, 
Kenny, & Mahalik, 2001). Accordingly, I do not expect men and women to have different 
physiological responses for guilt and pride per se, but there may be some differences in the 
emotion manipulations required to elicit these emotions to the same extent in both sexes. 
Nevertheless, a great deal more research is necessary to elucidate the psychophysiological 
mechanisms of guilt and pride in men and women.  
Sex differences in emotional processing have also been demonstrated in functional 
neuroimaging studies of emotion (George et al., 1996; Hamann & Canli, 2004; Mak, Hu, Zhang, 
Xiao, & Lee, 2009b), although studies that directly compare male and female responses are not 
very common. Based on women‟s heightened responsiveness to emotional material in general, it 
has been postulated that women should also show stronger brain activation in emotional tasks 
than men (Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). A meta-analysis conducted by Wager et al. 
(2003), failed to find any overall sex differences in activation, however. Instead, their findings 
suggested that sex effects for emotion at the neural level are complex and subject to regional 
specificity. In particular, men tended to show more activation in posterior sensory and left 
inferior frontal cortices, while women tended to show more activation in medial prefrontal and 
midline limbic structures, including the ACC and thalamus. While speculative, Wager and 
colleagues suggested that these differences in activation may reflect gender differences in 
emotional processing, such that males direct more attention to sensorimotor aspects of emotional 
stimuli to assess required action, whereas females focus more on the subjective feeling state 
engendered by the emotional stimuli.  
A more detailed discussion of sex differences in emotional brain activation, however, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For the present purposes, it may suffice to assume that sex 
differences also exist at the neural level during guilt, although they are likely to be subtle. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Data from the present thesis support and expand on various theoretical aspects of guilt 
and pride‟s motivation and function, yet findings should be considered in light of some 
methodological limitations. First, the individuals who participated in both the psychophysiology 
and fMRI investigations consisted of a very homogenous sample of college students (i.e., White, 












groups, as well as to older adults (see, e.g., Bierbrauer, 1992; Eid & Diener, 2001; Levenson, 
Carstensen, & Gottman, 1994). 
In terms of the physiological profiles detected for guilt and pride, future studies will be 
necessary to replicate the current finding of differential SNS activation patterns, as well as to 
determine the possible influences that environmental factors, specific action programmes, and 
individual differences in affective style, may have in the autonomic patterning of these emotions. 
While the current data are consistent with the notion of distinct physiological arousal patterns for 
discrete emotions, Study 1 was not designed with an aim of confirming Jamesian emotion theory. 
To confirm autonomic specificity for the moral emotions, one would also have to demonstrate 
autonomic differentiation between similarly valenced moral emotions (Levenson, 2003a). A 
fruitful line of future investigation may therefore be to investigate autonomic differences 
between negative moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, and embarrassment) and between positive 
moral emotions (e.g., elevation, gratitude, and pride). Like others (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 
2007; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), I encourage researchers to investigate these emotions in vivo in 
situations of high ecological validity.   
Another limitation, as discussed previously, was the difficulty in eliciting intense pride in 
research participants. Future studies may benefit from examining the pride response in relation to 
a moral act of goodwill, instead of the performance-based pride that is usually investigated in 
laboratory paradigms. This form of prosocial pride may have a more authentic emotional reaction 
as a result. Similarly, the fMRI paradigm was more closely associated with deontological than 
altruistic guilt. Guilt is thought to be triggered most powerfully in the context of communal 
relationships, especially if one‟s harmful action also threatens this relationship (Baumeister et al., 
1994). Developing an ecologically valid imaging paradigm to study interpersonal or altruistic 
guilt may therefore shed more light on affective disorders associated with abnormal guilt, e.g., 
depression (O'Connor et al., 2002). To improve the efficacy of such a paradigm, particularly for 
the fMRI context, researchers may benefit from developing paradigms or stimulus sets that are 
tailored for each individual participant (see, e.g., Mak et al., 2009a).  
Finally, the finding that activity in the pACC was related to participants‟ subjective 
reports of guilt opens up new fields of enquiry for future research. For example, given that 
increases in pACC activity may reflect individual differences in the efficiency of the cortical 











attachment system is also modulated by endogenous opioids (Nelson & Panksepp, 1998; 
Panksepp, 2005), it follows that dysregulation of this system in early childhood (e.g., as a result 
of separation-distress or trauma) may prevent effective guilt regulation in later life. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Guilt has been described as the emotion most essential in the development and regulation 
of moral behaviour (Izard, 1991). Although much has been written about guilt, relatively little is 
known about this moral emotion‟s biological substrates, especially because of various 
methodological challenges in its elicitation. The present thesis showed that guilt may be elicited 
reliably and studied in various experimental contexts through use of ecologically valid 
techniques. In particular, some findings from the present investigation clearly diverged from 
studies that employed only questionnaire measures to assess guilt. The importance of studying 
guilt in real-time is thus evident. In addition, the psychophysiology study (Study 1) demonstrated 
unequivocally that cognitive mind processes may be expressed in peripheral reactions also for 
the more complex moral emotions, and that investigation of such arousal patterns may contribute 
to our understanding of how moral emotions motivate behaviour and affect mental as well as 
physical health. 
Study 1 also indicated that current experiences of guilt are associated with strong bodily 
arousal and cardiovascular responses mediated by concomitant vagal withdrawal and cardiac 
sympathetic activation. The neuroimaging investigation (Study 2) supported these findings, again 
showing significant activation in brain structures associated with heightened autonomic arousal, 
e.g., the ACC and insula. Both studies furthermore pointed to an association between acute guilt 
and behavioural inhibition, with high BIS (i.e., punishment-sensitive) individuals reporting more 
guilt. Guilt therefore appears to interrupt ongoing action and promote self-reflection, before 
becoming approach-oriented to repair the harm caused. This shift may, in fact, be a critical 
distinction that separates adaptive guilt from maladaptive guilt and shame.  
Notably, both the psychophysiology and neuroimaging studies demonstrated that guilt is 
not a pleasant emotional experience, either cognitively or physiologically, and that it is 
associated with various other negative emotions, depending on the particular context. Its adaptive 












rectifies the harm caused to another, but also alleviates personal distress and possibly speeds 
cardiovascular recovery. 
As a final point of consideration, it is important to stress that individual differences in the 
physiology and experience of guilt appear to be considerable, and that more research is necessary 
to define the characteristics under which guilt becomes maladaptive. These may shed light on 
disease pathogenesis in terms of cardiovascular as well as psychopathological disorders. 
Importantly, given the lack of validity often afforded by self-report measures of emotion, these 
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Appendix A: Demographic and Health Questionnaire 
 
Participant ID:  ______________________________      Date:  ________________ 
 
 
1.  What age are you now?  __________________________   2. Date of birth? ______________ 
3.  Population group (circle): African Black           Indian              Coloured                 White 
4.  What is your first/home language?  _________________ 
5.  Which hand do you write with?  __________________ 
Did you always use this hand since you were a child?    Y     N    
6.  Number of years of formal education: ___________________ 
7.  What is your current job? ___________________________ 
8.  Medical History 
Have you ever been hospitalised for a neurological problem, such as head injury, epilepsy, 
stroke or brain tumour?  Y    N 
What for?  _______________________________ 
9.  Have you ever been treated for problems with alcohol or drugs? _____________________ 
10.  Psychiatric/mental health 
Have you ever been prescribed drugs for a psychiatric or other mental health problem, such as 
anxiety, depression, or schizophrenia?   Y     N 
When was this?  When did you stop taking the drugs (if appropriate)?  ___________________ 
11.  Menstrual cycle (if applicable) 
Days since last period:  ______________ 
Length of cycle:  ___________________ 
Do you use oral contraceptives?   Y      N 
12.  Learning disabilities 
Did you have problems at school for which you received special help, such as reading problems, 
for instance?    Y      N 
Please specify:  ____________________________ 
13.  Are you currently on any medication?   Y     N 












Appendix B: Study 1 Consent Form 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Informed Consent to Participate in Research and 
Authorization for Collection, Use, and Disclosure 
of Cognitive Performance and Other Personal Data  
 
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. This form provides you with information 
about the study and seeks your authorization for the collection, use and disclosure of your 
cognitive performance data, as well as other information necessary for the study. The Principal 
Investigator (the person in charge of this research) or a representative of the Principal 
Investigator will also describe this study to you and answer all of your questions. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary. Before you decide whether or not to take part, read the 
information below and ask questions about anything you do not understand. By participating in 








2. Title of Research Study 
 
Cognitive and Physiological Processes Underlying Performance on Three Psychological 
Tests. 
 
3. Contact Details  
 
Investigator: Melike Fourie 
 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
Office: (021) 650-3415 
Mobile: 083 781 6021 
 
4. Source of Funding or Other Material Support 
 
National Research Foundation (NRF) 













5. What is the purpose of this research study?  
 
The main purpose of this research essentially involves understanding how non-specific 
physiological arousal relates to cognitive performance in some specific neuropsychological 
tests. Additionally, we‟d like to correlate this performance with some personality traits like 
general mood and attitude. 
 
6. What will be done if you take part in this research study?  
 
You will essentially be required to participate in two legs of the same study: i.e. the cognitive 
and affective parts, which will take place on one occasion. In the first session you will be 
asked to complete some questionnaires that should not take longer than about 30min. These 
measure certain aspects of your personality and attitude.    
In the second session you will be administered a series of relatively simple cognitive tasks 
that are presented on a computer screen while we monitor your physiological arousal. This 
should take no more than 1hour. The tasks measure certain aspects of your visual, attentional, 
motor, and memory functioning, as well as your general cognitive functioning.      
To record the physiological data, a series of sensors/electrodes will be attached to your upper 
body and hands to measure things like heart rate and breathing.   
After the second experimental session is over, you will be informed in detail about the design 
of the study and the research questions we hope to answer. You will also have the 
opportunity to ask questions and thus learn more about psychological research. 
If you have any questions now or at any time during the study, you may contact the 
Investigator listed in #3 of this form.  
 
7. If you choose to participate in this study, how long will you be expected to participate in 
the research? 
 
The experiment consists of two sessions, which together should not last longer than one and a 
half (1½) hours. If at any time during the experimental sessions you find any of the 
procedures uncomfortable, you are free to discontinue your participation without penalty. 
 




9. What are the possible discomforts and risks?  
 
There are no known risks associated with participation in this study. Attaching the 
physiological electrodes might be experienced as uncomfortable and intrusive by some 
people, but this will be done by a trained female assistant and all care will be taken to be as 
unobtrusive as possible. You also may experience slight fatigue during the experimental 
sessions.  However, if you become tired you will be allowed to take breaks between blocks of 
tests whenever you want to.  
If you wish to discuss the information above or any discomforts you may experience, you may 












10a. What are the possible benefits to you? 
 
You may or may not personally benefit from participating in this study. Participation in this 
study may, however, improve your mental test performance due to training and practice. 
 
10b. What are the possible benefits to others? 
 
The information from this study may help improve our understanding of mental functions 
and cognitive processing. Additionally, this research will allow us to gather information 
about the performance of healthy adults on the administered tests.   
 
11. If you choose to take part in this research study, will it cost you anything? 
 
Participating in this study will not cost you anything.   
 
12. Will you receive compensation for taking part in this research study? 
 
Yes, you will receive financial compensation of R30 for taking part in this study. 
  
13a. Can you withdraw from this research study? 
 
You are free to withdraw your consent and to stop participating in this research study at any 
time. If you do withdraw your consent, there will be no penalty. 
 
If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may phone the 
Psychology Department offices at (021) 650-3430. 
 
13b. If you withdraw, can information about you still be used and/or collected? 
 
Information already collected may be used. 
 
14. Once personal and performance information is collected, how will it be kept secret 
(confidential) in order to protect your privacy?  
 
Information collected will be stored in locked filing cabinets or in computers with security 
passwords. Only certain people have the right to review these research records. These people 
include the researchers for this study and certain University of Cape Town officials. Your 
research records will not be released without your permission unless required by law or a 
court order. 
 
15. What information about you may be collected, used and shared with others? 
 
This information gathered from you will be demographic and health history information, 
records of your performance on certain cognitive tests, physiological data, and records of 
your responses to attitude questionnaires. If you agree to be in this research study, it is 











used for other research purposes. If so, the limited data set may only include information that 
does not directly identify you. For example, the limited data set cannot include your name, 
address, telephone number, ID number, or any other photographs, numbers, codes, or so forth 
that link you to the information in the limited data set. 
 
16. How will the researcher(s) benefit from your being in the study? 
 
In general, presenting research results helps the career of a scientist. Therefore, the Principal 
Investigator and others attached to this research project may benefit if the results of this study 
are presented at scientific meetings or in scientific journals. 
 
17. Signatures  
 
As a representative of this study, I have explained to the participant the purpose, the 
procedures, the possible benefits, and the risks of this research study; and how the 
participant‟s performance and other data will be collected, used, and shared with others: 
 
 
______________________________________________ _____________________  
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent and Authorization  Date  
 
 
You have been informed about this study‟s purpose, procedures, possible benefits, and risks; 
and how your performance and other data will be collected, used and shared with others. You 
have received a copy of this form. You have been given the opportunity to ask questions 
before you sign, and you have been told that you can ask other questions at any time. 
 
You voluntarily agree to participate in this study. You hereby authorize the collection, use 
and sharing of your performance and other data. By signing this form, you are not waiving 
any of your legal rights. 
 
 
______________________________________________  _____________________  
Signature of Person Consenting and Authorizing   Date  
 
Please indicate below if you would like to be notified of future research projects conducted 
by our research group:  
______________ (initial) Yes, I would like to be added to your research participation pool 
and be notified of research projects in which I might participate in the future.  
 
Method of contact:  
Phone number:  __________________________  
E-mail address:  __________________________  
Mailing address:  _______________________________________________ 













Appendix C: Study 1 Cover Story and Dialogue 
The section below presents the cover story that was given to all participants in Study 1 
and goes on to describe the details of the experimental emotion manipulations. Whereas the 
indented texts represent the verbatim dialogue that was employed, the texts inbetween describe 
the accompanying actions and proceedings.  
 
The following individuals were involved as „actors‟: 
 
Experimenter: Melike (dressed professionally) 
Confederates: 
Research assistant: Diane (she wore a white laboratory coat) 




Experimenter:  Greetings and welcome. I will now briefly explain to you the nature of the 
study you will participate in and then leave you in the trusted care of my 
assistant, Diane. This afternoon you will participate in two legs of the 
same study. In the first part you will be completing some questionnaires 
and forms about yourself, and in the second part we are interested to see 
how physiological measures, like heart rate and breathing, vary with 
cognitive function. In the second session, you will basically be doing 3 
computerised tasks and we want to see if you become better with practice. 
Many things influence people‟s cognitive skills, including transient 
emotional states that the person may not even be particularly aware of. 
Because emotion changes frequently over periods of even an hour, 
emotion-relevant information will be collected periodically while you are 
working on the task. This information will permit our research team to 
control for the effects of these small shifts in emotion in analyzing the 
data. Furthermore, because the cardiovascular measurements are very 
sensitive, it is crucial that you refrain from talking, once you have started 
the computerized tasks until the end of the experiment. Diane will tell you 
exactly when this happens. („No Talking‟ signs were also displayed 
around the computer cubicle to emphasize this point.)  
 
Experimental manipulation: Guilt condition 
 
After the research assistant attached all the sensors necessary for physiological measurements, 
she offered the participant more money than was originally agreed upon: 
 
Research assistant:  You know, these tasks actually take quite long - I‟m going to give you 
R60 today.  Some of the other participants haven‟t showed up, and I‟m 
sure Haidee has loads of money anyway. I‟m not really supposed to give 
you more than R30, but I‟m sure it will be fine – please just don‟t 












The research assistant then briefly explained the computerized tasks to the participant, and 
reminded the participant that any form of verbal communication will be prohibited during the 
rest of the experiment to ensure signal integrity. She also instructed participants to sit quietly 
and relax after tasks were completed, and that she might go to the bathroom, but would be 
right back. 
 
Participant performed RUN 1 
 
Participant performed RUN 2 (The research assistant left halfway through RUN 2 to “go to 
the bathroom.”) 
 
The experimenter and supervisor entered unexpectedly as the participant finished RUN 2, 
with the purpose of checking up on something. 
 
Supervisor  
(to participant):  Sorry to interrupt… Melike, where is Diane?   
 
Experimenter:  I don‟t know, she probably just went to the bathroom.   
 
Both the supervisor and experimenter then went behind the divider. 
 
Supervisor:  Melike, why don‟t you set up the next block of tasks for the participant in 
the meantime. (She finds the money box and discovers that money is 
missing.) No…this isn‟t right, something is wrong here…Melike can you 
come over here for a second? 
 
Experimenter left the participant before the next block of tasks was properly set up, and went 
back behind the divider.  
 
Supervisor:  There is some money missing here - do you know anything about it? 
 
Experimenter:  No, I don‟t work with the money, Diane does. 
 
Supervisor:  How is this possible? I put enough money in here for at least 5 participants 
and now it is almost all gone! This isn‟t right, are you sure you don‟t know 
anything about it? 
 
Experimenter:  I‟m sure. Diane woudn‟t just have just taken the money for herself, 
though. I think she probably pays participants more than she is supposed 
to. 
 
Supervisor:  Are you sure? Wait, lets find out… 
 
The supervisor then went over to the participant and directly asked her whether the research 













(to experimenter):  Well, this is just the last straw, and it has happened more than once now. 
Diane is just too nonchalant about this whole project… where is she 
anyway?  I‟m going to have to let her go. Please will you send her to me 
and start looking for a new assistant straight away.  Actually…wait, you 
stay here and finish the participant and I‟ll go and find her.  
 
Experimenter:  Yes of course, I‟m really sorry about it, I didn‟t know...   
 
The experimenter then finished setting up the next block of tasks (RUN 3) for the participant, 
telling her not to worry and to keep concentrating on the tasks.  
 
 
Experimental manipulation: Pride condition   
 
A similar procedure was followed as for the Guilt condition, however, the research assistant 
did not offer participants any extra financial compensation. 
 
Participant performed RUN 1 
 
Participant performed RUN 2 (The research assistant left halfway through RUN 2 to “go to 
the bathroom.”) 
 
The experimenter and supervisor entered unexpectedly as the participant finished RUN 2, 
with the purpose of checking up on something. 
 
Supervisor  
(to participant):  Sorry to interrupt… Melike, where is Diane?   
 
Experimenter:  I don‟t know, he probably just went to the bathroom.   
 
Both supervisor and experimenter then went behind the divider. 
 
Supervisor:  Melike, why don‟t you set up the next block of tasks for the participant in 
the meantime. (Supervisor is busy on the „dummy computer‟ and struggles 
to find the right file.) Melike, can you come over here for a second? 
 
Experimenter left the participant before the next block of tasks was properly set up, and went 
back behind the divider.  
 
Supervisor:  I can‟t find the test results for today – can you show me please? 
 
Experimenter:  Yes, sure – here they are. (She finds the right file.) So, for example, these 
are the previous participants‟ scores – you can see the data transfer is 
working quite nicely. Most of them do fine, but they seem to struggle with 
the first task. And these are „Tess‟s” (current participant name) scores. 












Experimenter:  Wow – yes I haven‟t seen them yet, but she really does seem to be 
outperforming almost everyone else. Nobody has done this well before. 
 
Supervisor:  And her reaction times are pretty fast as well. Look, she‟s just above the 
95
th
 percentile! I‟m really happy with these results and you guys are doing 
a great job. Wait, let me go tell her myself… 
 
The supervisor then went over to the participant where she warmly congratulated her and 
smiled approvingly. (Participant smiled back in recognition.) 
 
Supervisor 
(to experimenter):  Do you mind finishing up here, I actually need Diane for something else. 
 
Experimenter:  Yes of course.  
 
The experimenter then finished setting up the next block of tasks (RUN 3) for the participant, 
telling her that she was really impressed with her performance.     
 
 
Experimental manipulation: Neutral condition 
 
A similar procedure was followed as in the other two conditions, however, the research 
assistant did not offer participants any extra financial compensation, and no comments were 
made about the participant‟s performance. 
 
The experimenter and supervisor again entered unexpectedly as the participant finished RUN 
2, with the purpose of checking up on something on the computer.  
 
Supervisor  
(to participant):  Sorry to interrupt… Melike, where is Diane?   
 
Experimenter:  I don‟t know, she probably just went to the bathroom.   
 
Both the supervisor and experimenter then went behind the divider. 
 
The supervisor then started looking for a PowerPoint presentation on the „dummy computer‟, 
which she ostensibly needed for a presentation the following day. The experimenter helped 
her to find this file and explained some concepts in the presentation. (The dialogue was timed 
to be of similar length as in the other conditions, and the content thereof was neutral.)  
 
On their way out, the supervisor asked the participant if everything was going well. 
(Participant nodded.) She then asked the experimenter (Melike) to stay behind and finish the 
experiment because she needed the research assistant (Diane) for something else. 












In order to test the fMRI protocol, a behavioural pilot study was developed and 
conducted in the UCT Department of Psychology as an independent Honours project. The pilot 
study‟s main purpose was to confirm and optimize the validity of the IAT prejudice paradigm as 
a successful technique to elicit guilt and pride. It furthermore served to refine participant 
selection criteria for the larger study.  
 In short, a web-based screening survey was employed to recruit a large number of female 
participants (N = 147).  From the survey, a subset of 19 participants who met all screening 
criteria participated in the study. Aside from certain demographic criteria, inclusion criteria 
involved selecting participants with a positive attitude toward all social groups included in the 
study (e.g., Black people, homosexual people, and Jewish people), as well as high social 
desirability concern.
10
 During the testing session, participants also completed three other 
individual difference personality measures, namely the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), the Affect 
Intensity Measure (AIM; Larsen & Diener, 1987), and the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 
1994). These were included to explore possible relations between the constructs assessed by 
these questionnaire measures and self-reported affect after the emotion manipulation. 
Data from the pilot study confirmed that successful moral emotion elicitation is possible 
using preprogrammed IAT feedback. Self-report data as well as post-experimental interviews 
confirmed that target emotions of guilt and pride were differentially elicited by the IAT 
paradigm. The behavioural study furthermore served to identify types of individuals likely to 
experience intense target emotions. Of significance was the finding that BIS sensitivity was 
significantly correlated with self-reported pride (rs = .61, p < 0.01) and satisfaction (rs = .54, p < 
.05) in the Positive IAT (pride) condition. Pride and satisfaction were also highly correlated with 
each other in this condition (rs = .91, p < .001). In the Negative IAT (guilt) condition, BIS 
sensitivity was also significantly correlated with self-reported guilt (rs = .53, p < .05), as well as 
shame (r = .50, p < .05), but not embarrassment (rs = .27, p = .27). In this condition, guilt was 
significantly correlated with shame (rs = .82, p < .001), and to a lesser extent with embarrassment 
(rs = .53, p < .05), while shame and embarrassment were highly correlated (rs = .83, p < .001). 
The above findings from correlational analyses were in line with data from Study 1, and 
suggested that participants with high BIS sensitivity are more likely to experience guilt and pride 
                                                 
10Specific details of the pilot selection procedures are not discussed here in full, because a 











during the Negative and Positive IAT conditions, respectively. None of the other personality 
measures were significantly related to self-reported affect, except the Positive Affect (PA) scale, 
which showed a significant negative correlation with guilt (p < .01), as well as shame (p < .05).  
Some participants in the pilot study did not report experiencing target emotions, however, 
especially during the Negative IAT condition. Post-experimental interviews suggested that these 
individuals were often personally involved in cross-racial or gay relationships, or had close 
relatives or friends in these categories. They therefore did not believe Negative IAT feedback 
suggesting that they were prejudiced against Black or gay individuals. In order to avoid similar 
confounding effects in future, it was thus considered important to include indications of 
homosexual affiliations (e.g., “Do you have close gay friends?”), as well as cross-racial contact 
(e.g., “Do you have many Black friends/family?”) in future screening measures. 
 Overall, the pilot study suggested that the elicitation of specific moral emotions using an 
IAT prejudice paradigm with preprogrammed feedback was reliable, yet highly dependent on 
participant selection criteria. High BIS-sensitive individuals furthermore appeared to be more 














Appendix E: Web-based Survey (Demographic Section) 
 
UCT Social Preference Survey  
 
We are conducting research on social 'prejudice' or 'preference' tendencies among students at 
UCT. Please complete the questionnaires below, which shouldn't take you more than roughly 30 
minutes. In return for your participation (and completion of all forms) you will receive 2 
units toward your SRPP credits. Your responses will be kept completely confidential.  
There are no right or wrong answers, so please respond as honestly as possible. 
You are first required to fill out some demographic details on the next page. Please note that we 
need your correct student number in order to award you course credit. All personal information 
will be kept separate from your survey responses, so that those survey responses remain 
completely confidential. 
 









Please select one of the following: Asian/Indian, Black, Coloured, or White 
 
Age: (fill in) 
 
Religious Denomination: (fill in) 
 
Attitude toward religion i  general:  
Please select one of the following: Positive, Negative, or Neutral 
 
Sexual Orientation:  
Please select one of the following: Homosexual, Heterosexual, or Bisexual 
 
Please give an indication of the following in the space provided.  Please answer all questions: 
1) Have you ever dated someone of the opposite race?  
2) Do you have close gay or lesbian friends? 











Appendix F: Rating Thermometer 
 
We are interested in people‟s personal attitudes toward a variety of stereotyped social groups. 
  
Below you will see something that looks like a thermometer. You will be using this to indicate 
your overall evaluation of these social groups. 
  
Here‟s how it works: If you have a favourable attitude toward members of a group, you would 
give the group a score somewhere between 50° and 100°, depending on how favorable your 
evaluation is. On the other hand, if you have an unfavorable attitude toward members of this 
group, you would give the group a score somewhere between 0° and 50°, depending on how 
unfavorable your evaluation is. The degree labels will help you to place your evaluation. 
However, you are not restricted to the numbers indicated, feel free to use any number between 0 
and 100.  
 
                               
 
 
Please give your thermometer rating for Black people in the space provided: _______________  
 
  
100° Extremely favourable  
  
 90°  Very favourable  
  
 80°  Quite favourable  
  
 70°  Fairly favourable  
  
 60°  Slightly favourable 
  
 50°  Neither favourable nor unfavourable   
  
 40°  Slightly unfavourable   
  
 30°  Fairly unfavourable  
  
 20°  Quite unfavourable 
  
 10°  Very unfavourable  
 













Appendix G: MRI Screening Form 
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Appendix H: fMRI Consent Form 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
fMRI Participant Information Leaflet  
and Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Research Project:  Functional brain imaging of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in 
healthy low-prejudice individuals.  
 
Reference Number: 247/2009 
 
Principal Investigator:  Melike Fourie 
 
Contact Details:    
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
Office: 021 – 650-3415 
Mobile: 083 781 6021 
 
Supervisor:  Dr Kevin G.F. Thomas 
 





You are being invited to take part in a research project.  Please take some time to read the 
information presented here, which will explain the details of this project. The Principal 
Investigator (the person in charge of this research) will describe this study to you and answer all 
of your questions. It is very important that you are fully satisfied that you clearly understand 
what this research entails and how you could be involved.  Also, your participation is entirely 
voluntary and you are free to decline to participate.  If you say no, this will not affect you 
negatively in any way whatsoever.  You are also free to withdraw from the study at any point, 
even if you do agree to take part. 
 
This study has been approved by the UCT Psychology Ethics Committee, as well as the Research 
Ethics Committee of UCT Faculty of Health Sciences and will be conducted according to the 
ethical guidelines and principles of the international Declaration of Helsinki, South African 
Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice and the Medical Research Council (MRC) Ethical 












Research Objectives  
 
The main purpose of this research essentially involves identifying, through the technique of 
fMRI, which areas of the brain are active or take part in performing the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT). The IAT is a well-documented reaction-time test that gives a reliable indication of your 
unconscious bias or prejudice on things like race, age and gender.  Specifically, we are interested 




This study essentially involves two sessions, both of which will be conducted by the principal 
investigator listed above. During the first session you will be asked to complete some 
questionnaires assessing general mood as well as medical history (e.g., previous neurological or 
psychiatric illness), as well as an MRI suitability questionnaire which will mainly involve 
screening for pregnancy and any metal objects/implants in your body. If you meet the inclusion 
criteria and agree to participate, you will be contacted and scheduled to have a type of brain scan, 
called an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) scan. This session shouldn‟t take more 
than 30mins. 
For this second session you will be required to go to Tygerberg Hospital, where the fMRI 
scanner is located. Two qualified radiographers will take care of all the scanning and MRI safety 
procedures, such as making sure that the scanning room stays free of magnetic material. They 
will also perform a formal screen to make sure that it is completely safe for you to have a scan. If 
transport is a problem, a lift will be arranged for you from UCT to Tygerberg Hospital. During 
the scan, you will be asked to perform various versions of the IAT, which will enable the 
investigators to determine your brain function. Performing the IAT is relatively simple and 
basically involves sorting stimuli through button presses with either your right or left index 
fingers. You will be allowed to practice the task first outside of the scanner to become familiar 
with the instructions. In addition, during the scan some physiological sensors will be attached to 
your body to measure your heart rate during the tasks. It is estimated that the entire procedure, 
from once you arrive at the imaging centre (CUBIC) until when you leave, will not exceed 
roughly 2hours.   
As the scan is done n a relatively confined space, occasionally people become anxious. 
This does not happen often, and if you feel anxious, we will spend time allowing you to get used 
to the surroundings. The scan will require you to lie on your back on a table that will move into 
the scanning machine for the 40 minutes it will take for the scan. During this time you will be 
able to rest between different IATs. You will also be able to talk to the study doctor/assistant at 
all times during the scan. The scan is a safe procedure if you have been screened correctly for the 
presence of any magnetic material on or inside you such as pace-makers, surgical clips and metal 
objects in the eyes. When the machine performs scans, you will hear loud banging noises, but 
you will be clearly warned when this will take place. At this time you will feel nothing and the 
noise is not harmful to you in any way. To minimise the possible discomfort associated with this, 
we will give you some soft earplugs to put in and we will also give you earphones to wear during 
the scan. 
After the experimental session is over, you will be informed in detail about the design of 
the study and the research questions we hope to answer. You will also have the opportunity to 













Safety and Metal Objects:  The MRI scanner is a powerful magnet.  Because metal objects are 
strongly attracted to the magnet, any metal objects you are carrying or wearing must be removed 
prior to the MRI scan to avoid potentially severe injury 
 
Unexpected Findings: In rare cases, researchers discover unexpected findings related to a 
participant‟s MRI scan in which case the scan is referred to a radiologist for further analysis.   
Further tests may be recommended in order to determine the nature and significance of the 
unexpected finding, in which case that participant will be referred to a General Practitioner of 
their choosing. 
 
Ongoing disclosure of potential harms:  If new findings about the potential harms of the MRI 
technique become available during the time of the study, the researcher will inform you. 
 
Discomfort Associated with the Study 
 
There are only low or minimal risks associated with your participati n in this study. If you feel 
tired at any point in either of the visits, you should please ask the principal investigator for a rest. 
If for some reason you are unable to complete a visit on a particular day we may reschedule to 
complete the assessments at another time. If you wish to discuss the information above or any 
discomforts you may experience, you may ask questions now or call the Principal Investigator 




There may be no direct benefits to you for participating in this study.  However, you will be 
making an important contribution to research that may benefit others in the future.  This research 
will allow us to gather information about the performance of healthy adults on the administered 
tests.   
 
Compensation for Study Participation 
 
You will receive financial compensation of R150 for any cost incurred in attending the 





Your participation is regarded as strictly confidential.  The results of the study will be published 
in the professional literature and form part of a larger PhD thesis, but your identity will not be 
revealed at any time to people outside of the study team.  
                                     
The right to ask questions and withdraw from the study 
 
You have the right to ask questions at any time about any aspect of the study. If you have any 












Melike Fourie: Tel (24hr contact number): 083-781 6021 
Dr Kevin Thomas: Tel (office hours):    021-650-4608 
Prof Ernesta Meintjes Tel (office hours):   021-406 6547 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Chairperson of the Research Ethics Committee, Prof Marc Blockman (Tel: 021-406-6496). 
 
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary.  You have the right to withdraw at any time. 
If you decide to withdraw from the study, it will not jeopardize you or any future treatment you 
may require in any way. 
 
You are entitled to a signed copy of this document. 
 
 
If you agree to take part, please complete the following section.   
 
I (name)………………………………………………. have been invited to take part in the above 
research project entitled Functional brain imaging of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in 
healthy low-prejudice individuals.  
The principal investigator/study doctor has explained the details of the study to me and I 
understand what they have said to me. 
I also know that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time if I am unhappy. 
By writing my name below, I voluntary agree to take part in this research project.  I confirm that 
I have not been forced in any way or by anyone to take part. 
 
________________________ 
Name of Participant (printed) 
 
________________________     _______________  
Signature of Participant      Dated 
 
 
Declaration by investigator: 
 
I (name) ……………………………………………..……… declare that: 
 
I explained the information in this document to ……………………………………… 
I encouraged him/her to ask questions and took adequate time to answer them. 
I am satisfied that he/she adequately understand all aspects of the research, as discussed above. 
 
Signed at (place) ......................…........…………….. on (date) …………....………... 
 
_____________________   












Appendix I: Affective Ratings of fMRI IAT Stimuli 
The primary aim of this study was to obtain affective ratings for all stimuli that were 
selected to be programmed as part of the fMRI protocol. For the fMRI study, six novel IATs 
were necessary, each consisting of various images and attributes as well as pre-programmed 
response feedback.  Although emotion elicitation was entirely dependent on the response 
feedback, rather than the actual IAT stimuli, it was nonetheless important that IAT stimuli not 
elicit any strong emotions (either positive or negative) with the potential to interfere with desired 
emotional responses. By obtaining psychometric properties of all picture stimuli used, I aimed to 
validate their use in the fMRI study. 
To ensure that judgments for my target pictures were sufficiently neutral, they were 
compared to both positive and negative emotional pictures from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). The IAPS is a normative set of colour 
images specifically developed for emotion and attention research; the pictures in the set cover a 
wide variety of semantic categories. Each picture in this set had been standardized through 
ratings obtained from hundreds of participants using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Lang, 
1980). This affective rating scale records emotional assessments of stimuli in three dimensions, 
based on Osgood‟s factor analysis of the semantic differential scales (Osgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum, 1957). The two principle dimensions are affective valence and arousal. A third 
dimension, dominance or control, typically explains a smaller amount of the variance in affective 
ratings. By using the same normative rating procedure that was used for the IAPS, I was able to 
compare ratings obtained for my picture set to that of the established normative picture set. In 




Forty-three female participants between the ages of 18 and 25 years (M = 19.87, SD = 
2.38) were recruited from the UCT undergraduate population through the Department of 
Psychology‟s Student Research Participation Program. All received course credit in exchange for 












follow instructions; the final sample thus consisted of 41 participants.   
Stimuli  
Six IATs were developed for the three fMRI stimulus conditions: Neutral, Positive, and 
Negative. Each of these IATs involved two contrasted concepts (e.g., Black-White, or 
homosexual-heterosexual). Based on Nosek and colleagues‟ (2005) findings and 
recommendations in constructing IATs, I decided to use four stimulus items per concept (i.e., 8 
images for each IAT). A total of 48 pictures were therefore sourced from the Internet, as well as 
from the NimStim set of facial expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). The picture set ranged 
across topics for the 6 different IATs, namely facial hair, glasses, race, disability, sexuality and 
religion.  
Human faces were employed as a common denominator in all IATs to avoid fMRI 
artifact due to facial recognition in some, but not in other, conditions (Kanwisher, McDermott, & 
Chun, 1997; Rotshtein, Henson, Treves, Driver, & Dolan, 2005). Faces were specifically 
selected to appear as close to neutral in expression as possible, and were matched across IAT 
categories for attractiveness and age. To promote uniformity among the different IAT conditions, 
and to prevent gender biases from interfering with participant responses, all selected stimuli were 
male where possible (only two images included females, both as part of a heterosexual couple in 
the sexuality IAT). Therefore, the facial hair IAT featured male faces with or without beards or 
mustaches; the glasses IAT featured male faces with or without spectacles; the race IAT featured 
Black and White male faces; the disability IAT featured images and symbols of disabled and 
healthy/normal males; the sexuality IAT featured images and symbols of heterosexual couples 
and homosexual male couples; and the religion IAT featured images and symbols of Jewish 
males, and males practicing other religions including Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism.  
For comparison purposes, 10 positively- and 10 negatively-valenced pictures were 
selected from the IAPS. The average valence, arousal, and dominance values for these stimuli, 
based on previous SAM ratings by female participants (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005), are 












Table I1  
IAPS Stimuli Normative Ratings of Valence, Arousal, and Dominance: Female Subjects 
Description Picture No. 
Valence 
 Mean (SD) 
Arousal 
 Mean (SD) 
Dominance 
 Mean (SD) 
     
Practice Items     
1 Cow  1670 5.88 (1.84) 3.52 (2.05) 5.40 (1.74) 
2 Fire  9921 1.58 (1.06) 6.87 (1.94) 3.56 (1.60) 
3 Woman  2030 6.02 (1.48) 3.08 (1.72) 5.31 (1.59) 
     Positive Items     
1. Women  1340 7.63 (1.52) 5.25 (2.24) 5.85 (1.75) 
2. Puppies  1710 8.59 (0.99) 5.31 (2.54) 6.50 (2.09) 
3. Bunnies  1750 8.59 (0.75) 4.02 (2.40) 6.28 (2.01) 
4. Porpoise  1920 7.94 (1.61) 4.31 (2.57) 6.56 (2.05) 
5. Mickey  1999 7.68 (1.52) 5.02 (2.48) 6.85 (2.00) 
6. Baby  2040 8.74 (0.64) 4.97 (2.85) 7.32 (1.91) 
7. Baby  2070 8.50 (1.28) 4.84 (2.97) 7.44 (1.96) 
8. Giraffes  1601 7.17 (1.50) 4.02 (1.97) 6.51 (1.89) 
9. Adult  2010 6.77 (1.86) 3.74 (2.14) 5.85 (1.77) 
10.  Adult  2000 7.10 (1.62) 3.72 (2.31) 6.10 (1.57) 
Average  7.87 (0.71) 4.52 (0.62) 6.53 (0.55) 
     Negative Items     
1. Snake  1019 3.46 (2.03) 6.06 (1.83) 4.03 (2.10) 
2. Spider  1201 2.93 (1.81) 6.87 (2.09) 3.82 (2.26) 
3. PitBull  1300 3.41 (1.63) 6.70 (2.04) 3.34 (2.27) 
4. Shark  1930 3.56 (1.90) 6.71 (1.91) 2.93 (1.91) 
5. Baby  2053 2.17 (1.90) 5.83 (2.38) 3.40 (2.25) 
6. Heroin  9102 3.03 (1.75) 5.13 (2.53) 4.35 (2.42) 
7. Cemetery  9220 1.86 (1.46) 4.16 (1.84) 3.00 (1.72) 
8. Garbage  9290 2.76 (1.44) 4.44 (2.01) 5.11 (2.08) 
9. Dental Exam  9582 4.24 (2.64) 5.38 (2.36) 4.44 (2.32) 
10.  Mutilation  9253 1.60 (0.99) 5.65 (2.58) 3.48 (2.10) 
Average  2.90 (0.83) 5.69 (0.94) 3.79 (0.70) 
     
Note. These data were taken from the Instruction Manual for the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005). 














Affective Rating Scale 
The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Lang, 1980) is a nonverbal self-report scale that 
provides a relatively quick and easy method for obtaining affective assessments of picture 
stimuli. In my study, a paper-and-pen version of the SAM was employed, which makes use of 
graphic figures to depict the three main affective dimensions of pleasure (or valence), arousal 
and dominance (see Figure I1).  
The pleasure dimension of SAM ranges from a happy cheerful manikin to a sad and 
unhappy one, while the arousal dimension ranges from an excited wide-eyed manikin to one that 
appears sleepy and with closed eyes. The dominance scale represents changes in control, and 
ranges from a very small manikin (representing a feeling of being controlled or submissive), to a 
very large manikin (representing a feeling of being in control or powerful). For each of these 
dimensions, respondents are required to mark their assessment of a stimulus by placing an „X‟ 
over any of the five manikins of a dimension, or between any two to make a more finely graded 
rating. The SAM therefore comprises a 9-point rating scale, such that 9 signifies a high rating on 
each dimension (i.e., high pleasure, high arousal, and high dominance), and 1 signifies a low 
rating on each dimension (i.e., low pleasure, low arousal, and low dominance). (In order to 
obtain these ratings, the pleasure and arousal scales have to be reversed-scored.) 
Design and Analysis 
Participants were run in groups of two in two separate venues. The 68 pictures that were 
rated were arranged in a semi-random sequence in Microsoft PowerPoint, with the constraint that 
no more than 2 pictures from the same stimulus condition were presented consecutively. Pictures 
were displayed for 5 s on a 13 inch computer monitor, situated approximately 0.5 m from the 
participant. Four different picture orders were created to ensure that the position of a particular 
image was counterbalanced within the series of pictures. Every 5
th
 participant therefore viewed 
the same sequence of images. The size of each image on screen was roughly 10 cm x 12 cm, 
which was similar to the final dimensions used for stimuli in the fMRI protocol.  
The three dimensions of SAM (i.e., pleasure, arousal, and dominance) served as the 
dependent measures in data analysis. For all repeated-measures analyses, the multivariate test 















Figure I1. The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) answer sheet.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I • • • • • • • I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
I~ s ~TltA~~rT~ M ~I 
rn.~ "" ~ :;: "" "" \l.!I, D . tI · b- tj· bi tl· bi tl · Eij; 
D ~tl .&~tj .b~d .tJ!d.Ei!; 
D ~tl·b~tj .b~tl ·tJ!tl · tJ~ 
D ~tl .b7tl .tJ:!'d .tJ!tl . tJ!; 
D ~tl ·tJ7tl ·tl~tl ·tJ!tl · tl!; 
D ~tl ·&~tl ·tl~tl ·tJ!tl ·tl!; 
D ~tl ·b7tl .tl:!'d .tJ!tl .tl!; 
D ~tl ·tl7a ·tl';tl ·tJl'd ·tl!; 
D ~tl .tl';d.tl~tl .tJ!tl .tl!; 
D ~tl ·tl7d ·tl:!'tl ·tJ!d ·tl!; 
• • • . • • • 
, P art icipant No_ ______ I 
Session No _ _ Date____ I 
Se' ____ A,e ___ _ 
· • • 
[!] · • • 
[!] • · • 
[!] <j" • · • 














On arrival, the purpose of the study was explained, and informed consent and 
biographical details were obtained from each participant. The SAM rating procedure, which was 
similar to the normative rating procedure of the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005), was then thoroughly 
explained to each participant by demonstrating ratings in an answer booklet.  
In short, the pleasure dimension was explained to participants as ranging from happy 
(smiling manikin) to unhappy (frowning manikin). They were told that the one end of the scale 
should be selected (by placing an “X” over the figure) when one feels happy, pleased or satisfied, 
while the other end of the scale should be selected when one feels unhappy, annoyed or 
unsatisfied. They were also told that intermediate feelings of pleasure should be indicated by 
selecting manikins between the two ends, while the manikin in the middle of the scale should be 
selected if one feels completely neutral, i.e., neither happy nor sad. The arousal dimension was 
explained as ranging from feeling excited (manikin with eyes wide open) to calm (manikin with 
eyes closed). At one end of this scale one feels aroused, stimulated or jittery, while at the other 
end one feels completely relaxed, calm or dull. Participants were again encouraged to select 
figures in-between for more finely graded ratings that described their feelings more accurately. 
Finally, the dominance scale was explained as ranging from controlled (small manikin) to in-
control (large manikin). Participants were told that at one end of this scale one feels submissive, 
influenced or controlled, while at the other end of the scale one feels dominant, autonomous or 
in-control. Participants were instructed to rate pictures as honestly as possible and that the goal 
of the study was to determine how each picture made them feel while viewing it. 
Following these instructions, participants viewed and rated three practice pictures, as in 
the IAPS normative procedure (see Table I1). The purpose of the practice pictures were to ensure 
that all instructions were understood correctly and to help anchor the emotional rating scales. A 
positive, negative, and neutral image that was not used in the study, were thus presented. At this 
stage participants were allowed to ask questions of the experimenter (either myself or a research 
assistant). Once the experimenter was satisfied that all rating instructions were understood, the 
experimental session commenced.  
Each participant was seated in front of a computer monitor and instructed to view each 
picture for the entire time it was screened (5 s), and to then make their ratings of all three 











pushing the „down‟ arrow on the keyboard. Each picture was numbered and corresponded with a 
particular number in the answer booklet to avoid confusion. Following the presentation of the 
last picture, answer booklets were collected and participants were debriefed. 
Results 
Participant Demographics 
The sample of participants (N = 41) who successfully completed all rating procedures 
could be divided into the following racial demographic groups:  White (61%); Coloured (22%); 
Black (9.7%); and Asian/Indian (7.3%). Because I only intended to scan White participants in 
the fMRI study, it was important to check for demographic group differences in affective ratings 
that may cause the data to be unrepresentative of my target sample. Toward this purpose, the 
group was broadly divided into White (n = 25) and Other (n = 16) participants. I tested for 
differences in SAM ratings between these groups by performing independent-samples t-tests on 
the pleasure, arousal, and dominance dimensions of the positive and negative IAPS picture 
stimuli (Table I2). None of these analyses reached significance (ps > .2), although there was a 
slight tendency for White participants to experience higher arousal than Other participants for the 
negative IAPS stimuli (p = .09).   
 
Table I2  
Pleasure, Arousal, and Dominance Values for IAPS Stimuli, as Rated by Other (n = 16) and 
White (n = 25) Participant Groups 
 
Pleasure/Valence 
 Mean (SD) 
Arousal 
 Mean (SD) 
Dominance 
 Mean (SD) 
    
IAPS Positive:  Other  7.49 (0.75) 6.53 (1.14) 6.74 (1.14) 
White 7.43 (0.52) 6.19 (1.00) 6.35 (0.92) 
IAPS Negative: Other  2.37 (0.88) 5.69 (1.40) 2.82 (1.22) 
White 2.19 (0.60) 6.38 (1.10) 2.37 (1.17) 
    
 
Because no significant differences existed between White and Other participant groups 
on measures of pleasure, arousal, or dominance, this demographic grouping was not employed in 













Ratings of Valence, Arousal, and Dominance 
The means and standard deviations of affective ratings for all picture stimuli can be seen 
in Table I3. The results are presented according to picture group classification: IAPS Positive, 
IAPS Negative, IAT Positive, IAT Negative, and IAT Neutral. Because SAM records affect on a 
9-point rating scale for each dimension, a rating of 5 is considered neutral. 
From the data it is evident that participants rated the positive IAPS pictures as fairly 
pleasant, while the negative IAPS pictures were consistently rated as more negative or 
unpleasant. The IAPS values obtained in this study were furthermore very similar in valence to 
the normative averages for these pictures, while all ratings were slightly higher in terms of 
arousal values (see Table I3). By comparison, the ratings for stimuli from the different IAT 
stimulus conditions (i.e., Positive, Negative, and Neutral) were clustered around 5 for all three 
affective dimensions, and could therefore be regarded as fairly neutral. 
 
Table I3  
Affective Ratings for the Different Stimulus Groups, Assessed With the Self-Assessment Manikin 
Stimulus group Pleasure/Valence 
 Mean (SD) 
Arousal 
 Mean (SD) 
Dominance 
 Mean (SD) 
    
IAPS Positive (n = 10) 7.45 (0.61) 6.32 (1.06) 6.50 (1.02) 
Normative values 7.87 (0.71) 4.52 (0.62) 6.53 (0.55) 
IAPS Negative (n = 10) 2.26 (0.72) 6.11 (1.26) 2.55 (1.20) 
Normative values 2.90 (0.83) 5.69 (0.94) 3.79 (0.70) 
IAT Positive (n = 16) 5.79 (0.74) 5.38 (0.86) 5.53 (1.06) 
IAT Negative (n = 16) 4.88 (0.44) 5.02 (0.77) 5.27 (1.02) 
IAT Neutral (n = 16) 5.15 (0.50) 5.09 (0.82) 5.42 (0.96) 
Note. Normative values reflect ratings for the selected IAPS stimuli, as taken from the IAPS 
Instruction Manual (Lang et al., 2005). 
Comparison of Positive IAPS, Negative IAPS, and IAT Stimuli 
To determine if there was an overall difference in affective ratings between the IAPS 
pictures and my IAT pictures, the three IAT stimulus conditions were clumped together (i.e., 











Positive, IAPS Negative, and IAT Together, were compared through one-way repeated measures 
analysis for valence, arousal, and dominance respectively (see Figure I2).  
 
 
Figure I2. Intensity ratings across the three affect dimensions for the IAPS Positive, IAPS 
Negative, and IAT Together stimuli. 
 
For valence ratings, the repeated-measures ANOVA was significant, F(2,39) = 448.55, p 
< .001, η
2
 = .96 (Pillay‟s trace).
11
 Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons detected statistically 
significant differences between IAPS and IAT stimuli: While IAPS Positive stimuli were 
significantly more pleasant than IAT Together stimuli (p < .001, r = .96), IAPS Negative stimuli 
were significantly more unpleasant than IAT Together stimuli (p < .001, r = .97). For arousal 
ratings, the repeated- measures ANOVA also detected statistically significant differences 
between groups, F(2,39) = 53.71, p < .001, η
2
 = .73 (Pillay‟s trace). Post-hoc Bonferroni 
comparisons indicated that IAT Together stimuli were significantly lower in arousal than IAPS 
Positive, as well as IAPS Negative stimuli (ps < .001, rs > .65), while the IAPS stimulus groups 
were of similar arousal values (p = 1.00). Lastly, the repeated-measures ANOVA for dominance 
                                                 
11
MANOVA test statistics are reported for each analysis, because Mauchly‟s test indicated that 












ratings was also statistically significant F(2,39) = 158.22, p < .001, η
2
 = .89 (Pillay‟s trace); with 
post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons indicating significant differences between all stimulus groups 
(p < .001 for all three comparisons).  
 When the means of the valence and arousal ratings for all 68 pictures were plotted in two-
dimensional affective space, a characteristic boomerang-shaped distribution for the stimuli could 
be detected (e.g., Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert et al., 2001; Lang et al., 1999, 2005)
12
. This shape 
can be attributed to the fact that stimuli judged as either very pleasant or very unpleasant are also 
usually more arousing than stimuli judged as more neutral. A graphic display of these data can 
be seen in Figure I3. The distribution clearly indicates that most IAT picture stimuli (with some 
exceptions) are centred at values of 5 for both valence and arousal dimensions.  
From these results it could be concluded that my IAT stimuli were significantly different 
from the IAPS stimuli, thus neither positive nor negative, and more neutral in terms of valence, 
arousal, and dominance.  
 
Figure I3. A two-dimensional plot of affective space, employing mean valence and arousal 
ratings of all 68 picture stimuli.  
                                                 
12Because the dominance rating typically explains a small amount of variance, this dimension 











Comparison of IAT Stimulus Conditions 
To determine more specifically whether differences existed between the different IAT 
stimulus conditions, IAT stimuli were again divided into their respective stimulus conditions, 
i.e., Neutral, Positive, and Negative. These groups were then compared through repeated- 





Figure I4. Affective intensity ratings for stimuli from the thee IAT stimulus conditions, i.e., 
Neutral, Positive, and Negative.  
 
The one-way repeated-measures ANOVA for valence was significant, F(2,39) = 28.73, p 
< .001, η
2
 = .60 (Pillai‟s trace), as was a similar analysis for arousal F(2,39) = 4.20, p < .05, η
2
 = 
.18 (Pillai‟s trace). Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons indicated significant differences between 
IAT conditions for valence: IAT Positive stimuli were rated as significantly more pleasant than 
IAT Neutral (p < .001, r = .65), as well as IAT Negative stimuli (p < .001, r = .76), while IAT 
Neutral stimuli were also significantly more pleasant than IAT Negative stimuli (p < .01, r = 
.53). In terms of arousal, Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons indicated that the only significant 
difference existed between IAT Positive and IAT Negative stimuli, such that IAT Positive 
                                                 












stimuli were rated as more arousing than IAT Negative stimuli (p < .05, r = .42). The one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA for dominance between IAT stimulus conditions was not 
statistically significant (p = .07, η
2
 = .07). 
These results indicate that significant differences existed in terms of valence, and to a 
lesser extent arousal, between different IAT stimulus conditions. It should be noted, however, 
that IAT Positive stimuli were still significantly less pleasant than IAPS Positive stimuli, t(40) = 
11.39, p < .001, r = .87, while IAT Negative stimuli were still significantly less unpleasant than 
IAPS Negative stimuli, t(40) = -21.32, p < .001, r = .96.  
Discussion 
The rationale for the current study was to determine whether stimuli selected for the 
various IAT stimulus conditions were suitable for use in the fMRI study. To this end, IAT 
stimuli had to be sufficiently neutral in terms of valence and arousal values so as to not elicit any 
unwanted emotional reactions during the imaging procedure. IAT stimuli, as well as positive and 
negative images from the IAPS, were consequently rated on measures of pleasure, arousal, and 
dominance using a tool commonly used in emotional assessment studies, namely the Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM). At a glance, the SAM ratings for my IAT stimuli were fairly 
neutral across all affective dimensions; however, a more detailed discussion of results is 
presented below. 
 Because no significant differences existed between participants‟ emotion ratings across 
different racial demographic groupings, it was considered acceptable to analyze data of all 
participants together. IAT stimuli were then compared as a group (i.e., Positive, Negative, and 
Neutral stimulus conditions clumped together) to both positive and negative IAPS stimuli. 
Results indicated that positive IAPS stimuli were rated as significantly more pleasant and 
arousing than IAT stimuli, whereas negative IAPS stimuli were rated as significantly more 
unpleasant and arousing than IAT stimuli. IAT stimuli were also rated as significantly more 
neutral than IAPS stimuli in terms of dominance. These results are consistent with a plot of all 
stimuli in two-dimensional affective space based on mean valence and arousal ratings: Whereas 
IAPS pictures tended to cluster in the quadrants of emotional space depicting high arousal and 
high positive or negative valence (i.e., pleasant and unpleasant material), IAT stimuli were 











 Comparison of IAT stimulus conditions with each other, however, resulted in significant 
differences. The dimension that distinguished IAT conditions most significantly was valence: 
IAT Positive stimuli were rated as more pleasant than IAT Neutral and IAT Negative stimuli, 
while IAT Negative stimuli were rated as more unpleasant than IAT Neutral stimuli. Although 
these differences were statistically significant, it is evident when one inspects Figure I3 that there 
is little practical significance in these findings – stimuli from all IAT conditions were clustered 
around relatively neutral valence values. Moreover, there were significant differences between 
the IAT Positive stimuli and the IAPS Positive stimuli in terms of valence, and similarly, 
between the IAT Negative stimuli and the IAPS Negative stimuli. Taken together, the IAT 
stimuli cannot be regarded as positive or negative per se, but only as positive or negative in 
relation to each other.  
One may ask, however, how these differences in valence between different IAT stimulus 
conditions were brought about; why did IAT Positive pictures appear more pleasant and IAT 
Negative pictures appear more unpleasant? A closer inspection of specific valence ratings for 
each image provided some answers. In both the IAT Positive and Negative conditions, it 
appeared that certain images (about 4 per condition) were consistently rated as more pleasant or 
unpleasant, respectively. These images depicted people with disability and some Black 
individuals in the IAT Negative condition, and heterosexual couples and some religious symbols 
in the IAT Positive condition (see Figure I5). Participants therefore experienced any images or 
symbols illustrating disability as unpleasant, and there was also a tendency to rate Black faces as 
more negative than White faces, probably because the majority of participants were White 
themselves. Participants also rated any image illustrating heterosexual couples as high in 
pleasure, while the cross (the symbol for Christianity) was also consistently rated above average 
in terms of pleasure. Because of the nature of the IAT topics that were selected for the IAT 
Negative and Positive conditions (i.e., disability, race, sexuality, and religion), it was not feasible 
to find more suitable or neutral stimuli depicting the same subject matter than the images already 
employed.  
The images in the IAT Neutral condition that were rated as either too pleasant (n = 2), or 
unpleasant (n = 2), were easier to replace because all stimuli consisted of male faces (topics for 
the Neutral condition included facial hair and glasses). It was essential that the IAT Neutral 












analysis. Images that were rated as too pleasant (e.g., images of more handsome males) or 
unpleasant (e.g., images of unfriendly males) were therefore substituted with more average-




Figure I5. Examples of a) Negative b) Positive and c) Neutral IAT stimuli. Pictures in a) were 
rated below 4 on the SAM Pleasure scale (except the Black face that was rated between 4 and 5), 
while pictures in b) were rated above 6 on the SAM Pleasure scale. Pictures in c) were rated as 
fairly neutral. 
 
In terms of arousal ratings, none of the stimuli across different IAT conditions were 
regarded as particularly arousing. Although IAT Positive stimuli were statistically more arousing 
than IAT Negative stimuli, the actual differences in mean arousal values between these 
conditions were small, ranging from 5.02 to 5.38 (see Table I3). Moreover, none of the above-











unpleasant were associated with high levels of arousal. The finding of consistently neutral 
arousal values across experimental conditions was reassuring, especially in light of the fact that 
affective arousal, and not valence, has been demonstrated to be most strongly related to the 
degree of activation of the appetitive and defensive emotional motivation systems (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Cuthbert et al., 2001). In Bradley et al.‟s experiment, pleasant as well as unpleasant 
pictures of low arousal were similar to neutral pictures in terms of the magnitude of 
physiological responses.  
Given the data and results presented above, I thus felt confident that the selected IAT 














Appendix J: IAT Result Sentences 
Readability statistics were calculated for IAT result sentences in all stimulus conditions 
(i.e., Neutral, Positive, and Negative) to ensure that there were no discrepancies in the level of 
difficulty between conditions. Statistics calculated included the Flesch Reading Ease score and 
the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score. Both statistics rate text on a 1-100 point scale based on 
the same core values, namely word length and sentence length. They have, however, different 
weighting factors that lead to a rough inverse relationship between the two scores. Whereas it is 
easier to understand a document the higher the Flesch Reading Ease score is (standard 
documents are usually 60 to 70); the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level formula translates the score to 
a U.S. school grade level. A score of 8.0, for example, means that the text would be easily 
comprehensible to an eighth grader.  
To rule out the possibility of readability differences between experimental conditions, I 
compared the readability statistics of the Neutral, Positive, and Negative conditions using non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests. No differences emerged for the Flesch Reading Ease score (p < 
.22) or the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score (p < .22). The various stimulus conditions were 
thus of similar difficulty in terms of readability. Tables J1-J3 present the actual result sentences 













fMRI Result Sentences Following Each IAT for the Neutral Stimulus Condition 
 Result 1 Result 2 Result 3 Stats 
Facial Hair 
IAT 
    
 Your data suggest 
little to no 
automatic 
preference for 
people with facial 
hair compared to 
people without 
facial hair 




Extended Feedback:  
 
Generally, people with no preference for 
people with or without facial hair: 
 
 
Variant 1:   » Feel neutral about facial hair on other 
individuals. 
» Don‟t know exactly how often 
people shave. 
» Often won‟t recall whether 






Count = 26 
FRE = 51.6 
FKG = 8.2 
Variant 2:   » Feel neutral about cleanly shaved 
people. 
» Don‟t know a tremendous amount 
about different facial hair styles. 
» Often will not remember if someone 




Count = 26 
FRE = 54.8 
FKG = 7.7 
Glasses 
IAT 
    
 Your data suggest 
little to no 
automatic 
preference for 
people with glasses 
compared to people 
without glasses. 




Extended Feedback:  
 
Generally, people with no preference for 
people with or without glasses: 
 
 
Variant 1:   » Feel neutral about people who 
regularly wear glasses. 
» Won‟t always notice if someone 
changes their glasses. 
» Often will not recall whether 




Count = 26 
FRE = 51.6 
FKG = 8.2 
Variant 2:   » Feel neutral about people who don‟t 
wear glasses. 
» Are unconcerned about friends 
wearing glasses or not. 
» Will fail to remember the specific 




Count = 26 
FRE = 54.8 
FKG = 7.7 















Table J2  
fMRI Result Sentences Following Each IAT for the Positive Stimulus Condition 
 Result 1 Result 2 Result 3 Stats 
Sexuality 
IAT 
    





to Gay people. 
 





Extended Feedback:  
 
Generally, people with no automatic 




Variant 1:   » Treat all gay people with integrity  
and respect. 
» Believe that stereotyping a gay  
person is wrong.  
» Value internal qualities of a person  




Count = 27 
FRE = 47.3 
FKG = 8.8 
Variant 2:   » Try to be unbiased and positive  
toward gay people. 
» Will react positively to a homosexual  
person in company. 
» Are not judgmental towards people 




Count = 26 
FRE = 51.6 
FKG = 8.2 
Religion 
IAT 
    












Extended Feedback:  
 
Generally, people with no automatic 




Variant 1:   » Do not have prejudiced ideas about 
Jewish individuals. 
» Have respect for other people and 
their spiritual values. 
» Believe that all people should have 




Count = 26 
FRE = 51.6 
FKG = 8.2 
Variant 2:   » Do not have any disregard for Jewish 
people. 
» Judge people by their personal 
qualities rather than religion. 
» Believe strongly in the human rights 




Count = 26 
FRE = 51.6 
FKG = 8.2 

















fMRI Result Sentences Following Each IAT for the Negative Stimulus Condition 
 Result 1 Result 2 Result 3 Stats 
Race 
IAT 
    




White compared to 
Black people. 





Extended Feedback:  
 
Generally, people with an automatic 




Variant 1:   » Are more afraid of Black people than 
White people. 
» Can‟t help having stereotypical 
thoughts about Black people. 
» Think Black people are generally 




Count = 27 
FRE = 53.5 
FKG = 8.0 
Variant 2:   » Think Black people in authority are 
often corrupt. 
» Regard Black people as more lazy 
than White people. 
» Think White professionals are often 






Count = 27 
FRE = 53.5 
FKG = 8.0 
Disability 
IAT 
    




Abled compared to 
Disabled people. 





Extended Feedback:  
 
Generally, people with an automatic 




Variant 1:   » Attach high value to things like IQ 
and physical appearance. 
» Think they are better than mentally 
disabled people. 
» Prefer spending time with abled 




Count = 27 
FRE = 53.5 
FKG = 8.0 
Variant 2:   » Are sometimes a bit awkward around 
disabled people. 
» Feel that disabled people use up lots 
of public resources. 
» Don‟t fully understand the emotional 




Count = 27 
FRE = 47.3  
FKG = 8.8 
Note. Count = word count; FRE = Flesch Reading Ease score; FKG = Flesch-Kincaid Grade 
score 
 
